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I f  the theory fails in the test it is normally not the theory that is in danger but the 
researcher, because in normal scientific practice not the theory but the researcher is 
tested.
(After H. Koningsveld 1980)
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Abstract
An academic consensus seems to be that investments in sports events can 
hardly ever be defended on economic grounds, and that the evidence for their 
contribution to the promotional objectives of the host cities is not solid. The aim 
of this thesis is to apply a methodology for evaluating major sports events to 
the European Football Championship 2000, in short Euro 2000. This event was 
organized by Belgium and the Netherlands, but this evaluation concerns only 
the Netherlands. The methodology is a synthesis of economic impact analysis 
and cost benefit analysis (CBA). The CBA by multiple accounts introduced in 
this thesis is intended as a structuring device for public discussion.
Data was collected in three different ways: from visitors to this event by face-to- 
face interviews; from the population in five European countries by telephone 
interviews before and after the event; and from the Dutch population in the 
host cities and the rest of the country, also by telephone surveys. The net total 
sample consisted of 4,000 interviews.
The methodology of multiple accounts establishes an explicit distinction 
between private and public benefits.
The largest financial profit was made by Uefa, estimated at €81 million.
For the Dutch business community as a whole, the benefits outweighed the 
costs. Some branches of industry experienced a local decline in demand, but 
this was probably compensated by other branches or regions. These results 
confirm the observation in the literature that there are substantial 'crowding- 
out' effects on visitor patterns in host cities during major sports events. Now, as 
a result of this present research, it can be added that a substantial part of these 
effects is on domestic visits and should be discounted as economic impact at the 
national level. Some branches experienced a boom or decline, which was not
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specifically related to hosting Euro 2000, but is rather typical for any 
international football championship or sports event. The real winners were: the 
accommodation sector (especially the campsites), and catering (cafes, fast-food) 
sectors in the host cities. The results for the hotel sector are less unequivocal 
because of the crowding-out effects of Euro 2000 on foreign tourists.
For the public sector (the aggregated accounts of central and local government), 
the financial benefits have outweighed the costs. For an evaluation of the public 
costs and benefits, the external effects are also of relevance. The most 
frequently-mentioned positive external benefit is the increased awareness of the 
Netherlands in other countries. Surveys on image and awareness in foreign 
countries have confirmed these effects, but only to a modest extent. 
Nevertheless, it was possible to establish a relationship between the effects in 
specific countries and the performance of their national team.
It seems, therefore, that the earlier conclusions, derived from research on 
professional team sports in the United States, are sometimes too easily stretched 
to include major sports events. This misses two points. First, sports events 
might be undertaken at a low public cost. Such events might be organized using 
existing venues and thus would involve little public investment. Second, 
international sports events, by their very nature, bring additional expenditures 
to a city and country, whereas in the case of a sports franchise most of the 
economic effects are mainly of a switching nature.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background of the research
On 14 July 1995 the European Federation of Football Associations, Uefa, announced 
an unusual decision concerning the organization of a future European Football 
(Soccer) Championship. For the first time in history, the organization of a major 
sports event was in the hands of two countries. From 10 June to 2 July 2000, the 
Netherlands and Belgium would be the host countries for the final round of the 
European Football Championship 2000, in short Euro 2000.
This championship is among the largest sports events in the world, with around 1.2 
million spectators coming to the matches, and a cumulative TV audience of around 7 
billion (Solberg and Gratton 2000).
Although the lobbying behind the scenes was shrouded in secrecy, it is clear that the 
KNVB and KBVB (respectively, the Dutch and Belgian Football Association) had 
done some homework beforehand. In 1992 a Dutch research institute, the 
Netherlands Economic Institute (NEI), had claimed in a report that substantial 
benefits would flow to the Netherlands from hosting the event. This research had 
been commissioned by the KNVB to convince the authorities of the benefits of the 
event. However, a counter study, commissioned by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
challenged NEI's conclusions (NRIT1992).
This indicates that there was some discussion at policy level on the economic 
significance, but there had not been much public discussion about the consequences 
of the candidacy. If anything, the press and public opinion were rather critical 
towards the event, focusing on how much it would cost, and the threat of 
hooliganism (see Annex E for an overview of media voices). Probably because of this 
critical attitude, and the potential damage to the image of the Netherlands if things 
went wrong, the Dutch government and other authorities asked a group of research
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institutes to monitor the organizational and financial efforts and consequences of the 
tournament.1
After December 1999, the discussion on social and economic impacts really came to 
life. The cause was a prognosis based on a different methodology, which resulted in 
much lower figures than the original 1994 impact study (Meerwaarde 2000). The 
discussion between the various economic institutes on the economic impact (and 
costs and benefits) was on the front pages of the newspapers and TV news in early
2000.2 Suddenly the methodology of economic evaluation seemed to be of more than 
academic importance.
This course of events is quite typical for a major sports event. Advocates of an event 
will stress the benefits that it will bring to the host city and the country. This might 
be in the form of financial benefits, such as the income earned by firms in the catering 
and accommodation industry, as well as intangible benefits, such as the promotion of 
the city or country. To prove their point, those in favour of the event will often 
initiate an economic impact study (ElA). Opponents will stress the nuisance and risks 
of hooliganism.
From a discussion on benefits and nuisance, it is a small step to a cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA). The CBA and El A are thus two kinds of economic research that seem 
to grow more or less naturally out of the public debate on major events. In itself, a 
public debate provoking solid argumentation (impact study, cost-benefit) should be 
welcomed from both a democratic and an academic point of view. Economic research 
might prove its social value by helping to reveal opportunities and threats and 
contribute to better-structured and informed debate (Hall 1992). However, the 
economics discipline has a mixed record in terms of its usefulness as a policy tool. 
Often different economic researchers come to vastly different conclusions concerning 
the net benefits of public expenditures. This thesis hopes to contribute to a more
1 The authorities included the Ministries of Economic Affairs, of Health, Welfare and Sports, of 
Internal Affairs, the four host cities (Amsterdam, Arnhem, Eindhoven and Rotterdam), and the 
Netherlands Board of Tourism (NBT).
2 See annex E, table E.l.
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fruitful discussion by investigating the domains and restrictions of specific economic 
arguments.
The popularity of sports events
Major sports events like Euro 2000 have become a very valued commodity among 
larger cities worldwide, leading to fierce bid competitions. This has not always been 
the case. The Olympic Games of 1972 in Munich and of 1976 in Montreal led to large 
losses for the public sector. In 1976 the City of Denver withdrew its offer to host the 
(Winter) Games owing to the lack of support among the residents (Ritchie and Lyons 
1987). The turnaround was achieved by the Los Angeles Games in 1984, which were 
completely privately financed and a financial and commercial success (Preuss 2000).
The success of specific international sports events demonstrated the potential 
positive impact of an event on the image of a city. Often cited examples, besides Los 
Angeles in 1984, are Barcelona in 1992 and Sydney in 2000 (Botella 1995, Van den 
Berg et al. 2000, Gratton and Taylor 2001).3 Investments in sports stadiums and 
events have become a part of a long-term re-imaging strategy in Western cities as 
diverse as Los Angeles, Sydney, Baltimore, Barcelona, Sheffield, Manchester, 
Rotterdam and Turin (Kotler et al. 1993, Hamilton and Kahn 1997, Dobson 2000, Van 
den Berg et al. 2000, Hall 2001, Gratton and Taylor 2001). From the 1970s on many of 
these cities faced a decline of their economic base, as industrial production shifted to 
lower income countries. A strategy of diversification and reorientation towards 
other, leisure-oriented, functions is therefore part of an intended "city renaissance' 
and place marketing strategy (Kotler et al. 1993). Another common feature of these 
cities is that they are often 'challengers' to the capital city (Henry and Gratton 2001).
Often industrial cities suffering economic stagnation cannot fall back on a strong 
culture and arts sector. A historical and attractive city centre might be lacking as 
well, because of the relatively short history of many industrial cities, at least as major
3 Smith (2001) also mentions Barcelona as a success story, but only with reference to its football 
stadium and not to the hosting of the Games.
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cities. An important problem for many industrial cities is their image of places to 
work, but not to live.
The media play a crucial role in the 'production and distribution' of images 
(Whannel 2002). The intense media attention for major sports events is no doubt the 
key factor explaining the bond between sports events and place marketing (Smith 
2001). Another contributory factor is the traditional strong presence of popular 
cultural expressions in industrial cities, like sports and rock music. Moreover the 
sharp distinction between elite and popular culture seems to be vanishing, thus 
making sports events more useful for attracting high-income tourists (Smith 2001). 
This is the fertile soil on which a place marketing strategy based on sports events can 
grow.
Socio-historical perspective on sports events
What is the social raison d'etre of a sports event? Getz (1991) has drawn attention to 
the most important aspect of events in general: a festival or event is a public 
celebration. Sports events, like other events, symbolize the common values and the 
interdependence of social groups and strengthen bonds or relieve tensions (Caillois 
1958, Getz 1991). Events might be 'the sparks needed to light the community fire'4.
Events and sports events are as old as humanity. Sports events, being public 
celebrations, were historically linked to religion. The classic example is the ancient 
Olympic Games, which were first held in 776 B.C. The Olympic Games were not just 
sports events for public enjoyment, but also a religious celebration (Huizinga 1938, 
Coakley 2003).
At the beginning of the 20th century, a process of international standardization of 
sports rules and games transformed the existing local games and sports into a 
worldwide 'sports system'. A characteristic of this global sports system is that 
different sports are played all over the world, according to the same, standardized 
set of rules. In the process of diffusion, especially those sports originating in
Bonnemaison, cited in Hall 1992, p. 14
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economically successful countries became popular. This can be illustrated by the fact 
that most Olympic sports originate from just a handful of economically strong 
countries: the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan and Germany. Many 
authors therefore relate the emergence of the global sports system to the (economic) 
processes of industrialization and modernization (Elias and Dunning 1986, Van 
Bottenburg 2001, Guttmann 2002).
The transition from traditional local sports and games to the modern international 
sports system finds one of its most visible expressions in modern sports events. The 
reach of international sports events is global, not local, and their financial scale has 
risen accordingly. The rights to international sports events are literally owned and 
exploited by the sport federations or the International Olympic Committee (IOC), 
while for a traditional sports event one cannot really speak of "ownership of rights'. 
In contrast with events based on local traditions, international sports events have no 
self-evident legitimacy in the host city or community, because their location is 
different every time they are held.
This 'footloose' character of modern sports events may also help to explain the 
demand for economic research and evaluation studies. On the one hand, sports 
events promise economic benefits, because of their scale, measured in visitors or 
media attention. On the other hand, the legitimacy of international sports events for a 
host city is not as solid as that of traditional local events, because the event is hosted 
by a different city each year. The need for ex ante legitimization is made urgent by the 
perceived risks involved in hosting sports events. For football events, the fear of 
hooliganism and its potential for damaging property and image is an important 
drive for research and evaluation (COT 2001). For the Olympic Games, large-scale 
public investment in facilities and venues may be required. These may turn out to be 
a financial burden on the host cities, and thus constitute a financial risk. Economic 
studies in the field of sports events are, therefore, important tools either to convince 
public opinion in advance of the need to host the event, or afterwards to defend the 
decision to be a candidate (Hall 1992, Crompton 1995).
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However, as Preuss (2000) has pointed out, it is not just the local politicians who may 
show interest in the outcome of evaluation studies. Proven concrete benefits to the 
host cities may also be in the interest of the international sports federation involved. 
Benefits from past events will encourage more cities and countries to announce their 
candidacy for hosting in the future. A larger number of potential hosts means a 
better choice for the sports federation, thus enhancing the prestige of the sport.
There has been no shortage of economic impact studies of major sports events 
(Dobson et al. 1997, Ronnigen 1997, Brunet 1995, Gratton et al. 2000), and nor has 
there been a shortage of publications on the correct methodology for such an analysis 
(Burns et al. 1986, Crompton 1995 and 1999, Noll and Zimbalist 1997, Dobson 2000). 
Most of the academic discussion has thus focused upon the methodology for EIA; 
and many issues have been clarified in this respect. However, the issue of economic 
evaluation has received considerably less attention than the issue of economic impact 
measurement. An important issue is the relevance of economic impact studies in an 
evaluation context. Although some have raised serious doubts about the relevance of 
EIAs for the evaluation of public expenditures (Van Puffelen 1996, Burgan and Mules 
2001), or their use without measuring the costs (Dobson 2000), this issue has not yet 
been dealt with in a satisfactory manner (Law 1996b).
To summarize, the need for the evaluation of sports events stems from their nature, 
which promises economic benefits but involves risks as well. Its attractiveness is 
enhanced by the wish in many (industrial) cities to improve their image. The 
judgment on their public value needs to be established by the collection and 
structuring of information and a judgment procedure. This is exactly what an 
evaluation is. Although there is a solid body of knowledge on the economic impact of 
events, a theoretically-based approach to the economic evaluation of events is 
lacking.
1.2 Aim and objectives
The central aim of this research is to find a sound methodology for the economic 
evaluation of sports events, and to apply this methodology to Euro 2000. This should
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provide insight into the social and economic importance of Euro 2000 on a national 
and local level and help to assess these effects in terms of their relevance for public 
decision making. The aim of the thesis is to be furthered by the accomplishment of 
the following objectives:
1. To review the literature on the evaluation of sports events;
2. To construct a solid theoretical foundation of an evaluation approach by 
means of a critical assessment of the existing evaluation techniques;
3. To draw a conceptual framework and a methodology for assessing the costs 
and benefits and the economic impact of Euro 2000;
4. To assess the costs and benefits for the Dutch on a national level. The research 
is concerned with both the tangible (financial) and the intangible effects of the 
event, for the various sectors of industry, the Dutch population, and the public 
sector;
5. To assess the costs and benefits on the level of the host cities. The host cities in 
the Netherlands were Amsterdam, Arnhem, Eindhoven and Rotterdam.
An important limitation of this study is that it focuses on the evaluation of single 
sports events, and not on sports event policy. A 'sports event' is considered a project 
and 'sports-event evaluation' is thus a type of project evaluation. Of course, a series 
of project evaluations might eventually be the basis of an evaluation of sports-events 
policy. The exact relationship between project and policy evaluation is an interesting 
research question, but falls outside the scope of this thesis.5
1.3 Structure of this thesis
The thesis is structured by the objectives that were described above. Chapter 2 
provides a review of the literature on the evaluation of sports events. Different 
approaches towards impact assessment are discussed and the consistency of 
economic and social concepts used in the literature on events is examined.
For approaches to policy evaluation, see Van der Knaap and Schilder (2004).
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There are some unresolved questions in the literature, especially concerning the 
relationship between a CBA and an economic impact study. Therefore, the theoretical 
aspects of economic impact analysis, CBA and welfare economics are further 
analysed in Chapter 3. In that chapter the foundations for the approach used in this 
thesis are laid down. This approach uses a novel concept of CBA, using multiple 
accounts. This concept helps to overcome some of the theoretical difficulties that 
were unsolved in the existing literature.
The concept helps in deciding which tools are needed to do the research. In Chapter 
4 the tools are created by examining the conceptual and operational consequences of 
the theoretical approach. The methodology for data collection is the subject of 
Chapter 5.
In Chapter 6 the results of our research on this football championship are presented, 
with special reference to its effect on the Dutch economy. It includes data on 
expenditures by different groups involved in the event. These data are the input for 
the economic impact calculations and for the cost benefit accounts, which are also 
discussed in this chapter. The results are then compared with the original prognoses 
and data from the previous European Football Championship, Euro 1996.
The results are discussed in Chapter 7. That chapter attempts to make an appraisal of 
the theoretical, methodological and practical results of the research, against the 
background of the existing body of knowledge. It emphasizes the need for a better 
theoretical integration of (economic) theories of political processes, on the one hand, 
and economic tools like CBA, on the other, and also attempts to make a first 
contribution in this direction.
Finally, Chapter 8 is a summary and a reflection on further research into the 
evaluation of international sports events.
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2 Literature review
2.1 Introduction
The task of a reviewer of the literature on the evaluation of sports events would be 
considerably easier if there were a firmly delineated body of literature on the subject. 
This is not the case, and admittedly this problem is not specific to sports events, but 
probably to any topic of research. Nevertheless, the characteristics of sports events, 
which cut across a number of different topics and disciplines, may constitute a 
research field even less well-organized than other subjects.
Before the contributions are examined into more detail below, it should be remarked 
that there are parallels between the literature on the economic impact and value of 
sports, and the literature in the seventies and eighties on the impact of arts and 
culture. One of the first contributions to the latter subject is probably Cwi and Lyall 
(1977). Important contributions in this field in the UK were made by Myerscough 
(1988). In the Netherlands a lively debate on the interpretation of economic impact 
studies was fueled by Hietbrink et al. (1985), De Kam (1986), Abbing (1989, 1990), 
Poppelaars and Sips (1993) and Van Puffelen (1994, 1996). For a comparison of the 
value of sports, the arts and culture in the context of city marketing see Ingerson 
(2001).
To turn back to the research field of sports events, several complications arise. First, 
the topic of sports events is at the intersections of the literature on special events, 
urban tourism, and sports. Second, in terms of approaches and disciplines, the field 
has been entered by -  amongst others -  geographers, economists, sociologists and 
marketing researchers. A third complicating factor is that the approach taken by 
different researchers is not only determined by the topic and discipline, but to some 
extent also by their geographical origin.
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To turn to this last point, despite the sometimes remarkable similarities in the city 
marketing policies in the United States, Europe and Australia, there are also 
important differences regarding the social organization of sports in these countries. 
Especially relevant is difference between the United States and other Western 
countries. In the USA, the professional sports leagues have a legally institutionalized 
monopoly in their branch of sports, and have become commercially very successful 
enterprises. In Europe, competition between sports clubs is open: clubs are free to 
enter as long as they meet certain criteria (Fort 2003, Sandy et al. 2004). As a 
consequence, many cities in the United States follow the strategy of building 
stadiums in order to attract or retain professional sports teams, a phenomenon which 
has no counterpart on this scale in other Western cities. In cities in Europe, public 
policy is often geared towards attracting major international sports events, and 
sports venues are simply the means to this end (Noll and Zimbalist 1997, Van den 
Berg et al. 2000; Gratton and Henry 2001b).
With this specific geographical feature in mind, the structure of the literature might 
now be examined along the lines of topic and discipline. There has been some 
specializing by specific discipline in topics, so this might be a starting point for 
structuring. Still, it should be kept in mind that the following classification of authors 
is just intended to help structure the research field. Crossovers between research 
traditions are common.
Traditionally, the topic of (urban) tourism and events has been characterized by a 
strong presence of geographers (Hall 1992, Page 1995, Law 1996a, Shaw and Williams 
2001) and economists (Crompton 1995, 1999, 2001; Burns et al. 1986, Mules and 
Faulkner 1996, Gratton and Taylor 2001), with more recent authors drawing from 
marketing theory (Jansen-Verbeke 1988, Ashworth and Voogd 1990, Kotler et al. 
1993, Van den Berg et al. 2000; Hankinson 2004).6 Sociologists have traditionally been 
more interested in sports events as a specific form of expression of sports, ideology, 
and globalization issues (Roche 1994, Whitson and Macintosh 1996, Schimmel 2001),
6 Hall (1989a) provided an excellent overview of the early literature on events and its origin in 
tourism research.
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often inspired by theories on postmodernism (Harvey 1989). A more recent 
development is the emergence of the discipline of sports economics (Fort 1997, Noll 
and Zimbalist 1997, Leeds and Von Allmen 2002; Lavoie 2002; Fort 2003, Sandy et al. 
2004), and sports events seem to emerge as a subtopic of this field of research (Preuss 
2000; Dejonghe 2004; Masterman 2004).
The survey of the literature is divided into primary and secondary literature. The 
primary literature is that on the impacts and evaluation of sports events, which is the 
central focal point here. This literature is dominated by geographers and economists. 
The other approaches and or topics (sociology of sports, sports economics and city 
marketing theories) are considered secondary.
Authors from Australia and Canada dominate the first research tradition, while the 
literature stemming from the economics of professional sports is, of course, more 
oriented towards the situation in the United States, and American authors are more 
prevalent. 7
2.2 Tourism research and sports events
Major early contributions to the literature on sports events were by authors with a 
track record of tourism publications, such as Getz, Hall and Crompton.8 After a 
seminal article by Ritchie (1984), and probably stimulated by the financial success of 
the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, events, and especially sports events, rapidly 
developed from a specialized topic of tourism research into a distinct research field.
Ritchie (1984) points out that, traditionally, the economic impacts of special events 
are the main focus of attention for tourism policy, and for policy-oriented research. 
However, a more comprehensive approach is needed for a better understanding of 
the social impact of events. In a more comprehensive approach, tourism/commercial, 
physical, socio-cultural, psychological, and political impacts find a place, besides
7 For an overview of this research tradition see Lavoie (2000) and Fort (2003).
8 A closely related topic to event tourism is urban tourism, which is explored by (amongst 
others) Page (1995), Law (1996), and Shaw and Williams (2001). This research field also is adjacent to 
the city marketing approach that will be discussed in the next section.
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economic impacts. Ritchie subsequently formulates a framework for assessing the 
social impacts.
He elaborated his ideas in five articles on the impact of the 1988 Calgary Winter 
Olympics (Ritchie and Aitken 1984; Ritchie and Aitken 1985; Ritchie and Lyons 1987; 
Ritchie and Lyons 1990). The initial, rather ambitious, research framework for the 
Calgary case study included monitoring economic, sports-participation, social- 
cultural, and physical (infrastructure) impacts (Ritchie and Aitken 1984). 
Unfortunately, this wide-ranging research programme did not materialize; the 
results focus mainly on the socio-cultural impact. However, in the last of these five 
articles, Ritchie and Smith (1991) break new ground in assessing the impact of the 
Winter Games on the awareness and image abroad of the host city Calgary.
The impact of events from an economic perspective
Burns et al. (1986) heeded Ritchie's call for a comprehensive and empirical approach 
towards the impact of events. In their evaluation of the Adelaide Grand Prix in 
Australia, not only economic impacts are taken into account but also social side 
effects, like noise, travel time losses by residents, and road accidents. Although their 
evaluation is close to a cost benefit analysis (CBA), the authors seem to hesitate to 
label it as such. The study introduced several important methodological insights: 
first, it is explicitly recognized that costs and benefits are not absolute categories, but 
depend on the perspective (which is a choice made by the researcher). A subsidy 
from the state government to a local authority is a cost from the point of view of the 
state government, but a benefit from the local point of view. Second, the economic 
impact of an event should be expressed in additional expenditures flowing into the 
local economy. Switching of expenditures should be accounted for and netted out. 
For example: expenditures by residents are not additional, because the funds are 
switched from one local destination to another. Third, the study also paid attention 
to effects for separate branches of industry, such as accommodation, restaurants and 
transport. It indicated a loss for the restaurant sector, an effect later labelled as 'the 
Los Angeles-effect' (Hatch 1986, Hall 1992: 59). Fourth, the authors investigated new
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approaches to include intangible costs and benefits, such as the noise, time loss 
because of traffic hindrances, road accidents (the 'Hoon effect'9, Fisher et al. 1986: 
172), and the promotion of entrepreneurship and general promotion.
Regarding the financial costs and benefits, Burns and Mules (1986) compare the 
public costs with the economic effects (benefits) caused by visitors' expenditures and 
funding from extra state sources (a net gain of AUS$ 2.3 million). In their own words 
(Burns and Mules 1989:173):
"We have adopted the position that the costs and benefits associated with the event should be 
measured from the viewpoint of South Australia as a whole, not just from the viewpoint of the 
State Government."
However, this viewpoint can be challenged. A section by Thomson (1986) (in the 
same study as Burns and Mules 1986) develops a different approach. Thomson (1986) 
excludes the economic benefits from the public comparison, netting costs and (only) 
direct benefits to the public sector (for example, tax income). He argues (pp. 187-188):
"To justify the provision of public funds on the grounds of externalities in a democratic mixed 
economy such as ours it must be shown that the benefits that spill over to other [groups] than 
the participants are received by a very wide cross section of the community. (....) However, if 
the claimed external benefits were to go only to (say) hotel owners, or taxi drivers, or others 
involved in servicing the event and patrons of the event, one could well ask why there should 
not be simply a special levy or offsetting increase in tax (e.g. license fees) to these hotel owners 
and other identified beneficiaries to provide the additional funds required."
The difference is not just academic, it may lead to diverging conclusions on the net 
value of the event: according to Burns and Mules the costs made by the local 
authorities can be defended on purely financial grounds, whereas according to 
Thomson the financial account is in deficit but the subsidy might, or might not, be 
defended by pointing at spillover effects (externalities).10
9 A 'hoon' is Australian slang for a street drag racer.
10 The situation was more complicated because part of the Grand Prix was financed by a subsidy 
from the national government, which is a benefit for the local economy. As a result, there was no
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There seems to be a tendency in economic event research to focus on the 
measurement of the contribution of events to economic growth. A theoretical 
foundation for the economic contribution of events to economic growth is often 
found in 'the economic base theory', complemented by input-output analysis or 
multiplier approaches (Hall 1992, Jokovi 1998, Dobson 2000). The economic base 
theory differentiates between basic sectors and non-basic sectors. Branches earning 
their money predominantly by exports are considered 'basic sectors'. The economic 
base theory might be criticized because of the very dominant value that is attached to 
exports to promote economic growth.11 However, this is not the issue that is at stake 
in this thesis. The question raised here is: What conclusions can be drawn from a 
contribution to economic growth? In other words: How can this (potential) 
contribution be evaluated? In this context, Shibli and Gratton (2001: 87) refer to an 
Australian rule of thumb of "AUS$ 8 of additional spending to AUS$ 1 of event net 
cost as a benchmark target for justifying investment in events". Though practically 
convenient, there seems to be little theoretical support for this particular benchmark. 
This point is acutely highlighted in the question whether the economic impact can 
and should be part of a social CBA. Consensus has not yet been reached.
The issue of the relationship between economic impact and CBA was re-addressed 
by Mules and Faulkner (1996) and by Burgan and Mules (2001). Mules and Faulkner 
dispute the argument put forward by a critic12 that economic impact should not be 
counted amongst the benefits of a special event (because these benefits are private
operating loss for the local government in either case. For the clarity of the argument, I have simplified 
the case.
11 Instead of choosing export branches as 'base industry', investments branches (construction) or 
government branches (for example, education or health care) are equally fit to be labelled 'basic 
sectors'. For example, a university (education) may stimulate innovations and have thus considerable 
economic spin off. A classification into 'basic' and 'non basic' is therefore arbitrary, and echoes the 
classic distinction between productive (agriculture) and sterile sectors (trade) (Schumpeter 1954/1994, 
Dobson 2000). For a possible alternative, see Porter (1990).
12 Black, T. (1994) The Queensland IndyCar Grand Prix: assessing costs and benefits, Agenda, 
Vol. 1, No. 2,1994, pp. 259-61, quoted in Mules and Faulkner (1996).
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instead of public, an idea similar to that of Thomson 1986). Following this argument, 
a levy could be imposed on the beneficiaries, thereby avoiding public financing. 
Mules and Faulkner (1996) reject this critique and defend the inclusion of economic 
impact in the calculation of net benefits. Their argument is that a public subsidy of 
events is a type of export promotion. This can be considered to be a public good. 
Their article, however, by comparing events with tourism promotion, also provides 
the counter-argument: more than export promotion, an event could be seen as a type 
of local tourism promotion, and local tourism promotion is in many countries (e.g. in 
the Netherlands) financed by levies on the tourism industry, not by general taxes. 
The tourism industry is the main beneficiary of the economic impact provided by 
sports events. Therefore there is no a priori reason to make a distinction between 
tourism promotion and sports events, and financing the latter out of general tax 
revenues, while imposing a special levy on the industry for the former.13
A new element brought up in the same article by Mules and Faulkner (1996) is the 
consumers' surplus as the measure for social gains. Consumers' surplus (a term 
coined by Marshall 1920) is commonly defined as 'the amount a consumer would be 
willing to pay for a product over the (market) price' (Mishan 1976, and see also 
Annex B of this thesis). In fact, Mules and Faulkner (1996) link event evaluation 
research with traditional CBA and welfare economics, by introducing the concept of 
consumers' surplus. However, this leads to an additional complication for their own 
position, because the economic impact is not a part of this consumers' surplus and is 
not counted among the benefits in traditional CBA (Sassone and Schaffer 1978). In 
other words: the inclusion of economic impact as a social gain (benefit) is not 
supported by the mainstream literature on CBA. Mules and Faulkner (1996) 
recognize this problem, but they draw no further consequences from it.
13 Of course, it could be argued that a special event tax on the tourism industry is impractical. 
First, the discussion here is on the principles, and therefore this argument is of less relevance. Second, 
even if it practical issues should have some weight, this is true in the case of a one-time event, but for a 
'continuous supply' of events, this argument is not very convincing. Still, the author of this thesis is 
aware that this discussion deserves more attention than he can give it here.
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The issue was dealt with again in Burgan and Mules (2001). As they point out, CBA 
is normally applied to projects that reduce social costs, such as public investment in 
roads. However, in the case of an event, the economic benefits do not accrue directly 
to the consumers (residents), in the form of reduced costs, but to the business 
community (the producers), in the form of additional income. It is therefore not 
illogical to investigate whether economic impact could be included at the producers' 
end: Is it part of the producers' surplus, or producers' rents? Burgan and Mules's 
(2001) conclusion is that, although this approach may be possible, "it is no different 
than placing an emphasis on Gross Domestic Product as a measure of economic well­
being" (Burgan and Mules 2001: 326). Later, in this thesis a similar conclusion (see 
Chapter 3 of this thesis) is reached, but it is considered that their route towards it is 
unnecessarily complicated and disputable.14
Finally, Burgan and Mules conclude that in the case of events, economic impact 
analysis (EIA) is a better measure for welfare gains than consumers' surplus. 
However, this again raises the question put forward by Thomson (1986): Why should 
a government be involved in creating this private welfare? The arguments given by 
Burgan and Mules (2001) are the same as in Mules and Faulkner (1996), and the same 
objections could be raised against them.
The techniques of EIA and CBA appear to have enough attraction to inspire many 
economists to refine these methodologies, especially the EIA. In recent years, the 
methodology of EIA seems to have progressed into a limiting set of dos and don'ts. 
Contributions were made by, amongst others, Burgan and Mules (1992) Crompton
14 The most important objection from the traditional point of view is that producers' surplus is 
the same as producers' rents, and these are in fact factor rewards. A change in factor rewards (prices) 
means that one factor reward rises relatively, while others decline. In other words, in a neoclassical 
setting, changes in relative factor prices balance themselves out and have no additional effects on total 
welfare (Mishan 1976). Therefore, just like economic impact, producers' surplus is normally not 
considered in a traditional CBA. Burgan and Mules, however, challenge this view  and claim that 
additional welfare might be created when unemployed labour is called into production. At the same 
time, they admit that the 'producers' surplus' concept is far from elegant and indeed is 'nebulous' (p. 
327).
27
(1995, 1999), Mules and Faulkner (1996, discussed above), UK Sport (1999) Preuss 
(2000, discussed below) and Auld and McArthur (2003).
Besides the already mentioned issue of additional expenditures, a much-debated 
issue is the use of the correct multiplier (Crompton 1995). The emergence of 
consensus is illustrated by the publishing of guidelines on how to assess economic 
impact: Crompton (1999) and UK Sport (1999) (also: Gratton and Taylor 2001; 
Dobson 2000).
Parallel to (and partly building on) the methodological consensus of EIA, a constant 
flow of empirical articles and books has emerged, in which economic impacts are 
quantified. Most of the empirical work is done on the short-term effects of events.15
Long and Perdue (1990) qualitatively investigate the spatial distribution of 
expenditures. Dobson et al. (1997) researched the economic impact of 'Euro 1996' in 
the UK, focusing on the expenditures by foreign visitors, assessing the economic 
impact both at local host city level and national level for the UK as a whole. Other 
empirical studies on visitors include Andersson and Solberg (1999) and Dwyer et al. 
(2000b). A logical next step in this research direction is to compare and categorize 
sports events by their impact (Gratton et al. 2000; Shibli and Gratton 2001).
More embracing assessments, which include costs of sports events, are scarcer but 
not totally absent. The theoretical foundation of the CBA by Rahmann et al. (1998) is 
not very strong, but their careful modelling of future costs and benefits of world 
championship football for Germany deserves attention. Brunet (1995), in his 
assessment of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, uses separate accounts for 
different interests: an account for the Local Organizing Committee (LOC); an account 
for total costs and benefits with respect to the event; and an account for the public 
sector. He also calculates the macro-economic impact, including consumers' 
expenditures and investments. However, the relationship between the 
(microeconomic) accounts, and the (macro)economic impact is not clear. The idea of
15 Exceptions are Mount and Leroux (1994; their findings are predominantly qualitative) and 
Ronnigen (1997).
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different accounts is also used by Preuss (2000) in his thorough study on the 
economics of the Olympic games from 1972 to 2000. Preuss's solution to Brunet's 
problem of the relation between micro-impacts (interests) and macroeconomic 
impact is to deliberately treat these two in separate sections. This presentation adds 
to the clarity of the report, but leaves unanswered the fundamental question: How do 
these two concepts relate to each other?
In a contribution to the EIA technique, Preuss identifies nine different tourist groups, 
or journey patterns (as he calls them), related to events, some of which bring 
additional expenditures, while others imply 'leakage' of expenditures.16 As Preuss 
points out, negative or leakage effects are often neglected in impact studies. An 
example of such an effect is the effect that tourists are scared off by a major sports 
event, also referred to as 'crowding-out effects'. Most studies disregard crowding-out 
effects, an exception is Hultkranz (1998). He performed an econometric analysis of 
tourism data to investigate the net impact of the World Athletic Championships in 
Gothenburg (Sweden). He finds indeed that the negative effects ('crowding-out') 
actually outweighed the positive visitor impacts of this event.17
The impact of events from a socio-cultural perspective
Socio-cultural research has some common ground with economic evaluation 
approaches. Its scope is typically to provide guidance for a classification and 
measurement of social impacts. A complete overview of the socio cultural approach 
towards events is beyond the scope of this thesis and is not provided here. Getz
(1991) and Hall (1992) provided an overview of the research on social impacts to 
date. Both publications attempt to approach special events from a multidisciplinary 
point of view. Furthermore, both authors belong to a tourism research tradition, and
16 See also Burgan and Mules (1992) who add the effect of residents coming to the event, and 
who would have gone abroad had it been in another country (and therefore refrain from going 
abroad). Their expenditures may be counted as additional.
17 Ronnigen (1997) however finds an increase in tourism after the 1994 Lillehammer Winter 
Games.
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this influence can be found in their emphasis on the integration of event policy into a 
general tourism policy and a bottom up approach towards planning (see also Syme 
et al. 1989, Hall and Page 1999). Both Getz (1991) and Hall (1992) base their treatment 
of economic analysis predominantly on Burns et al. (1986).
As for the classification (or typology) of social impacts, the article of Ritchie (1984) is 
the logical starting point. It makes a distinction between the economic impact of 
events and other kinds of impacts: for example, political and psychological effects 
(see Table 2.1). However, upon scrutiny, this typology might lead to confusion, 
especially regarding the "economic impacts'. For example, tourism effects (promotion 
of a city or country) are listed separately from economic impacts. However, tourism 
impacts may be considered economic effects, in the long or short run. Of course, 
some arbitrariness can never be avoided in classifications, but for our purpose the 
concept of economic impact should not be allowed to cause confusion. Furthermore, 
the labelling of manifestations as either 'negative' or 'positive' is in many cases 
disputable. Price increases, listed as negative manifestations, mean higher income for 
suppliers and therefore cannot be regarded as unequivocally negative. The 
strengthening of local traditions and values may be appreciated by some, but not by 
those who do not share those values. The construction of new facilities and 
infrastructure is only beneficial if those constructions have a positive economic or 
social rate of return, etc.
Hall (1992) elaborated the typology.18 He uses 'economic impact' as a general 
heading, under which he distinguishes three types of economic research among 
which is CBA.19 However, this classification runs into more serious complications 
from a conceptual point of view. Take as an example the cost-benefit study of Burns
18 See also Hall and Page (1999). In this textbook 'economic effects' and 'tourism/commercial 
effects' are categorized under 'economic dimensions'.
19 The other types are (1) tourism multipliers; (2) input-output analysis. But this could be 
disputed as well: an input-output analysis also includes multiplier-effects. In fact, multipliers are often 
calculated ex post from input-output analysis (see Burns and Mules 1986). However, it does illustrate 
the existing confusion in terminology.
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et al. (1986), which included what Hall (1992) and Ritchie (1984) would label as social 
costs (e.g. nuisance). This leads to an inconsistency, because: 1) according to Hall
(1992), CBA is a type of economic impact analysis; but 2) a CBA includes social as 
well as economic impacts. Therefore, if a CBA can include social impacts, it is 
inconsistent to classify it purely as a type of economic impact analysis. This issue will 
be further discussed in Section 2.4.
Table 2.1 Types of impact of hallmark events
Manifestations
Impact Positive Negative
Economic • Increased expenditures
• Creation of employment
• Price increases during the event
• Real estate speculation
Tourism/ commercial • Increased awareness of the region 
as a travel/ tourism destination
• Increased knowledge concerning 
the potential for investment and 
commercial activity in the region
• Acquisition of a poor reputation 
as a result of inadequate facilities 
or improper practices
• Negative reactions from existing 
enterprises due to the possibility 
of new competition for local 
manpower and government 
assistance
Physical • Construction of new facilities
• Improvement of local infrastructure
• Environmental damage
• Overcrowding
Socio-cultural • Increase in permanent level of local 
interest and participation in type of 
activity associated with event
• Strengthening of regional traditions 
and values
• Commercialization of activities 
which may be of a personal or 
private nature
• Modification of nature of 
event/activity to accommodate 
tourism
Psychological • Increased local pride and 
community spirit
• Increased awareness of non local 
perceptions
• Tendency towards defensive 
attitudes concerning host regions
• High possibility of 
misunderstanding leading to 
varying degrees of host/ visitor 
hostility
Political • Enhanced international recognition 
of region and its values
• Propagation of political values held 
by government and/or population
• Economic exploitation of local 
population to satisfy ambitions of 
political elite
• Distortion of true nature of event 
to reflect values of political 
system of the day
Source: Ritchie (1984: 4).
Perhaps inspired by the methodological progress in economic impact assessment, 
more recently several authors have set out to standardize the assessment of social 
impacts. Carlsen et al. (2001) use the Delphi method to establish the most important 
criteria for judging events. The technique consists of interviewing experts on the
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subject of which criteria to use for evaluation of events. During the course of several 
rounds, the experts are confronted with opinions by their colleagues, and thus they 
arrive at some consensus. The problem with this approach is that it only measures 
common practice among researchers; it has neither theoretical foundation nor does it 
have an empirical basis.
Fredline et al. (2003) have done a survey in which they let respondents differentiate 
between effects on personal versus social well-being. This adds a new dimension to the 
original taxonomy of Hall and Ritchie, which only differentiated between negative 
and positive manifestations. Earlier, Delamere et al. (2001) developed a similar 
approach, by introducing a scale that measures residents' attitudes towards events, 
the FSIAS (Festival Social Impact Attitude Scale, analogous to an earlier developed 
Tourism Impact Attitude Scale - TIAS). As in Fredline et al. (2003) the dimension 
social vs. private impact is distinguished, but in addition the dimension of costs and 
benefits has also been included. These two approaches are remarkably close to those 
of economists, and a common economic and socio-geographical approach might just 
be a matter of time.
2.3 City marketing, sports economics and sociology of sports
A second and related, though definitely different, research tradition is the economics 
of sports, which has been developed particularly in the United States. The financial 
success of the 1984 episode of the Games did transfer the Games, and even 
international events in general, from the sphere of white elephants to the sphere of 
money-making activities. The transfer, intensified by an increasing interest in urban 
economies, lifestyles and popular cultures, made sports events successful epitomes of 
(post)modern urban life. As Harvey (1989: 59), a theorist on postmodernism puts it:
"The collapse of time horizons and the preoccupation with instantaneity have in part arisen 
through the contemporary emphasis in cultural production on events, spectacles, happenings, 
and media images (...). (...) it has (...) permitted a rapprochement (...) between popular 
culture and what once remained isolated as 'high culture'."
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Sports events were thus brought to the attention of sports economists, sports 
sociologists, and urban policy makers.
Motivated by the wish to retain or attract major league professional sports teams, 
policy makers in the United States have stimulated large-scale public investments in 
sports stadiums. These strategies frequently borrow from "place marketing", 
"destination marketing' or "city marketing' concepts (Getz 1991, Kotler et al. 1993). 
Place marketing could be described as a policy paradigm that approaches cities and 
urban planning policy from a marketing point of view. The basic concept is that the 
policy should be demand-oriented, which means that the users of the public space 
and their needs should be the focus point. The city should be made more attractive to 
the users. The users are the citizens living in the city, but also the tourists visiting the 
city centre or the investors considering a new location for their company (Jansen- 
Verbeke 1988; Ashworth and Voogd 1991).20 Although, theoretically, city marketing 
is not confined to city promotion or re-imaging, often sports is used for precisely this 
goal: to enhance the attractiveness of a city by lending the positive connotations that 
are ascribed to sports. This strategy of using positive "lifestyle" connotations is 
labelled "branding", Nike being the most famous example (Klein 2001, Hankinson 
2004). Once this positive image is established, the "brand" can be used to market other 
products (Kotler et al. 1993). A contribution by Smith (2001) conceptualizes image 
and perception, by distinguishing levels of image formation. Image formation of a 
city, according to Smith, takes place at the functional level, which is represented 
through the services provided by the city, and at the symbolical level, on which the 
city is associated with specific values. According to Smith, sports have the potential 
to address both levels (see also Hankinson 2004 for a discussion and alternative 
conceptualization).
20 There are remarkable parallels between this literature on the value of sports for city 
marketing, and the literature in the eighties on the impact of arts and culture (with reference to the 
latter see Cwi and Lyall 1977, Hietbrink et al. 1985, Hietbrink et al. 1988. For a comparison of the value 
of sports, the arts and culture see Ingerson 2001).
33
Often economic arguments and impact studies play an important role in the 
legitimization of stadium investments, and these have drawn the attention of several 
(sports) economists. Baade and Dye (1990) tested empirically the economic rationale 
of investments in sport stadiums, taking growth in income per capita as the 
dependent variable. They find no correlation between income growth and the 
existence of such stadiums. The economic rationale of public investments in sports 
stadiums, but also sports events, is also thoroughly questioned by Crompton (1995; 
2001), whose approach is similar to that of Burns et al. (1986), discussed above. In 
Noll and Zimbalist (1997), the economic and political aspects of investments in sports 
stadiums are scrutinized on their economic, employment, distributional and political 
aspects. These authors are rather sceptical towards the existence of any economic 
benefits. An academic consensus appears to be growing that investments in stadiums 
can hardly ever be defended on economic grounds (Lavoie 2000, Sandy et al. 2004). 
Nevertheless, these findings produce no response in the political arena. In this 
respect Fort (1997, 2003) refers to 'the stadium mess'.
Social criticism of developments in the sports sector is not a recent phenomenon. 
Already in 1938, Huizinga (1938) was rather critical about the role of 'modern sports' 
in Western society. According to him, professionalism and commercialization have 
taken out the playful element, thus killing the intrinsic creative force of sports. What 
is left is professional sports: a sterile activity, more similar to the Roman 'Bread and 
Circuses' than to the Greek ideal.21 More recently, the theme of 'authentic culture' 
versus 'commercialized fabrication' is echoed in critical publications by Simson and 
Jennings (1992), Yallop (1999), Klein (2001) and several sociologists, discussed below. 
In the spirit of Huizinga, Klein (2001) describes how multinational firms feed 
themselves upon youth culture (sports): the 'branding' strategy discussed above. 
Although the impact of Klein in the scientific community does not seem to be as 
great as her impact on the anti-globalization movement, the relationship she 
establishes between economic globalization and modern sports (events) is almost
21 This ideal might be a romantic construction of later date (Coakley 2003). For an assessment 
and elaboration of Huizinga's argument, See Callois (1958).
34
commonplace in sociological literature (Maguire 2000). Social critique is often mixed 
with economic scepticism. Whitson and Macintosh (1996) and Smith and Ingham
(2003) use the findings on non-existent economic benefits as ammunition for a
(critique on sports and place marketing concepts in general. The economic argument 
is extended to a political context, pointing not only to non-existent economic benefits, 
but also to a lack of political participation and the democratic quality of political 
decisions (see also Thorne and Munro-Clark 1989, Schimmel 2001).
Roche (1994), making a more philosophical point, distinguishes between planning 
and critical approaches.22 Planning approaches, which he describes as "normative, 
practical and 'applied' in orientation", focus on (economic) effects and take the 
political context of events for granted, while critical approaches try to explain the 
'production' of these events by the political process. Roche subsequently questions 
the usefulness of planning approaches for mainstream social sciences. Because most 
economic approaches would fit the description of a 'planning approach' (Becker 
2001), this could be interpreted as flinging down a gauntlet towards the economic 
approach. It has not yet been taken up. A possible response is formulated in Chapter 
7.
2.4 Summary and discussion
In this chapter, the literature on the evaluation of sports events was discussed. A 
division was made into primary and secondary literature, based on the perceived 
relevance of this literature for the thesis.
Starting from the seminal contribution of Ritchie, which called for a comprehensive 
approach towards events, the study of Burns et al. (1986) was analysed. Four points 
of insight were determined: 1) the relative character of costs and benefits, depending
22 The distinction made by Roche echoes the epistemological debate between the (neo)positivists 
and the critical theory of the Frankfurter Schule. The (neo)positivist point of view is mostly associated 
with Karl Popper, the critical theory with Adorno and Habermas (Koningsveld 1980). Instrumental 
approaches reflect a positivistic approach, while explanatory approaches are in line with critical 
theory.
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on the perspective that is chosen; 2) the need to focus on additional expenditures 
instead of total expenditures; 3) the need to discriminate between economic sectors 
when studying economic impact; and 4) the need to research intangible effects to 
reach a comprehensive judgment on an event.
The usefulness of an economic impact study for the evaluation of public investments 
was discussed. It became clear that there is no consensus on this subject. However, 
there seems to have emerged a consensus on the methodology for establishing the 
economic impact as such. Studies that entail a comprehensive (economic) analysis of 
an event are not absent, but are relatively scarce compared with economic impact 
studies.
The geographically-oriented tradition of research on tourism and events has 
provided a framework for the discussion of different types of social impacts. Getz, 
Ritchie and Hall made important contributions towards an interdisciplinary 
approach to events. Their definition of economic impact, however, lacks consistency, 
a point that will be further discussed below.
In recent years, attempts have been made to establish a standardized methodology 
for assessing social impacts. Some of those attempts come close to the terminology of 
a CBA.
Social developments in the United States have sparked a discussion among 
researchers on the public financing of sports stadiums for professional team sports, 
leading to a sceptical attitude towards the economic benefits of sports development. 
The critique is also aimed at city marketing arguments for sports events. Critical 
sociologists are using the arguments of sports-economists against public funding for 
large-scale investments in stadiums and major events, and also criticize the lack of 
public accountability.
Discussion of terminology
The terminology on economic effects used by Ritchie and Hall is not solid enough, 
because it lacks consistency. Therefore, the terminology should be re-examined. An 
impact may be defined as the effect upon some part of society. In fact, this is a notion
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similar to that of Ritchie and Hall. An economic impact analysis is thus an assessment 
technique for the effects (e.g. of a sports event) upon the economy. A cultural impact 
analysis may be an assessment of the effects upon culture or the cultural sector, etc.
Subsequently, a distinction between this concept of impact analysis, which refers to 
some "social phenomenon", and evaluation technique, is useful. An evaluation 
technique may use an impact assessment, but it is more than that: it attaches a social 
(or private) valuation, positive or negative, to the assessed impact (Lichfield et al. 
1975). A CBA is an example of an evaluation technique. In annex A more space is 
devoted to this issue and its relationship a method or a an object approach towards 
economics.
To summarize, the relevant economic research on the social value of sports events 
can be divided into two species:
1) Research investigating the impact of an event upon "the
economy", or on "economic growth", which will be referred to
as "economic impact analysis' (EIA), a type of assessment;
2) Research using economic methods or concepts, valuing 
different types of social impacts by economic methods, which 
will be referred to as "economic evaluation".
CBA is thus an economic evaluation technique, because it has the potential to include 
social phenomena, not just financial ones. The characteristics of CBA will be further 
discussed in Chapter 3. For now it may be concluded that, if economics had restricted 
itself to a specified class of social phenomena (namely, economic phenomena), CBA
could not have performed the function of a comprehensive social evaluation
technique. In other words: the acceptance of a method approach towards economics 
is a prerequisite for the acceptance and application of CBA as a social evaluation 
technique.
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3 Theoretical foundations
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter the foundations of economic evaluation are discussed, focusing on 
economic and social impacts and cost-benefit analysis (CBA). In the previous chapter 
social impacts (among which economic impacts) were defined as the impact upon 
some sector of society.23 Economic impact, then, is the impact upon the economy. 
However, how is this economic impact measured? How is the concept made 
operational?
Section 3.2 is devoted to the theory on assessing the economic and social impacts of 
events. It was found earlier that the measurement of economic impact is now a fairly 
standard methodology. This methodology is discussed in more detail here. 
Subsequently, some theoretical contributions to the measurement of social impacts 
are examined in more detail.
The next step is to incorporate social impacts into an evaluation framework. To 
clarify the relationship between economic impact, external effects and CBA, Section
3.3 is devoted to the theoretical foundation of CBA, which is welfare economics. In 
that section, the concepts of consumers' surplus, externalities and the social welfare 
function are discussed. The methodology of the conventional CBA and the use of 
economic impact analysis are appraised against this theoretical background.
23 Conceptually economic impacts are a subset of social impacts. However, in this chapter and 
the rest of the thesis, the terms 'social' and 'economic impact' are used as referring to separate 
phenomena. Instead of social impacts meaning all impacts upon society, the reader should interpret 
social impacts as referring to all impacts upon society excluding economic impacts.
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In Section 3.5 a modified version of the conventional CBA is presented, which should 
help to avoid some of the theoretical problems of the conventional CBA.
3.2 Economic and social impact assessment
Economic impact assessment
What is the definition of the term "economic impact"? This question was answered 
partly in the previous chapter by defining an impact as an effect on a social 
subsystem, for example, the economy. Economic impact, then, is the effect on the 
economy.24 If this concept is accepted, the next question arises: which effects should 
be taken into account? For example, should economic impact be confined to tangible 
effects, such as expenditures by visitors? Or should economic impact also include the 
effects of sports events upon the image of a city? These effects on image might bring 
financial benefits to the hospitality industry in the future; therefore, they might be 
included to count as beneficial for the economy. This issue may be clarified by 
discussing some examples of earlier and later economic impact studies.
In 1977 David Cwi and Katherine Lyall (1977) investigated the economic impact of 
the arts for Baltimore. They use "economic impact" as a generic term, including 
spending by residents and "quality of life effects' (and their impact on investment 
decisions). This study served as a blueprint for an economic impact study by Van 
Puffelen (Hietbrink et al. 1985) for the arts in Amsterdam. These researchers arrived 
at their results by multiplying the expenditures of inhabitants and visitors with a 
multiplier. The press reacted enthusiastically by reporting that government subsidies 
were more than regained by the economic impact of the arts 25 In a re-evaluation Van 
Puffelen (1996) scrutinized the use of impact studies. He posed two questions:
24 At the same time, it was acknowledged that such a sub system is a theoretical construction 
and does not exist in this way in reality.
25 There were several flaws in the argument that the subsidies were regained. One is that this 
comparison is not correct, as several authors have pointed out (de Kam 1986, Abbing 1989). The arts 
sector benefits not just from specific subsidies but also from general public expenditures on, for
39
1. What is it that economic impact studies try to measure?
2. Which conclusions for policy may be drawn from the results?
The first question refers to the method of assessment; the second question refers to 
the concept of evaluation. The answer to the second question will be discussed later 
on. According to Van Puffelen (1996), the answer to the first question should be: an 
economic impact study measures the effect of the arts sector on the growth of the 
economy. Van Puffelen (1996) mentions as an example the additional expenditures 
by visitors.
In contributions of Ritchie (1984), Getz (1991) and Hall (1992), both expenditures and 
Teal estate speculation' are included in the concept 'economic impact'. Thus 
economic impact includes short-term effects (expenditures) as well as long-term 
effects (prices of real estate). 26
Both Hall (1992) and Getz (1991) rely for their economic concepts and methods 
mainly on the study by Burns et al. (1986). In this study, the concept of 'net' or 
'additional expenditure' is introduced, with special mention of 'time' and 'within 
State' switching.
Following the approach of Burns et al. (1986), Crompton (Crompton and McKay 
1994, Crompton 1995) stresses that the economic impact should be measured in terms 
of additional income. Additional income is in fact the same as the contribution of an 
event to economic growth; therefore his approach is similar to that of Van Puffelen 
(1996). Crompton (1995) analyses the most commonly made mistakes in economic 
impact studies. He lists 11 different mistakes, although almost all of them can be 
reduced to two main questions: (1) the question of 'additionality'; and (2) the use of
example, infrastructure and education. This argument relates to the question whether an economic 
impact study should be part of a public evaluation, which will be discussed separately.
26 Their notion of economic impact ultimately lacks consistency. However, w e might just 
concentrate on their notion of economic impact as shown in Table 2.1, which in itself is no cause for 
confusion. The inconsistency is introduced by Hall, when including CBA as a type of economic impact 
analysis.
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the (correct) multiplier.27 These two issues are interrelated. The use of a multiplier 
implies that the expenditures are additional, i.e. on top of the normal expenditures in 
a region.
The correct way to conduct an impact study according to Burns et al. (1986), and 
Crompton (1995,1999) is to determine:
■ The geographical area for which the impact study is to be made;
■ The additional economic direct expenditures (expenditures) caused by the 
event;
■ The correct multiplier, if possible by making use of input-output models;
■ The value added as a result of the direct expenditures;
■ Any alternative uses for the subsidies used in the event;
■ The same above-mentioned variables for this alternative use of public money.
Crompton (1999) elaborates his approach in a manual Measuring the Economic Impact. 
In this publication, economic impact has obtained a very specific meaning, the effects 
of additional expenditures. Any effect which might have a longer time frame (prices of 
real estate, effects on the "quality of life") are no longer taken into consideration in an 
economic impact study. In other words, the meaning of economic impact (the effect 
upon the economy) is narrowed to the effects in the short run.
Shibli has written a similar manual for UK Sport (UK Sport 1999, see also Gratton 
and Taylor 2001). The conclusion may be that this approach is now standard 
methodology for measuring the economic impact of sports events. The term 
"economic impact analysis" has thus developed from general use, to describe various 
effects and methodologies, to a specific methodology, focusing on additional 
expenditures, but taking secondary effects, such as time switching into account.
Gratton and Taylor (2001) differentiate between "special behaviour" (economic impact 
of international sports events) and "normal behaviour" (economic importance of 
sports). This difference is essential: to distinguish the concept of economic impact
27 For an earlier contribution on multipliers, see Archer (1982).
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from the concept of economic importance. Economic importance refers in this thesis to 
the weight of a branch of industry in the total production. A often used measure for 
this concept is the value added created in that industry. It is quite possible to discuss 
the "economic importance' of the sports industry, measurable by the added value 
created in that sector.
However, Sandy et al. (2004: 188), belonging to another research tradition (see 
Section 2.2), define economic impact as 'the total spending which takes place', 
including spending that is not additional. They introduce the term 'economic 
development' for the effects that lead to economic growth, so (including) additional 
expenditures, or in the terminology of the publications referred to above 'economic 
impact'.
Here, following Burns et al. (1986), Crompton (1995) and Gratton and Taylor (2001) 
the economic impact study is defined as 'a study measuring the growth of the 
economy caused by additional expenditures'. These additional expenditures are 
caused by a new or incidental phenomenon, such as a sports event. To calculate the 
effect of additional expenditures, an input-output model, or multipliers might be 
used. However, if expenditures are not additional (for example, when they are 
switched from other local destinations), the use of multipliers is not permitted. In this 
case the expenditures indicate the economic importance of the phenomenon, not the 
economic impact.
Although this thesis conforms to a general use of terminology, a refinement of the 
concept is introduced here. The refinement is that the 'additionality' is to be 
established by a comparison of two situations. For example, to determine the 
additional expenditures during Euro 2000, a 0 and a 1 situation is used:
1. The 0 situation is that Euro 2000 is hosted by another European country (not 
the Netherlands and Belgium);
2. The 1 situation is that Euro 2000 is hosted by the Netherlands (and Belgium).
This refinement is nothing else than an explicit statement of what normally is 
implicitly assumed: that the impact is in fact the change compared with a reference
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situation. Auld and McArthur (2003) labelled a similar approach incremental 
analysis'. They state (p. 193):
"Concentration on the changes in costs and revenues that arise from an event does not imply 
the unimportance of those that would occur anyway: it simply means that those revenues and 
costs are irrelevant in estimating the impact (Italics in the original.)
To give an example of the application of the 0 situation: sometimes it is assumed that 
export or 'foreign demand' leads to additional growth (Jokovi 1996, Dobson 2000, 
Sandy et al. 2004). Stated this way, this is dubious. Exports themselves do not lead to 
growth; only a positive change in, in other words additional exports, may lead to 
growth. As a consequence, it is not correct to apply multipliers to foreign demand, 
but only to the additional parts of this demand.28 To put it in another way: when a 
multiplier is applied to 'normal' or 'existing' (foreign) demand, the implicit 
assumption is that all of this demand is additional: in other words, the 0-situation is 
that this demand is non-existent. In the case of an international sports event this 
assumption might be realistic.29 However, for measuring the economic impact of the 
sports business in a specific city, the reference situation is more complicated. Is the 
complete absence of this industry a realistic alternative? Because of the difficulties of 
finding a realistic 0 situation, measuring the economic impact of the sports sector, 
supposing that is possible, is conceptually more complicated than measuring the 
economic impact of a sports event.
This underlines the importance of an explicit 0 situation: whether demand is 
additional can only be established by reference to the alternative or 0 situation. The 
economic impact is the change in expenditures, or additional expenditures. The
28 The 'economic base theory' differentiates between basic sectors and non-basic sectors. 
Branches earning their money predominantly by exports are considered 'basic sectors'. The analysis 
here is basically Keynesian and from a Keynesian point of view, instead choosing for export branches 
as 'base industry', investments branches (construction) or government branches (for example, 
education or health care) are equally fit to be labelled 'basic sectors'.
29 Sandy et al. (2004:193), the reference situation chosen in this research is slightly different, see 
section 4.3.
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difference in (net) real income between these situations is considered to be the (net) 
benefit (or cost) of the event. The use of real income as an indicator for benefits will 
be further discussed in Section 3.3.
Social impact assessment (intangibles)
In the economics literature, social effects that are not directly measurable in monetary 
terms are grouped together as 'intangibles'. Sometimes a distinction is proposed 
between incommensurables (physically measurable but no price) and intangibles 
(not physically measurable), although other authors reject this distinction (Lichfield 
et al. 1975; Sassone and Schaffer 1978). There seems to be no procedure for 
determining which social impacts may be of relevance, this is apparently for the 
researcher to determine, depending on the characteristics of the project under 
consideration (Dwyer et. al 2001).
Before 2000, when the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted, the standardized 
methodology available for identifying and clustering social impacts related to sports 
events were the approaches by Ritchie (1984) and Hall (1992) (see section 2.2). 
However, more recently, some articles have aimed at further developing a standard 
approach.
An article by Fredline et al. (2003) sets out from the taxonomy by Ritchie (1984) and 
Hall (1992). Based on this taxonomy they identify 42 items that might be relevant for 
social impact assessment. The clustering of 42 items related to social impacts is 
decided on empirical grounds by factor analysis of the received questionnaires. What 
is interesting though is that the authors let the respondents differentiate between 
judgement on personal well-being and that on social well-being, which adds a new 
dimension to the original taxonomy.
The authors end up with six factors (in order of importance):
1. Social and economic development benefits;
2. Concerns about justice and inconvenience;
3. Impact on public facilities;
4. Impacts on behaviour and environment;
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5. Long-term impact on community;
6. Impact on prices of some goods and services.
These six factors should cover the 42 different items. The final clustering of the 
different items is not by scientific discipline; for example, social impacts (opportunity 
for socializing) are grouped together with economic impacts (money spent helps the 
economy) under 1. This in itself is an interesting result and is a step away from the 
Ritchie-Hall taxonomy. However, the original distinction between personal and 
social impact judgment cannot be found in Fredline's final 6 factors.
Delamere et al. (2001) develop a scale that measures residents' attitudes towards 
events: the FSIAS (Festival Social Impact Attitude Scale, comparable to the Tourism 
Impact Attitude Scale TIAS). Delamere et al. (2001) take two dimensions of social 
impacts into account:
- Social vs. private impacts;
- Cost vs. benefits.
Like Fredline et al. (2003), the dimension social vs. private impact is distinguished, 
and an additional dimension of costs and benefits has been added. Although the 
article by Delamere et al. (2001) was published after the construction of the 
questionnaires, the dimensions social vs. private and cost-benefit are quite in line 
with the approach taken in this study.
Promotional effects, the effects on image and awareness of host city and country in 
other countries, should be mentioned separately. These are generally considered to 
be among the most important effects of sports events (Delamere 2001; Fredline et al. 
2003; Carlsen et al. 2001; Emery 2001). These effects do not belong to the economic 
impact, as defined earlier. Promotional impacts are therefore a subset of the social 
impacts. Ritchie and Smith (1989) was one of the first attempts to quantify these 
effects. In their article, name awareness of Calgary in foreign countries was measured 
before and after the Winter Games. A similar approach was adopted in this study, 
which will be discussed in Chapter 4.
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The conclusion may be that the articles on social impacts give some information 
about the indicators which could be used and which are actually used in pre- and 
post-event evaluation. However, most of the effects are more of a common sense 
nature than resting on a firm theoretical base, perhaps with the exception of the 
contribution by Smith (2001) on image, and the measurement of economic impact as 
discussed earlier.
An economic typology of social effects
With these concepts in mind, the earlier classification of Ritchie (1984) can be 
modified into an economic approach.
Table 3.1 Types of impact of hallmark events: an economic approach
Economic -> 
method
Manifestations
Impact Benefits Costs
Economic /  financial 
impact (tangibles)
• Additional income in 
the region
• Tax income
• Employment 
opportunities
• Sponsoring of events
• Investment in venues
• Expenditures for safety 
control
• Tickets/merchandise
Other social impacts 
(intangibles)
• Social cultural
• Promotional impact
• Psychological impact
• Physical impact
• Socializing with family 
and friends
• Fraternization
• Improved image of the 
region
• Improved awareness 
of the region
• Increased awareness of 
the region as a holiday 
destination
• Civil pride
• Enhanced 
organizational 
capabilities
• Social tensions within 
families
• Irritation because of 
over exposure media
• Deteriorated image of 
the region
• Reduced feelings of 
safety
• Xenophobic feelings
• Traffic congestion
• Damage to properties
Table 3.1 is a re-interpretation of Ritchie's table (Table 2.1), and shows how the 
original typology might be interpreted in terms of costs and benefits. A second 
distinction should be made between private and public costs and benefits.
The following typology of economic and social effects can be used. Social effects can 
be divided into two types: 1) economic impact; and 2) other social impacts 
(intangibles).
1) 'Expenditure effects' are the effects caused by (additional) expenditures, e.g. from 
visitors attending a sports event. These effects are: added value, income, and 
employment (in a certain region). These effects are also labelled economic impact or 
financial effects.
2) 'Other social effects' are all the other impacts that might be looked at through 
economic spectacles. These effects are also called 'intangible', and in this thesis 
they are referred to as 'non-financial effects'. The intangible effects can be further 
subdivided into a) specific intangible effects; and b) generic intangible effects.
a) 'Specific intangible effects' are effects of a phenomenon which are beneficial to 
specific persons (or organizations), but which, nevertheless, are not (directly) 
visible in the form of financial transactions.
• An example is the media exposure of the sponsors. In principle, only the 
sponsor benefits from these effects. In the long term, these effects may lead 
to additional sales. That is why the sponsor took the decision to sponsor 
the event in the first place. However, in the short run, no direct financial 
benefits can be registered.
• Another example is a giant television screen that might be placed by cafe 
owners in a public square for watching the matches. In some cases, other 
firms might benefit from this screen, because it brings them additional 
customers. This is an externality, but which favours only a specific group 
of people.
b) Generic intangibles are intangible effects of a sports event that are beneficial 
(or detrimental) to (almost) every citizen. No one can be excluded from
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picking the (sometimes bitter) fruits of these effects. These effects are also 
known as 'non-excludable external effects' (Van den Doel and Van Velthoven 
1993). An example is the promotional value of a sports event. If a city becomes 
better known because of a sports event, every citizen of this city may profit 
from this effect.
Although intangible effects are not 'visible' by means of financial transactions, this 
does not mean that they do not have economic value. It is often quite possible to try 
to find some monetary value for these effects, or to give an indication of their 
magnitude by circumstantial evidence, as will be shown in Chapter 4, when the 
results of Euro 2000 are discussed.
3.3 Cost-benefit analysis
3.3.1 The traditional approach
There is hardly any difference of opinion about the question whether an impact 
analysis in itself provides enough information for public decision making: it does 
not. An economic impact analysis gives only partial results: no public costs of events 
are included. When undertaken as recommended, social impact assessments might 
then give a partial contribution to the evaluation of public policy (or of the use of 
money). How to proceed to come to a full judgment? The function of an evaluation 
technique is precisely this: to prescribe how to come to a judgment based on 
assessments of relevant impacts. An evaluation technique in its ideal form is 
comprehensive: all relevant effects and information as well as all groups affected 
should be taken into account (Lichfield et al. 1975: 5).
The obvious economic candidate for such a comprehensive approach is CBA, because 
this method includes the costs, by definition. A CBA is commonly described as an 
instrument for the rational allocation of scarce resources. It quantifies the net benefits 
of an investment or expenditure (Mishan 1976).
A firm might use a CBA to choose between investments. In that case, cost and 
benefits will be predominantly of a financial nature. In other cases, a CBA might be 
applied to public expenditures, such as public investments in infrastructure. For this
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purpose, the CBA need not be restricted to the financial costs and benefits. It is 
possible to include non-financial or intangible effects. For a new road, this might be 
savings in travel time, or damage to the environment. For a sports event, the effect 
upon the image of a city or country is an example of a non-financial or intangible 
effect. When the (social) benefits outweigh the (social) costs, it is legitimate to spend 
money on, for example, a sports event (Dasgupta and Pearce 1972, Sassone and 
Schaffer 1978, Mishan 1976, Layard and Glaister 1994, Rahmann et al. 1998, De 
Brucker et al. 1998, Eijgenraam et al. 2000, Hellendoorn 2001). In Figure 3.1, an 
example of the procedure of CBA is given.
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Figure 3.1 CBA: a conventional approach
Social value
(approximated by)
T
CBA
Tangible effects
Changes in consumers' surplus/W TP 
Opportunity costs
T
Effects on income distribution 
(or Hicks Kaldor)
▼
Political process: decision *4
Positive: public money Negative: no public money
As the figure indicates, the basic procedure of a cost-benefit is that costs and benefits 
of a specific project are identified and, as far as possible, translated into financial 
terms. If the translation of effects into monetary values is not possible, the effects 
might be judged in the political process.
Intangible effects 
(other social effects)
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In an economic sense, the benefits are the change in wealth that can be attributed to 
an investment. In the traditional literature benefits have been related to changes in 
the consumers' surplus or willingness to pay (WTP). The consumers' surplus is the 
intramarginal utility of separate units up to the last unit bought by a consumer (see 
Annex 3). Consumers' surplus can be measured by the slope of the demand curve, 
and is supposedly a better approximation of welfare than (changes in real) income. 
This issue will be investigated further below.
For analytical reasons a distinction is often made between 'primary' and 'secondary' 
benefits. If a new road is built, the reduction in travel time is a primary benefit. 
Primary benefits are the benefits that are related to the main objective of the project. 
A secondary benefit is the additional economic activity caused by the road. As might 
be clear from the example, the literature on CBA focuses on large-scale investments, 
especially in infrastructure, health, and projects in developing countries (Pearce 1983; 
Layard and Glaister 1994). The term 'economic impact' usually is reserved for 
secondary effects (Sassone and Schaffer 1978).
There are a number of specific concepts and issues related to CBA, some of which are 
derived from welfare economic foundations (Mishan 1976), and other are very much 
confined to the 'art of making CBAs.' The concepts relevant to our purpose here 
are:30
1. Measuring the benefits: consumers' surplus, economic impact and CBA
2. Measuring the costs: opportunity costs
3. The political assessment: effects on income distribution
According to Crompton (1995: 33), the procedure for including economic impact 
analysis in a CBA is straightforward:
30 Not all concepts are discussed. The notion of social discount rate, which is prevalent in many 
cost-benefit manuals, is not discussed, because it is not relevant for an evaluation that is limited to 
short-term effects.
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'Incorporating costs into a study changes it from an economic impact analysis to a 
benefit cost analysis, and in the author's view this is the information decision makers 
should be using when evaluating alternative investments'
However, the procedure of incorporating an economic impact study into a CBA is 
not that simple. The debate on the role of economic impact in CBA focuses on two 
different issues: first the admissibility and second the usefulness of an economic impact 
study in a CBA.
Concerning the admissibility of economic impact in a CBA, some authors defend the 
position that at least there are tensions between the basic concepts of a CBA and 
economic impact analysis, which make it difficult to reconcile the techniques. One of 
the main issues is that the main indicator used for welfare, consumers' surplus, does 
not include economic impact effects (De Brucker et al. 1998, Burgan and Mules 2001).
The usefulness of economic impact in a CBA is a point of discussion as well. The 
point raised is that external effects, and not economic impact, should be decisive for 
public decision making (Van Puffelen 1996).
To clarify these issues, a further investigation into the theoretical foundations of cost- 
benefit analysis is mandatory.
3.3.2 Theoretical foundations of cost-benefit analysis
As indicated by the adjective 'political' in the old fashioned name for economics, 
'political economy', this discipline traditionally analysed social issues for the purpose 
of giving political advice on actual problems, especially on revenues and 
expenditures of monarchs (Schumpeter 1954/1994, Sage 2001). Later, building on the 
foundations laid out by Adam Smith (1776), part of economic theory has been 
devoted to the analysis of the workings of the (national) economy and of the 
importance of markets for the efficient allocation of productive resources. Another 
part of economic theory pays attention to state behaviour and welfare in general, 
building on utilitarian concepts laid out by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). It adresses 
the question: Can economic theory help to decide what is sound economic policy, not
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only in terms of efficient production, but also in terms of social welfare? This is the 
central theme of welfare economics.
Since the writings of Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), most economists have abandoned 
the idea that utilities are interpersonally comparable, and can be aggregated. A 
society is considered to be in a Pareto-optimal state if no transactions can be carried 
out, by which at least one person benefits, while the others stay equal. This criterion 
is in fact Pareto's solution to scrutinize the effects of policy on welfare, while 
avoiding the need to judge between levels of welfare between subjects.
It can be shown theoretically that, under the assumptions of perfect competition 
(utility maximization by subjects, absence of externalities, profit maximization by 
firms, no increasing returns to scale etc. see Sassone and Schaffer 1978: 56-58) and 
general equilibrium, market prices exactly reflect the marginal rate of substitution 
between products (the equimarginal principle) and the costs of production. The 
resulting general equilibrium is Pareto-optimal. Moreover, in this situation, market 
prices reflect social and private costs and benefits of production (Sassone and 
Schaffer 1978).
If perfect competition is the starting point, several lines of thought can be followed 
regarding the need for collective action, and thus for valid procedures and criteria for 
public decision making:
- The consumer's surplus approach (Marshall, Hicks);
- The externalities approach (Pigou, Samuelson, Coase);
- The social welfare function approach (Samuelson, Arrow).
Consumers’ surplus
The fundamental principle on which the original idea of consumer's surplus rested, 
was that the slope of the demand curve revealed information about the marginal 
utility to a consumer of a product. The total area under the demand curved 
measured, so it was thought, the valuation not only of the last, marginal unit bought 
by the consumer (the price) but also all the other units bought, i.e. the intra-marginal
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units (Mishan, 1976) Therefore, a better measure for 'wealth' than price times 
quantity (p*Q) is the total area under the demand curve. Thus, as long as the demand 
curve is downward sloping and the subject consumes more than one unit, some 
surplus in 'wealth' is experienced. Moreover, this surplus can be measured in money.
For a further discussion of the concept see annex 3. Later modifications of the concept 
(Hicks 1956, Mishan 1976) have used the 'compensated demand curve', in which 'real 
income' instead of the nominal income is retained. In the case of a rise in price the 
area under this curve is equal to the Compensating Variation (CV) in income (Deaton 
and Muellbauer 1989). It should be remembered that in the recent interpretations the 
area below the demand curve is not a proxy for wealth; it only indicates the CV in 
the case of a change in prices. In addition, as Samuelson and Deaton and Muellbauer 
have pointed out, the CV can, sometimes more conveniently, be approached using 
the theory of index numbers, or just by changes in nominal income.
The CV is often empirically estimated by asking respondents their 'willingness to 
pay'. Another formulation is that the consumer's surplus is the amount that a 
consumer would be willing to pay, minus the actual price. This is actually a very 
similar concept to the CV, and not the same as the Marshallian concept of consumers' 
surplus (Samuelson 1983, Deaton and Muellbauer 1989). However, the term 
consumer's surplus is unfortunately still widely used in CBA (Mishan 1976, Pearce 
1983, Sassone and Schaffer 1978).
The relationship between the (Marshallian) concept of consumers' surplus and the 
empirical concept of willingness to pay (WTP) is highly questionable. However, in 
situations where the marketprice does not reflect the the costs of production (or 
scarcity) the concept of WTP might be used for establishing the difference between 
the marketprice and the value to the consumer. An example which is relevant in the 
context of this thesisi is the price of tickets for popular football matches. Some of the 
matches of Euro 2000, especially those of the hosting country, are sold out at a very 
early stage.
It is safe to assume that the actual value, expressed in money, of at least a part of the 
tickets, exceeds the actual price. This is underpinned by the existence of a black
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market for those tickets. In other words: the owners of the tickets experience a 
surplus value over the market price. Again, this surplus value is often referred to as 
consumer's surplus, but it is different from the Marshallian notion.
It is interesting to note that the circumstance that spectators do not pay the 'full' 
market price is not Pareto-efficient. After all, the welfare of some could be improved, 
while no one experiences a loss, which is the criterium for a Pareto-improvement. 
Some could sell their ticket for a higher price, experiencing a gain in welfare to 
others, who also reach a higher level of satisfaction. This is, of course, exactly what 
happens on the black market, therefore in a Pareto sense, a black market increases 
social welfare. Nevertheless, traders on a black market are to a great extent 
criminalized, especially by the LOC. Probably this is not only because of the high 
ethics of the LOC but at least partly also because this money does not flow in their 
own pockets.
It can be expected that an auction system by the Internet will be established in the not 
too far future. The consequences on social welfare will be discussed in Chapter 6.
Externalities
The state has a monopoly on taxing; it is not an organization to which people 
voluntarily contribute, or whose products they choose to buy. This monopoly may be 
legitimised by the utility to the citizens of its expenditures, and this valuation might 
be expressed through some democratic procedure. However, under the standard 
neoclassical assumptions, the provision of goods by the market is Pareto-optimal. An 
intervention by the government might be justified if some members gain in real 
income, while nobody loses by the intervention. The minimum requirement for such 
an intervention is that real income increases. However, besides an intervention that 
may cause an increase in total real income, the legitimisation for public intervention 
might be when the neoclassical assumptions do not hold. This could be the case if 
there is a kind of 'market failure'. Two types of market failure are often cited in the 
economic literature: externalities and public goods.
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The concept of externalities is associated with Pigou (Samuelson 1983, Mueller 
2003).31 The idea was that for some goods the market prices did not reflect the true 
costs of production or the benefits of consumption. This might be the case when the 
production of a specific good causes environmental damage, a damage which is not 
reflected in the price of this good. The decisions by individuals based on pure 
marginal calculation do not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome, because goods with 
negative externalities are too low priced and probably overproduced. A government 
could ensure that by taxes the true costs are incorporated and thus increase total 
welfare (Mueller 2003).
Another exception is public goods, which can be defined as "goods with benefits 
from which nobody can be excluded', and as 'goods with no rivalry consumption'. 
Different combinations of both characteristics can be incorporated in a good, i.e. a 
good can possess either one characteristic or both characteristics. An example of 
'non-excludability' but 'rivalry consumption' is travelling on a crowded street. As in 
this example, often the problem of excludability is technical, and indeed technical 
devices are now tested in several parts of Europe which price the use of roads. An 
example of non rival but excludable consumption is the use of a (not crowded) 
bridge. Exclusion is possible, but (often) not feasible (Musgrave and Musgrave 1984).
According to Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) the characteristic of non-rival 
consumption (but excluding possible) yields a case for public intervention; whereas 
rival consumption (but exclusion not feasible) is a type of market failure, but not 
necessarily a case for public intervention.
If both characteristics apply it is common to speak of 'pure public goods' (Van den 
Doel and Van Velthoven 1993, Mueller 2003).32 An example is the provision of dykes
31 Pigou (1946) himself did not use the concept of externality in this way. He differentiated 
between the social and the private net product. Pigou (1946: Chapter 9). The term external economies 
or diseconomies, later shortened to externalities, was introduced by Marshall and modified by 
Samuelson, see Mishan (1976) and Coase (1988: 23).
32 The term 'pure public good' is ascribed to Samuelson (1954), though in this article Samuelson 
refers to 'collective goods'. Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) call these goods 'social goods'.
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to protect civilians against flood33, or an army to protect against enemies. 
Traditionally, a public good is defined as having a positive impact on welfare, 
whereas an externality has a negative impact. However, what is analytically more 
important is that an externality has a specific impact on a limited group of persons, 
whereas the public good is, by definition, of a non-excludable nature: it affects all the 
community.
In fact, the argument of public goods and externalities is very similar. It can be 
shown that public goods and externalities have the same Pareto optimality 
conditions (Mueller 2003). Therefore, traditional externalities are labelled "excludable 
externalities', and public goods 'non-excludable externalities'.
It is possible to expand the reach of externalities even further. Hennipman (1981) 
states that externalities can be interpreted as the interdependence of utilities between 
subjects. He gives the example of voluntary welfare donations by rich to poor people. 
This might raise the welfare of both groups, because the welfare of the rich may 
depend on the welfare (or income) of the poor. Interpreted this way, externalities 
may include virtually all types of market failure. It is this expanded interpretation of 
external effects which is used throughout this thesis. As this interpretation is not 
crucial to the main argument, the reader may substitute this term with a formulation 
of his/her preference.
Coase (1988) has argued that, in the case of excludable externalities, negotiations 
between subjects will result in a Pareto-optimal distribution (a result which is known 
as the Coase-theorem). This conclusion may also hold in the case of non-excludable 
externalities and small groups of people, when contracts bind the participants. 
However, when groups are sufficiently large and the externalities are non­
excludable, a rational calculating subject will not join the negotiations and 
voluntarily sign a contract. (Mueller 2003: 38) concludes:
33 It is interesting to note that in the Netherlands dykes were historically not maintained by the 
state, but by specific semi voluntary organizations, the 'waterschappen'. This might point to the 
relevance of Coase's theorem even for public goods.
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"When a non-excludable public good is involved, it may be necessary to require that all 
members of the community participate in the writing of the binding contract to provide it."
This is very similar to the social contract theory of government. The conclusion might 
be that governmental intervention according to this line of thought can be legitimised 
when two criteria have been met:
1) The benefits are of a non excludable nature;
2) The group affected is too large to make negotiations a realistic alternative.
The social welfare function
Pigou (1946) distinguished between private and social net benefits from 
consumption. A (private) utility function is a convenient way to describe the 
marginal private benefits. Would it be possible to construct, in a similar fashion, a 
social utility function, which describes the social benefits and which can be 
maximized along the same lines as a private utility function? Thus, the social welfare 
function (SWF) was introduced by Bergson (1969) and adopted by Samuelson (1983) 
and others (see Mueller 2003). The SWF, which need not be a mathematical function, 
but could also be a procedure, describes how to derive social preferences from 
private preferences (utilities).
Within the neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition etc., i.e. no market 
failures, the private and social welfare functions are identical and should lead to the 
same price structure and factor allocation. For individuals, the marginal rate of 
substitution between goods is equal to their price ratio. Moreover, the prices are the 
so-called 'Lagrangian multipliers7 generated by the solution to the linear 
optimisation problems (Mueller 2003). However, in the case of a divergence between 
private and social net benefits, the SWF should help to establish a set of optimal 
prices and allocations, leading to a maximum in social welfare. The Lagrangian 
multipliers should reflect the social prices (or shadow prices).
The SWF is a procedure that translates the individual preferences into collective ones. 
One of the requirements of any SWF is that its preferences should show transitivity:
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if A is preferred to B, and B to C, then A should be preferred to C. However, Arrow 
(1963) showed that under some relatively mild assumptions, there is no procedure 
that can guarantee transitivity of the outcome, the so-called Arrow impossibility 
theorem (Van den Doel and Velthoven 1993; Mueller 2003).
Arrow's theorem has inspired several interpretations of the 'real world' and 
historical democratic processes. Some authors point to Plato's 'The Republic', in 
which Plato dismissed democratic voting procedures and propagated a rule of wise 
men, taking decisions along technocratic lines (Mueller 2003). Others have stressed 
the cultural consensus which must underlie any collective decision making process 
in order to yield satisfactory results (Van den Doel and Velthoven 1993).
Arrow's theorem is based on the post-Pareto assumption that interpersonal 
comparison of utilities is not possible. However, under the pre-Pareto assumptions of 
cardinal measurement and interpersonal comparability of utilities, a consistent SWF 
is possible (Dasgupta and Pearce 1972, Mueller 2003). Among others, Harsanyi (1955) 
explores this route, who thereby turns full circle, back to Jeremy Bentham. However, 
Harsanyi (1955) refines the classical position by making a distinction between an 
individual social utility (function), which includes interpersonal comparison of 
utilities, and an individual private utility, for which the Pareto assumptions still hold.
My interpretation is that there is no technical or arithmetical solution for the problem 
of aggregating individual preferences, unless the dominant point of view, in which 
utilities are incomparable, is abandoned. This abandonment might be accepted for a 
specific class of preferences that are considered of relevance for public decision 
making. An important question is then which preferences might be compared and 
added (the 'individual collective preferences') and which belong to the sacred area of 
the 'individual private preferences'. The question might point to the function of 
politicians in the collective decision making process: their function could be 
described as deciding which preferences are considered relevant for collective 
decision making and subsequently to transform the potentially inconsistent 
aggregate individual preferences into consistent public choices. Their task is
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impossible without making an analytical distinction between private and social 
preferences.
3.3.3 An appraisal of CBA, EIA and welfare economics 
Neoclassical welfare economics and CBA
In a strict sense, CBA, being a decision rule, is not compatible with welfare 
economics, based on neoclassical microeconomics. CBA is of a procedural nature. In 
the standard neoclassical world of welfare economics there are no decision 
procedures, there is just an optimal choice. In this choice there is no difference 
between prices, values and marginal costs. In this situation costs equals oppurtunity 
costs, equals benefits.
In cost-benefit literature, the opportunity costs are defined as the benefits of the best 
alternative. To give an example of this principle: consider the situation where a boss 
asks an employee to work overtime, and rewards him for this with additional 
income. Now the benefit is the income (and maybe making a good impression on the 
boss). The costs however, depend on the employee's alternatives for the evening: if 
he particularly wants to go to a concert, his -  subjective -  costs are much higher than 
if he had an obligation to go to a boring reception.
Under the conditions of perfect competition the (opportunity) costs are equal to the 
market prices (Dasgupta and Pearce 1972, Mishan 1976, Sassone and Schaffer 1978). 
If the neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition are fulfilled, there is no such 
thing as opportunity costs, different from market prices. Market prices reflect the 
costs (and at the same time the benefits for the counterpart) of the best alternative 
and are thus the opportunity costs. For a (marginal) project in a setting of 
neoclassical perfect competition, benefits and (opportunity) costs are all reflected in 
the market prices (Knight 1969).34
If the government were one of the parties competing on a perfectly competitive 
market, the costs would simply be the prices paid for inputs on the market (for
34 See Samuelson (1983), footnote 234.
60
example the salary of police officers). If the costs are out-of-pocket expenditures, 
taking the market price often is quite a satisfactory indicator for the social costs.
Income distribution
A valuation of the effects of a project on income distribution is not an integral part of 
the traditional CBA (Dasgupta and Pearce 1972, Pearce 1983). Applying the Pareto 
criterion means that only resulting income distributions in which there is no real 
income loss for any subject involved, can be considered a gain in wealth. CBA 
provides no guidelines for other situations, with other effects on income 
distribution.35 Several remedies are suggested, ranging from ignoring the problem, 
by assuming that redistribution is achieved by the tax and social security system 
(application of the Hicks-Kaldor principle, see Mishan 1976), to a secondary analysis 
of the effects on income distribution and the application of a weighing procedure 
(Pearce 1983).
To circumvent this conclusion, some authors call on the Hicks-Kaldor rule or 
principle (Pearce 1983; Sassone and Schaffer 1978). The rule can be stated as follows: 
the government is allowed to intervene, when the benefits for the winners outweigh 
the losses for the losers. This principle can also be interpreted in such a way that it is 
assumed that the question concerning the change in total income can be separated 
from the question concerning the distribution of this change in income (Mishan 
1976). Whether and how the losers will be compensated is a matter for income policy, 
and will be solved at a later stage (or swept under the rug, Layard and Walters 1994). 
However, the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle is not a good indicator for Pareto 
improvements, because effects on income distribution may also change prices, and 
thus real income. This led Scitovsky (1941) to propose comparing the effects of a 
project on (total) real income with the effect of redistribution on (total) real income. 
This (again) presupposes knowledge of the true cost of living index, or, which is the 
same, of all indifference curves. In Chapter 7 this issue will be re examined.
35 This lacune is particularly serious in the case of development projects, in which an 
improvement in income of the poor is the main objective.
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These observations do not mean that CBA is therefore flawed. In fact, it could be 
considered a shortcoming of the neoclassical theory that it cannot explain the use of 
CBA, or other economic procedures used "in the real world' (Simon 1945, and see 
also Coase 1994). Neither does it mean that theoretical concepts or insights from 
welfare economics cannot be fruitfully applied in CBA and its relationship with EIA. 
However, it does undermine the claim that CBA is directly derived from welfare 
economics, at least when it uses the neoclassical Weltanschauung. However, the 
neoclassical assumptions might still be used as an analytical device.
The conclusion is valid that there is no ground to reject the use of an economic 
impact study on the ground that it is fundamentally incompatible with CBA on 
welfare-theoretical grounds. However, there are reasons to question the usefulness of 
an economic impact study precisely on welfare theoretical grounds. This will now be 
elaborated.
CBA, EIA and welfare economics
The standard measure for welfare change is change in real income. Changes in real 
income might be caused by price changes or by changes in nominal income. These 
can be measured or approximated by either willingness to pay (WTP), or by 
observed changes in prices or by observed changes in nominal income. Welfare 
theorists have abandoned the concept of consumers' surplus, which was once part of 
welfare economics, at least in its original form. What is left is the Compensation 
Variation concept, which is the same as a change in real income.
A temporary, one-off large sports event is likely to have temporary effects on 
demand in a region.36 These changes in demand may lead to a (temporary) rise in 
nominal (and real) income.37 This rise in (real) income resulting from a large sports
36 The evaluation of a series of events is a form of policy evaluation, be it tourism policy or 
sports policy. See Sandy et al. (2004) for an evaluation of longer-term economic effects of sports policy.
37 The link between additional demand and income changes (which is a proxy for real income 
changes) can be established quite straightforwardly by input-output analysis.
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event can quite straightforwardly be incorporated into a CBA. At first sight, there 
seems to be no objection, at least from a welfare theoretical point of view.
However, there has been much debate on the inclusion of economic impact in CBAs 
in the CBA literature (Dasgupta and Pearce 1972, Sassone and Schaffer 1978, De 
Brucker 1998). The question now is: Why is the inclusion of economic impact 
controversial? This is caused by the nature of the projects to which CBA is normally 
applied. It should be kept in mind that, in this literature, CBA is mostly applied to 
infrastructure (Mishan 1976). These projects affect real income indirectly, e.g. by 
lowering costs (prices) of production.38
In this literature economic impact effects are (sometimes) labelled as "secondary 
benefits'. Secondary benefits are understood as the effects upon the economy caused 
by a project. Secondary benefits then are, for example, new economic activity, new 
investments (known as forward linkages) or economic activity resulting from 
construction of the infrastructure itself (backward linkages). The substantial 
difference in opinion as to whether these secondary effects should be taken into 
account in a CBA has led some authors to formulate strict rules under which 
secondary benefits, or 'economic impact', may included as benefits in CBA (Sassone 
and Shaffer 1978, Dasgupta and Pearce 1972). These conditions are similar to what 
has been labelled in this thesis 'additionality' conditions (Section 3.2), and conditions 
concerning the employment of factors of production.
Burgan and Mules (2001: see Chapter 2, Section 2.2), acknowledging the restrictions, 
try to work around them by postulating a 'producers' surplus' (similar to the 
consumers' surplus). The approach by Burgan and Mules is needlessly troublesome. 
A main objective of a sports event is to attract visitors, who spend money. Benefits 
related to the main objectives of a project should be considered primary (Sassone and 
Schafer 1978). Expenditures by visitors are therefore not a 'secondary effect', on the 
contrary: the rise in income by additional expenditures is the primary benefit of a 
sports event.
38 Because the rise in real income is indirect, willingness to pay is a convenient measure for 
increase in real income.
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On a more fundamental level, another objection can be raised against including 
economic impact as a benefit. The argumentation is that, if factors are fully 
employed, "additional demand" can not exist and shifts in demand will only cause 
shifts in the allocation of resources to the branches in which face the additional 
demand, resulting in loss of production in the sector from which the resources are 
drawn. This argument presupposes a closed economy. This might be a justifiable 
simplification in case of an investment in infrastructure. In the reality of an 
international sports event, for which is an open economy is the relevant situation, the 
external visitors cause an increase in external demand (probably) resulting in 
additional income. To question this, would be the same as questioning that an 
increase in international trade may have positive income effects on an open 
economy.
The difference between financing a sports event and an investment in infrastructure 
can be illustrated by comparing it with evaluations within a firm. Suppose a firm has 
to evaluate a) an investment in machinery (infrastructure); and b) additional 
expentures on advertising (sports event).
In the case of an investment in machinery, the effects on sales are supposedly 
secondary: the primary effect is the increase in efficiency (lower costs) and eventually 
in profits (real income).
In the case of an advertising campaign the primary effect is to be expected on sales. 
Effects on efficiency (if any) are secondary.
Therefore, in the case of an investment in machinery, efficiency benefits should be 
the main effects to evaluate, and in the case of advertising, effects on sale are the 
main effects to evaluate.
A sports event differs in this respect substantially from an investment in 
infrastructure. In the case of sports events additional "sales", "economic impact" 
should be counted among the primary benefits. The inclusion of additional income 
caused by additional expenditures should therefore not be controversial at all.
Furthermore, welfare economics has also led to some insights about externalities and 
the relationship between individual and collective preferences. The main conclusion
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for public decision making is that government interference in competitive markets 
without externalities is not justifiable. If there are externalities, decentralized 
negotiations between the involved parties should be preferred to general 
governmental regulations, according to the Coase theorem. Only in the case of public 
goods with a large number of beneficiaries is there a ground for public intervention. 
Also theoretical developments concerning the SWF, Arrows' impossibility theorem, 
and the contribution by Harsanyi (Mueller 2003) seem to point in a similar direction: 
there is a case for a separation, even at the individual level, of judgments made on 
private considerations from those made on public considerations.
This leads us to the paradoxical conclusion that, although economic impacts are 'real 
primary' benefits for those involved in receiving the income, the relevance for public 
intervention can not be established. To put it more practically: Coase would probably 
agree with Thomson (1986: see subsection 2.4.3) when he suggested that the 
organizers of an event should turn to the hotel owners for funding, but he would 
probably add that the best way to achieve this is not by taxing, but by negotiations 
between those parties.
Another issue that was discussed was the concept of opportunity costs. If the 
government were one of the parties competing on a perfectly competitive market, the 
costs would simply be the prices paid for inputs on the market (for example the 
salary of police officers). If the costs are out-of-pocket expenditures, taking the 
market price often is quite a satisfactory indicator for the social costs.
If expenditures are not out of pocket, or there are other reasons why market prices 
clearly do not reflect social costs, the opportunity costs might guide the researcher in 
establishing the 'real cost'. In practice, it is, of course, impossible to test all possible 
alternatives, in order to find the best one. The practical solution to determine the 
costs in this case is to compare the proposed project (for example, the hosting of an 
event) with an alternative situation (not hosting the event).39 The social value of the 
public resources used is the value of the public services which are not provided in
This is similar to the procedure of comparing the 0 and 1 situation, as described in section 3.2.
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case of organizing the event; for example the diminished availability of police in 
other regions, because police officers are employed in the host cities. This may lead to 
higher crime levels outside the host cities. An approximation for the value of these 
unavailable government services is the sum of the salaries of police officers involved 
in security services. The assumption is in this case that the price for labour of police 
officers is a good enough approximation for the social value of police work.
The point is that those insights have no place in the conventional CBA technique, in 
which all interests, public and private, are lumped together into one account. To put 
it somewhat provocatively: the traditional CBA has integrated the flawed parts of 
welfare economics, such as consumers' surplus, while ignoring the more relevant 
developments, such as the theoretical developments on external effects, the Coase 
theorem, and the Arrow theorem.
3.4 A reconciliation of economic impact and cost-benefit analysis
3.4.1 Cost-benefit by multiple accounts
Most authors would agree that a CBA is to be preferred to an economic impact 
analysis. However, there is no consensus on the issue of whether an economic impact 
analysis can be integrated in a CBA and on the role and place of external effects in a 
CBA. In the traditional single account CBA there is no space for the public interest. 
Generally speaking, in these approaches a distinction is made between tangible and 
intangible effects, not between external and 'not external' effects.
The traditional CBA claims that it shows the gains and losses to society as a whole, 
and its result tends to be interpreted as an absolute judgment: either the project is 
socially feasible, or it is not. The political discussion is, in principle, restricted to 
weighing this outcome against other 'political priorities' and against intangibles that 
could not be assessed in the CBA itself. The political decision makers have to rely on 
the professional judgement of the economists. Some economists even go as far as to 
refer to 'political constraints' and complain that they are not given a completely free 
hand. The reliance on experts may lead to a potentially undemocratic situation of
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'rule by experts', and is one of the reasons why the technique of CBA is often 
discredited (Pearce 1983: 2).40
In a conventional CBA there is only one perspective: the national economy. To give 
an example: Mishan discusses at length the consequences of a bounty given by the 
national government to a local authority for a hospital. He remarks (1976: 77):
"... the [local] governmental authorities may insist that the bounty be entered as a cost- 
saving item in evaluating the project. In such cases, the economist, as a practical matter at 
least, may have to comply; his calculations are in fact being subjected to political constraints. 
For all that, he should make it clear in his report that the calculation is subject to this political 
element and that, on a strictly economic calculation, the bounty cannot be treated as a benefit, 
or cost-saving, item."
According to Mishan (1976), what is at stake here is the integrity of the economist. 
The question arises: Why not simply admit that, from the viewpoint of the local 
authority a bounty is a benefit, and from the viewpoint of the national government a 
cost? Why not make two cost-benefit accounts, one for the central government and 
one for the local authorities, and then negotiate on the bounty, on the basis of these 
accounts and the calculated costs and benefits for the parties? This touches upon the 
role and status of the government and its advisor, the economist: according to the 
conventional approach of CBA, the calculation of costs and benefits is a neutral, 
technical matter. However, according to the approach defended in this thesis, the 
calculations play an active role in the negotiations between interest groups (see 
section 2.3 and Chapter 7).
The point is that the consolidation of different interests into one account creates 
many of the theoretical difficulties that were identified in the preceding section. First,
40 The term political constraints' is used by Gramlich (1981: 50): "Often economists throw up 
their hands at 'political constraints', but just as often these constraints serve a valuable purpose (...) 
that certain morally offensive actions are ruled out." Gramlich (1981) and Pearce (1983) are among 
those writers on CBA who pay explicit attention to the relationship between political processes and 
CBA.
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it distorts the analysis of the difference between public and private costs and benefits. 
Second, it causes the lack of attention to the distribution of costs and benefits.
The solution is to simply split the consolidated account into different sub accounts: 
the local authorities; the central authorities; the local organizing committee; the local 
business sector, etc. The approach proposed here can be considered to be a slightly 
adapted version of the Planning Balance Sheet Analysis (PBSA) which was 
developed by Lichfield (Lichfield, Kettle and Whitbread 1975, Lichfield 1991).
This alternative has the following properties when compared with the single-account 
CBA:
a) It differentiates between public and private interests, costs and benefits;
b) It takes the distribution effects explicitly into account;
c) It integrates the results of an economic impact analysis.
As an example, the following interests in society are elaborated: a) industry; b) local 
authorities; and c) local organizing committee.
Table 3.2 Potential costs and benefits: industry
Costs Benefits
Financial costs Financial benefits
• Sponsoring
• Less turnover caused by crowding-out
• Expenditures authorities
• Expenditures LOC
• Expenditures visitors
Intangible costs Intangible benefits
• Negative publicity for sponsors • Promotion of city, region, country
• Promotion of sponsor firms
• Improved relations with customers because of 
relation ship marketing
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Table 3.3 Potential costs and benefits: public authorities
Costs Benefits
Financial costs Financial benefits
• Expenditures on safety and security
• Free transport for visitors
• Other expenditures
• Contributions from business community
• Tax income
Intangible costs (negative externalities) Intangible benefits (positive externalities)
• Nuisance, disturbance of the public order
• Image risk
• Promotion
• Improvement of the quality of living in the 
long run.
Table 3.4 Potential costs and benefits: LOC*
Costs Benefits
Financial costs Financial benefits
• Rent of stadiums
• Costs of ticketing
• Security
• Other costs
• Sponsor income
• Media-income
• Ticket income
Intangible costs (negative externalities) Intangible benefits (positive externalities)
• Riots, negative image • Improvement of organizational skills
• Promotional effects
* LOC= local organizing committee
On examining Tables 3.2 and 3.4, it becomes apparent that sponsor contribution in 
Table 3.2 is on the left, debit or cost side of the industry-account and on the right side 
of the organizing committee-account. This is logical, because for the sponsors it is 
expenditure, and for the organization it is income. The example, however, draws 
attention to the fact that sponsoring may be either an economic cost or a benefit. The 
label depends on the perspective. This is true for all financial costs and benefits (with 
'financial' meaning 'involving a money transfer between two parties').
The tables differentiate between financial and non-financial costs and benefits. 
Financial costs (and benefits) are positioned above the line, non-financial below. The 
accountancy truism that a cost for A implies a benefit for B applies to all financial 
transfers. However, it is not true for non-financial costs. The promotional value, for 
example, is a benefit for industry as well as for the citizens. Some of these non- 
financial effects are external effects. However, not all non-financial effects are 
external effects. For instance, the additional name awareness of a sponsor by his 
customers is a non-financial effect, but it is not an external effect (public benefit).
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This approach can be extended to any sector, or branch of industry. Figure 3.2 
illustrates the idea schematically. The (social) effects of a sports event will be valued, 
positively or negatively, by the different sectors in society. In the figure, the positive 
consequences are listed on the left-hand side of the tables, the negative effects on the 
right-hand side. Each sector has its own table with the line drawn between financial 
effects in the upper half of each table and non-financial effects in the lower half. The 
social value is not represented by one single account. The model can also be 
interpreted as a way to map the public decision making process.
70
Figure 3.2 Cost-benefit by multiple accounts
Other branches of 
industry
I/U b lie  sector
legend:
CBA account
financial transaction between 
sectors
financial effects/ economic 
impact
non-financial effects
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3.4.2 The function of economic impact analysis in public decision making
Public choice
What is the role of the government in this model? The key to the answer is the public 
account. Above the separation-line, the income, mainly taxes, is represented on the 
right-hand side, and the expenditures, for example, on police or subsidized 
transport, on the left-hand side.
Politicians can make their decisions based on these purely financial variables. It 
cannot be denied that the net expected benefit for the public sector is often an 
important argument for or against any subsidization. Apart from these financial 
effects, however, the government could also try to weigh the non-financial public 
costs and benefits. These are the 'external effects'.
However, how about the economic impact analysis? In this scheme, the direct 
economic impact is not weighed in the public decision making. This is because these 
benefits are primarily of a private nature. The expenditures of visitors on 
accommodation and food, for example, are a benefit to hotels and catering. However, 
some of these effects may also be valued as an external benefit. This might be the case 
when there is substantial unemployment and the economic impact results in 
substantial additional employment.
Input-output analysis
As stated above, it is possible to create as many accounts as needed, one for every 
separate interest. This may seem complicated, but in fact, there is already a similar 
set of accounts. These are the national accounts, kept in the Netherlands by the 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS). In the accounts, the financial transactions 
between different sectors are registered.
Every branch of industry has a row in the input-output table, which specifies the 
demand for its products, by other branches and by what is called 'final demand' 
(expenditures by consumers, investments and export). In the columns, the same 
branches are listed but the figures indicate the demand from the branches
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themselves. This table shows, for example, which supplies agriculture has bought 
from the cattle food industry, but also how much is imported from abroad. At the 
crossing of the row and column of agriculture the figure indicates what it delivers to 
itself, or to put it more precisely, what one farm within this branch delivers to 
another. One of the inputs for the branches of industry is labour, supplied by the 
consumers. The rewards for these inputs are the values added, and these can also be 
found in the input-output table.
It is possible to make a model based on these tables. Such a model can calculate the 
(short-term) effects of additional direct expenditures into the economy, based on the 
presumption that the productive output is determined by the additional demand 
(expenditures). It is called an "input-output model". An input-output model is an 
instrument to analyse the expenditure effects, especially on income. The input-output 
model is particularly suitable for simulating the financial part of a social CBA. In the 
same way that the additional value is determined in the national accounts, the extra 
additional value caused by the event can be calculated. These calculations can also 
serve a purpose for the government, for it is the base on which to determine the 
additional income tax.
An input-output model can be considered to be a type of equilibrium model, based 
on the assumption of fixed prices and production coefficients (Miller and Blair 1985). 
When additional demand is exercised upon the model, the sectors of production 
increase their production, using additional inputs. The direct effect is an increase in 
turnover in the branches in which the money was spent (for example, 
accommodation). The indirect effects are the effects that are caused by intermediary 
supplies, and the induced effects are the effects caused by the spending of the 
additional incomes that are earned. The effects presented in this thesis are the direct 
and indirect effects. Induced effects are not calculated, because their occurrence is 
controversial. According to some authors, they may be included only under strict 
conditions: for example, factors of production have to be unemployed and receive no 
unemployment benefits (Sassone and Schaffer 1978).
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Before the additional expenditures are fed into the input-output model, the direct 
expenditures should be adjusted concerning two aspects:
1) First, VAT has to be deducted from the expenditures;
2) Second, the expenditures have to be deducted that would lead straight away 
to additional import of goods and services.
The idea behind these adjustments is that these parts of the direct expenditures do 
not find their way through the economy. Tax income does not lead to the production 
of additional goods and neither do imports, at least for the Netherlands.
One additional euro (or one guilder, as the unit would have been one guilder for the 
Netherlands in 2000) spent creates a whole series of effects in different branches of 
industry which all make deliveries to each other. These "backward linkages" 
constitute the indirect effect of the initial direct expenditures. For example, €1 million 
could create €0.6 million additional turnover, making the total effect €1.6 million. 
Flowever, the word "could" should be stressed, because in reality the economy is not 
a deterministic mechanism with standard reactions. The reaction to additional 
demand can also be that, instead of buying additional inputs, the prices rise, or 
substitutes from other branches are used or additional input from outside the 
country is purchased. These reactions depend on the capacity utilization of the 
involved branches and also on the reactions of input suppliers to additional demand. 
The total effect on the economy depends therefore on the mix of reaction and choices 
of the involved suppliers. The reaction of a temporary rise in demand, like that 
resulting from Euro 2000, will probably be:
1. To utilize the existing capacity and resources as much as possible, for 
example, overtime work for employees in the catering sector, and,
2. If possible to raise prices, especially for accommodation, where (room) 
capacity is fixed in the short run.
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Value added
The sum of the direct expenditures and the indirect effects is the turnover created by 
the event. From a social and policy point of view, the additional turnover is not very 
relevant, because it is a gross figure. What is important is the additional income (and 
employment). One of the items in the input-output table is the value added created 
in a specific branch, which is the monetary reward for the input of labour. This value 
added is one of the main results of the input-output analysis, because it is equal to 
the additional income that is created.
3.5 Summary
The following typology of "economic effects' was presented: 1) expenditure effects 
and 2) non-expenditure effects.
Expenditure effects are the effects caused by (additional) expenditures, for example, 
made by visitors attending a sports event. These effects are: added value; income; 
and, employment (in a certain region). These effects are known as the economic impact 
or as financial effects.
The non-expenditure effects are all other effects, looked at through economic 
spectacles. These effects are also called 'intangible', and in this report they are 
referred to as 'non-financial effects'. These intangible effects can be further 
subdivided into a) generic non-tangible effects, which are the same as non-excludable 
externalities; and b) specific non-tangible effects.
Although non-tangible effects are not 'visible' by means of financial transactions, it is 
sometimes possible to find a monetary value for these effects.
The methodology for measuring economic impact is well established. However, 
there are several different opinions on the admissibility and usefulness of the 
economic impact studies for policy decisions. It was concluded that, although an 
economic impact study is admissible in a CBA (at least in the case of a sports event), 
its usefulness is questionable. Another conclusion is that a CBA is not as firmly 
linked to welfare theory as is normally suggested in textbooks on the subject.
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For pricing costs and benefits, welfare theory suggests using market prices, while for 
changes in wealth, real income should be the first indicator.
The distinction between private and public interests (and effects) is essential. An 
approach was chosen in which the single social cost benefit account is split into 
different accounts for different interests. One of the accounts represents the public 
interest. This approach was called the 'CBA by multiple accounts'. The economic 
impact is a part of the private accounts. However, some of the (employment) effects 
may be considered public interests and therefore could be located on the public 
account as non-financial external effects.
This chapter concludes the theoretical parts of this study, which have explored the 
foundations for an economic evaluation of Euro 2000. Now it is time to move from 
theory into methodology and then into practice in the next chapters. There the 
enhanced version of CBA is applied in an attempt to answer the intriguing question: 
Were the accounts of Euro 2000 in the black or in the red?
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4 Analytical framework
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter the practical implementations of the research concepts outlined in 
Chapter 3 are discussed. These elaborations constitute the analytical framework for 
the field research discussed in the chapters 5 and 6. First, in section 4.2, attention is 
paid to the layout and the number of accounts used. In section 4.3 the nature of the 
direct expenditures is discussed. The central question is: If the criteria of the previous 
chapter are applied to the economic effects resulting from Euro 2000, which 
expenditures are additional and which are not? In section 4.4 the concepts of direct 
and indirect expenditures are examined.
4.2 Lining up accounts
For the economic evaluation accounts for industry, the population and the 
government are used. Table 4.1 shows the account for industry. The costs are on the 
left-hand side of the account, the benefits on the right-hand side.
Table 4.1 Account for industry
Costs (debit)
Financial costs
Benefits (credit)
Financial benefits
Direct costs and expenditures related to Euro 2000 
(promotion, security, damage)
Bought supplies from other firms (inch import) 
Added value
Lost turnover because of crowding-out
Additional direct expenditures by 
visitors and LOC 
Deliveries to other firms 
Additional turnover because of Dutch 
staying at home
Non-financial costs Non-financial benefits
Time lost because of traffic congestion Promotion of the industry
Improved relations with clients, public
officials
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The table makes it clear that financial and non-financial effects are separate 
categories (these terms have been explained in Chapter 3.) Of course, financial effects 
are especially interesting for the business sector, but the financial effects are not the 
only effects valued by industry (or other sectors). Different actors weigh non- 
financial effects, such as promotional value, by their own preferences and form their 
opinion on the event. However, it may be clear that these effects are harder to 
quantify in money terms.
The economic impact is to be found under the headings 'expenditures by visitors' 
and 'deliveries to other firms'. The benefit for the business community is the 
additional turnover that was generated by Euro 2000, including the indirect 
turnover. The additional costs are the deliveries from other branches of industry and 
imports that are needed to produce the turnover. When the cost of deliveries is 
deducted from the turnover, the additional value is what is left, which is equal to the 
income that is generated by the event. This is the same as the financial net benefit for 
the business community. It is the balance (of the costs and benefits related to the 
additional turnover) and is therefore on the debit side of the account.
The economic impact is not only of relevance to industry. The value added is also 
important for the other sectors: population and the public sector. Some of the Dutch 
population received the additional value added caused by the event, in the form of 
wages, profit, interest or dividend. The benefits can also be found on the account of 
the population, on the right-hand side. This is because value added is a cost for 
industry but a benefit for the population.
Even the public sector benefits from the expenditures. First of all, part of the 
expenditures goes directly to the public account, in the form of value added tax 
(VAT). The common VAT rate in the Netherlands is 19%. Furthermore, the 
government levies income tax. This means that also a part of all wages, profit, 
interest and dividend is creamed off by tax. Of course, the government also has to 
pay some bills related to the event. The most important are the expenditures on 
safety measures. Also, during Euro 2000, public transport was subsidized by the 
government: every visitor with a ticket could use trains, subways and buses 'for free'
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on the day of a match. The effects below the line on the public account are the 
intangible costs and benefits; these are called 'external effects'. The external benefits 
are promotion for the country (Holland promotion); the negative external effects are 
the nuisance experienced by the population by aggressive supporters and possibly 
the effects on traffic.
4.3 Additional expenditures for the Netherlands
As a consequence of an event like Euro 2000, there are many possible different 
economic effects: expenditures by firms on advertising, expenditures by visitors on 
accommodation; the purchase by individuals of television sets to watch the matches 
etc. However, not all of these expenditures can be considered as additional. How can 
what is additional, and what is not, be determined?
In Chapter 3, the four 'golden rules' for an impact analysis were identified:
1. The geographical area for which the costs and benefits are calculated 
should be determined;
2. The economic direct expenditures have to be determined. For these 
direct expenditures, only the expenditures which are additional for the 
region under consideration may be taken into account;
3. It is preferable to use an input-output model to determine the value 
added of the event. If multipliers are used, only value added multipliers 
(or employment multipliers) may be used, no sales or turnover 
multipliers are allowed.
4. If an input-output model is used, a complementary investigation should 
be undertaken to determine whether the assumption of these kinds of 
models hold (for example, fixed prices).
There are two criteria to distinguish additional from non-additional expenditures:
1. Euro 2000 causes the expenditures. To check the relationship between Euro 
2000 and the effect, a 0 and a 1 situation is compared:
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a) The 0 situation is that the Euro 2000 is hosted by another country (not 
the Netherlands);
b) The 1 situation is that Euro 2000 is hosted by the Netherlands (and 
Belgium).
2. The expenditures are not just a shift in time or space. By 'space' is meant the 
region under consideration (see golden rule 1). The expenditures are therefore 
not dead weight expenditures, i.e. they are not compensated by a loss of 
expenditures elsewhere in time, or in the region under consideration, or 
between branches of industry.
Normally, additional expenditures are considered to be all the expenditures from 
outside the region. However, also the criterion of the 0 and 1 situation was 
introduced. A list of the most frequently mentioned economic effects of the event, 
and their 'additionality' is now discussed. An important issue to bear in mind is that 
exclusively economic effects that are characterized by some kind of expenditure in 
the year 2000 are treated in this section. This is just because economic impact was 
defined this way and does not mean that other type of effects, or expenditures that 
are not in the year 2000, are not important. An example of important effects are the 
promotional effects, which are left out but which may very well cause additional 
expenditures after 2000.
The following classification of expenditures is applied: (1) organizational 
expenditures; (2) tourism and travel related expenditures; and (3) other effects upon 
domestic demand.
1) Organizational expenditures are further classified as:
a) Expenditures by the organization (LOC) in the Netherlands;
b) Expenditures by the visiting teams;
c) Expenditures (investments) by the Dutch media for providing the 
international signal;
d) Investments for the preparation of the stadiums;
e) Expenditures by the Dutch government;
f) Expenditures by sponsors of Euro 2000.
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2) Tourism and travel related expenditures are classified as:
a) Foreign tourism;
b) Domestic tourism.
3) Other effects upon domestic demand are classified as:
a) Sale of VCR's and television sets and sale of alcoholic beverages to the Dutch 
population;
b) Commercials on television, expenditures on advertising.
In the next subsection the organizational expenditures that are directly related to 
Euro 2000 related are examined, in subsection 4.3.2 the tourism and travel related 
expenditures and in subsection 4.3.3 the other effects upon domestic demand.
4.3.1 Organizational expenditures
Expenditures by the local organizing committee (LOC) in the Netherlands
The tournament was organized by the Foundation Euro 2000, which was founded by 
the Dutch and Belgian Football associations. Uefa financed a large share of the 
expenditures, so these expenditures come from abroad. However, on closer 
inspection, not all income is from foreign sources. The three main sources of income 
for Uefa are the ticket sales, the broadcasting rights and the sponsoring of the event. 
An important share of the ticket sales are to Dutch supporters, so the benefits to the 
Dutch economy are partly not real, because they are financed by the Dutch 
themselves. As Dutch saying goes, it is like 'presenting a cigar from your own box'.
It is, therefore, important to map the different flows of money surrounding the 
tournament. Subsequently, the net money flow into the Dutch economy is calculated.
Expenditures by the visiting teams
Foreign teams stay in the host country until they are eliminated from the 
tournament. The travel costs are covered by the organizing country. However, their 
stay is to be financed by themselves. This can be considered to be an additional flow 
of money into the Dutch economy.
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Expenditures (investments) by the Dutch media for providing the international signal
The Dutch public television (NOS) and Belgium counterparts (RTBF) founded a joint 
venture, FORTO 2000. This joint venture was responsible for the international 
broadcasting of the matches. A share of the costs was covered by the broadcasting 
rights, and can be considered to be an additional demand from abroad.
Investments in the stadiums
The investments in the stadiums, which are made to extend their capacity or to 
upgrade their services, and are often required by the Uefa, should not be considered 
as additional for the Netherlands. There are a number of different arguments 
underlying this choice:
Burns et al. (1986) provided a first argument. They consider all investments, public or 
private, which are somehow financed from within the economy under consideration, 
as costs and not as benefits. A second argument is that a part or all of the investments 
are often only rescheduled in time. So, often a large sports event only helps these 
investments to be made earlier in time. Third, such an investment should be weighed 
against future benefits; i.e. t he future use of capacity. Therefore, a part of this 
investment is financed by 'domestic demand' in the future.
However, despite these arguments, not all authors take this point of view. Rahmann 
et al. (1998) consider the investments for the World Football Championship 2006 in 
Germany to be additional for the German economy.
Expenditures by the public authorities
Although there is some discussion on the subject of investments, and whether they 
are additional or not, on expenditures by the government there is consensus. They 
are not additional, with one exception. The exception is that expenditures by the 
national government can be considered additional from the regional point of view. 
This is the case when these expenditures would have flowed to other regions of the 
national economy in the 0 situation.
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The argument behind considering the government expenditures as not additional is 
that these expenditures can be considered as a shift. Under the ruling political 
agreements on budget policy in the Netherlands, additional expenditures should be 
compensated for by a cutback elsewhere. This means that other expenditures are 
replaced by the Euro 2000 expenditures.
Expenditures by sponsors of Euro 2000
There are two types of sponsors of any international football event. The first is the 
group of sponsors of the Uefa, including Carlsberg, Coca Cola, Fuji Film, Hyundai, 
JVC, MasterCard, McDonalds, Philips, PlayStation, Pringles, PSINet, and 
Sportal.com. They could call themselves 'Official sponsor of Euro 2000'. This group 
negotiated with the ISL, a company specialized in selling the broadcasting and other 
rights of sports (Simson and Jennings 1992). In return for their financial contribution, 
which can be estimated at €4.5 million for each sponsor, they could use the official 
Euro 2000 logo in their communications, and had access to tickets for the matches 
and other facilities.
The second group is what were known as 'Official Suppliers'. These were: Adecco, 
Adidas, Cisco Systems, Connexxion, KLM, Nashuatec, Telfort and TotalFina. Some of 
these official suppliers made their contribution in kind, others in cash, or a 
combination of kind and cash.
4.3.2 Travel and tourism
Clearly, there is a link between tourism and (sports) events.41 The visitors to an event 
are basically tourists: they use the same infrastructure as the regular tourists. From a 
tourism point of view, events can be considered as an attraction, the same as others. 
Attending an event may be a good 'excuse' for visiting a city or country. They may 
not be the main reason to visit, but give just the right incentive to consider a visit.
41 For an example of a tourism oriented approach towards events, see Getz (1991). See also 
Chapter 2, section 2.2.
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Sometimes, events may be the main reason to visit a city or country. This is certainly 
the case for sports events. It is known from research that 80-90% of the spectators of 
sports events come especially for the events (Jokovi 1996, Andersson and Solberg
1999). From the perspective of a tourist there may be different types of events, using 
the Michelin stars for restaurants as an analogy, events may fall into one of three 
categories:
* A  1-star event: attracts visitors, if they happen to be in town anyway;
** A  2-star event: is worth making a detour to visit;
*** A  3-star event: is good enough as a destination in its own right.
So, using the above-mentioned figure of 80-90% spectators, who come especially for 
the sports event, the sports event is a three-star event for this group.
However, an event is not likely to function simply as a magnet for visitors. It will 
probably also have its effects on other target groups, such as inhabitants and other 
visitors in the area, or potential visitors to the area. This applies especially to large- 
scale events like football tournaments. Other tourists may be scared off because of 
fear of riots (hooliganism) and because of the effects on prices and the availability of 
accommodation. Although the magnitude to which these effects happen needs to be 
further researched, there is no question that these effects are real, as will be shown in 
Chapter 6.
On closer observation, the range of potential effects on travel and tourism is quite 
extensive. Not only may tourists be scared off, but the event may have effects on 
domestic travel as well. Some local inhabitants may decide to stay at home rather 
than go on holiday because of a large event, while others may wish to actually flee 
the city. On a more positive note, the event may have the result of attracting visitors 
in the future because of the promotion of the city by the media. Or visitors attending 
the event may want to come back again quite soon because of their good experiences 
during their first visit. This raises the question of what the balance of these effects 
will be. Which effects will be dominant?
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These questions about the effects of a major sports event on tourism require a 
concept in which the different effects are observed in their mutual relationships and 
totality. To analyse these effects a distinction can be made between the effects that 
occur during the event (or, for practical methodological reasons, during the year in 
which the event takes place) and the effects that may materialize in the future.
Figure 4.1 Schematic representation of the tourism effects of an event
Note: see text below for an explanation of tourism effects A-F
Source: adapted from Preuss (2000).
Each short term effect falls into one of the following categories (see Figure 4.1):
A. Visitors who combine their planned visit with a visit to the event ('casuals'); these 
visitors consider the event a one-star event: something to visit, if you happen to 
be in the area;
B. Visitors who are attracted by the event, but cancel another planned visit, thus 
switching their visit between two points in time ('time switchers');
C. Potential visitors who are scared off;
a. Potential visitors who decide not to come at all to the city; and,
b. Visitors who shift their visit to a period before or after the event;
D. Visitors who would not have come without the event; these are the visitors who 
consider the event a three-star event: worth a journey;
E. City residents who stay at home for the event;
F. City residents who flee the city for the event:
85
a. City residents which shift a planned trip to the period of the event; and,
b. City residents leaving for an additional trip.
Some visitors may have replaced a planned visit at some other time with a visit 
during the event, which is generally called 'time-switching'. The effects mentioned 
above were from the perspective of one host city. However, for the purpose of the 
evaluation of Euro 2000, and also of other events that have more than one city 
involved, there is another dimension to be reckoned with, and that is the regional vs. 
the national perspective. This introduces the category of visitors who are 'space 
switchers', e.g. the visitors who had already planned a visit to the Netherlands, but 
who visit the event as a detour. These people consider it a 2-star event.
There are Time switchers' and 'space switchers'. Both these groups can be considered 
to value the event as a 2-star (**), making either detour in space or in time. Besides 
these groups there are the 1-star (*) and 3-star (***) visitors. Furthermore, residents of 
the host cities, domestic travellers and foreigners visiting the event are three separate 
groups. This means that there are many different groups to be reckoned with. Table 
4.2 presents an overview of all possible effects (21 plus 3 not relevant effects).
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Table 4.2 A typology of short-term tourism effects of events
Foreign Domestic Residents
* * *
Direction To event 
+
p***+
Foreign visitors 
additionally attracted
Domestic tourists 
cancelling a foreign 
holiday
Domestic supporters 
staying home instead to 
travelling to another 
host country
R***+
Residents cancelling a 
foreign holiday
From
event Foreign tourists staying away altogether
P***_
Domestic consumers 
going on an additional 
foreign holiday
P***_
City residents going on 
an additional foreign 
holiday
* *
Time To event 
+
PY**+
Foreign visitors, shifting 
their planned visit to 
event period
DT**+
Domestic tourists going 
on a planned foreign 
holiday before or after 
event
RT**+
City residents going on 
a planned foreign 
holiday before or after 
event
From
event Foreign tourists, shifting their planned visit before 
or after the event
d t **_
Domestic tourists going 
on a planned foreign 
holiday, but shifted it 
to the event period
R T **_
City residents going on 
a planned foreign 
holiday, but shifted it to 
the event period
Space To event 
+
FS**+
Foreign visitors come to 
host cities instead to 
other regions within 
Netherlands
DS**+
Domestic consumers 
replace trips to other 
regions with trips to the 
event
RS**+
Residents cancel trips to 
other regions and go 
instead to the event
From
event
FS**-
Foreign visitors go to 
other regions within the 
Netherlands
DS**-
Domestic consumers 
replace trips or holiday 
to host cities with trips 
to other regions
RS**-
Residents plan 
additional trips or 
domestic holiday to 
other regions
*
Casuals To event 
+
F*+
Foreign casuals: visitors 
to event, combining with 
a planned visit to city
D*+
Domestic casuals: 
visitors to event, 
combining with a 
planned trip to city
R*+
Residential visitors to 
event
From
event
(Not relevant) (Not relevant) (Not relevant)
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Table 4.2 introduces codes to describe specific groups, for example, FS**-means the 
group of foreign visitors (F), who shifted their visit in space (S**), away (-) from the 
event. In the case of Euro 2000: they have come to the Netherlands, but instead of 
visiting one of the host cities, they went to another region in the Netherlands.
As will be treated later, some of these groups are almost non-existent, or at least they 
were during Euro 2000. This is, for instance, the case for residents fleeing the host 
city: no such people were found in the survey.
Some of the people not going on holiday, may do so during any sports event that 
takes place anywhere in the country or the world, so it is necessary to be certain that 
people do really stay at home because their city is hosting the event. This is filtered 
out by the 0/1 criterion.
Another way of presenting the concepts is by making use of the fact that most of the 
groups are one of a symmetrical pair. For example, the foreign space switchers away 
from an event have a counterpart, the foreign time switchers to an event. Therefore, 
these effects can be put into an account in which the positive effects (in terms of 
additional expenditures) are on the right-hand side and the negative (in terms of lost 
income) on the left. Furthermore, if the origin (foreign, domestic and city residence) 
is left out as well, the target groups can be summarized according to Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Summary of short-term tourism effects of major events
Stars (Potentially) negative (Potentially) positive*** Tourists staying away and inhabitants fleeing 
the country
Tourists additionally attracted and 
inhabitants staying home** Time shifters to period before or after the 
event
Time shifters to event period
** Space shifters within the country to outside 
host cities
Space shifters within country to host 
cities
* Casuals visiting the event
Table 4.2 listed all short-term tourism effects that an event may cause and comes to 
21 different effects, or target groups. Now, which of the expenditures, connected to 
these groups, may be considered additional for the Dutch economy? (In a later stage, 
the actual existence of these groups and expenditures will be considered.)
In general, the tourists coming or staying away directly because of the event, the so- 
called *** motivated groups, should be considered additional. For these groups 
would not have come, by definition, if there had been no Euro 2000 event. Time 
switchers are generally not additional, whether positively or negatively. This is 
because these groups were defined as the people who shift their visit in time. In other 
words: they would have come to the Netherlands anyway, only they would have 
chosen another date, if there had been no Euro 2000 event.
Whether expenditures by space switchers are additional depends on the perspective. 
From a regional point of view, for the host cities, these effects are additional. 
However, from a national point of view, expenditures are shifted from one region to 
another, and the total effect is neutral.
The expenditures by casuals, visitors who happen to be in the neighbourhood and 
use the opportunity to visit the event, are not additional. The focus here is on some 
specific target groups, taking into account the circumstances of Euro 2000.
Taking the Dutch inhabitants and residents as one group, leads to a summary of the 
original Table 4.2.
Table 4.4 Summary of tourism effects and their additionality
Stars (Potentially) negative (Potentially) positive Additional
on
regional
level
Additional
on
national
level
Foreign *** Tourists staying away 
altogether
Tourists additionally 
attracted
Yes Yes
** Time shifters to period 
before or after the 
event
Time shifters to event 
period
No No
** Space shifters within 
the Netherlands to 
regions outside host 
cities
Space shifters within the 
Netherlands to host 
cities
Yes No
* Casuals visiting the 
event
No No
Domestic *** Dutch fleeing the 
country
Dutch staying at home Yes Yes
** Dutch evading the 
host cities
Dutch attracted to the 
host cities
Yes No
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Table 4.4 indicates which tourism effects should be considered additional for the 
Dutch economy. It thereby illustrates that on a national level, most of the effects are 
shifts in demand and thus not additional. However, on a local level, some of these 
effects should be counted as additional demand.
Foreign visitors
The expenditures by visitors from abroad are additional for the Netherlands as long 
as they have come especially for the event. They would not have flowed into the 
Dutch economy in the 0 situation, in which the event was organized by another 
country. In practice, it was almost impossible for foreign tourists to go "casually7 to a 
match, because the tickets ware sent to the home addresses of the supporters in 
advance. Furthermore, the price of the tickets was, on average, about €50, which can 
be considered to be too high for just a marginally interested tourist just passing by. 
Therefore, the category of "casuals', which may be substantial for other events, is 
negligible for sports events of this type.
Dutch staying home
The examination of expenditures by the Dutch is very a useful occasion to illustrate 
the concept of additional expenditures. Anticipating on the results in Chapter 6, it 
can be revealed that 4% of the Dutch population have postponed their vacation or 
did not go on vacation at all, because of Euro 2000. It should be kept in mind that a 
considerable share of the long-term vacations by the Dutch is spent abroad: for 
example, 61% in 1999 (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek/Nederlands Bureau voor 
Toerisme 2000). This is a potential source of additional expenditures for the Dutch 
economy: if the money which is normally spent abroad, is spent on goods in the 
Netherlands because of Euro 2000, the different branches of industry producing these 
goods, will benefit.
However, it is also known from the same survey that of the group of people who 
postponed their holiday, 85% always stay at home during any European 
Championship. So, although they stayed at home because of Euro 2000, they would
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also have stayed at home if the tournament had been hosted by another country. 
These expenditures are not really caused by the hosting of Euro 2000. Or, in other 
words: if the 0/1 criterion is applied: these expenditures would have been the same 
in the 0 situation (hosting by another country) and are therefore not additional.
Expenditures by other domestic spectators in the Netherlands
Applying the 0/1 criterion also has consequences for some of the Dutch supporters. 
The Dutch national team has loyal supporters who travel to any game, whether it is 
abroad or in their home country. In the 0 situation, the tournament would have been 
organized by another country, so these supporters would have travelled to this 
alternative host country. Now that the tournament was hosted by the Netherlands, 
one could say that the expenditures by this group are 'saved' for the Netherlands. 
Again, this applies not to all domestic supporters, but only the ones who would have 
gone to a match abroad (the 3-star supporters). The research on Euro 1996 (Dobson et 
al. 1997) gives an indication of the expenditures by this group. Although these 
expenditures are in some sense 'hypothetical', they are counted as additional (see 
section 6.3.3).
The expenditures of the rest of Dutch spectators are in principle not additional for 
the Netherlands. It might be assumed that their expenditures would have flown into 
the Dutch economy anyway. However, on the lower level of the host cities, the 
expenditures of the Dutch visitors originating outside the host cities are additional, at 
least, if it is assumed that these visitors would not have visited these cities had there 
not been the Euro 2000 event. These visitors are 'space switchers' (2-star visitors). In 
this research, these domestic expenditures are treated as a shift from the rest of the 
Netherlands to the host cities. The expenditures are positive for the host cities and 
negative for the rest of the Netherlands. They are neutral for the Dutch economy as a 
whole.
4.3.3 Other changes in domestic demand
Most of the other expenditures of domestic origin do not pass the 0/1 criterion on 
additionality, or are shifts between branches of industry. This can be illustrated by
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the most frequently mentioned examples in the media: expenditures on TV sets and 
VCRs; expenditures on alcoholic beverages (beer); expenditures on Euro 2000 
merchandising; and expenditures on additional commercials by the industry.
Sale of VCRs and television sets
An example of the application of the 0/1 criterion is the sales of TV sets and VCR's. 
From the TV manufacturers Sony and Philips, it is known that the sale of TVs and 
VRCs peaked before Euro 2000. The turnover of Philips in the months April-June 
2000 was equivalent to the figure for the whole of 1999. However, are these 
expenditures additional? According to Sony the same thing happened in May and 
June 1998, during the World Championships in France (Algemeen Dagblad 2000a). 
Therefore it could be argued that if Euro 2000 had been hosted by another country, 
the same peak would have occurred. These expenditures are probably just part of a 
2- or 4-yearly pattern.
The same argument applies to the sales of alcoholic beverages to the Dutch 
population. These sales are also part of a regular seasonal pattern and not really 
additional for the Dutch economy, despite the fact that the press stresses the 
enormous 'economic benefits' for the retail sector and breweries.
Expenditures on Euro 2000 merchandising by the Dutch
During the tournament, the Dutch spent considerable amounts of money on 
merchandising. Merchandise are shirts, flags etc with the Euro 2000 logo. Uefa sold 
the licences to ISL, who redistributed them (with a profit margin) among 
manufacturers. The expenditures by the Dutch on these souvenirs are considered as a 
shift between branches of industry, because it is most probable that they would have 
spent their money on other branches in the Netherlands, if there had been no Euro 
2000.
The expenditures on merchandise by visitors are somewhat more complicated: their 
expenditures on merchandising will flow back to Uefa, and via Uefa partly into the 
Netherlands by means of the organization budget. The expenditures of visitors were
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counted as additional, and also the financing of Uefa, which includes a part of this 
licence income. Therefore, there is an overlap in these expenditures. However, the 
amounts are quite small, because only a small part of the total retail price can be 
attributed to the licence and then only a part of this specific licence income is paid to 
the organization.
Commercials on television, expenditures on advertising
That Euro 2000 is especially a media event can be seen by the ratings of the matches. 
19 out of the top 20 of most-watched television programmes during 2000 in the 
Netherlands were either matches or directly match related programmes during Euro 
2000. Of course this is a golden opportunity for any supplier to score with his 
products. The expenditures on advertising soared, rising 24% above the level of 1999, 
or an extra €55 million in the Netherlands. These expenditures came from the 
automobile industry, IT, sports wear, food and alcoholic beverages, credit cards and 
lotteries. How much of this can be attributed to Euro 2000? The rise during the World 
Championships of 1998 was 14%. So 10%, (i.e. 24%-14%) can be considered to be the 
Euro 2000 bonus: €5.5 million.
There is another fundamental question concerning these expenditures. Are they part 
of final expenditures and could they raise effective demand? According to economic 
conventions, they are if they are investments. And investments are, according to the 
definition in the national accounts, "the value of those produced or imported goods 
which are not exported, used in production or consumed during the period under 
observation" (Compaijen and Van Til 1978: 40). Now the issue is whether they are 
used or not. Normally the expenditures on advertising are accounted in the books as 
costs, so t hey are not activated. If this bookkeeping convention is followed, these 
expenditures are not part of final demand. The exception is whenthey are financed 
by foreign sources, for example, by an international marketing budget.
According to ISL sources, most of the marketing expenditures were financed by the 
local marketing budgets. There are no indications for additional funding from 
external resources.What seems most probable then is that these expenditures shifted
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in time: the peak in expenditures during Euro 2000 leading to a dip after the 
tournament.
4.4 Direct expenditures and indirect effects
The effects identified are truly additional. This means that the original economic 
direct expenditures cause 'ripples' in the economy, which radiate from the direct 
expenditures and may be counted as economic impacts by the hampionship. These 
are called the indirect effects. How to imagine those effects? The expenditures of 
visitors cause additional turnover in the business sector in the Netherlands. To be 
able to supply the goods, the firms have to hire additional employees and buy 
additional inputs. The beer, which is drunk by the supporters, has to be served. 
When the pub runs out of beer, it has to order more beer from the wholesaler. The 
wholesale business then orders more beer from the brewery, and thus the 
expenditures spread rapidly through the economy.
To be able to account for these indirect effects, an input-output model is used. An 
input-output model is based on an input-output table, on the basis of which 'demand 
oriented input-output models' have been constructed. This means that a change in 
demand (or expenditures) determines the change in production and thus in value 
added and employment. This is therefore a demand-oriented analysis and a 
reasonable description of how the economy functions in the short run. Central to the 
demand-oriented model are the input coefficients, which determine the input that is 
needed to make the products bought by the customers (final demand).
One additional euro (or one guilder as the unit was in the Netherlands in 2000) spent 
generates a whole series of effects on different branches which all make deliveries to 
each other. These 'backward linkages' constitute the indirect effect of the initial direct 
economic direct expenditures. For example, €1 million spent could generate €0.6 
million additional turnover, making the total effect €1.6 million. 'Could', however, is 
the operative word, because in reality the economy is not a deterministic mechanism 
with standard reactions. The reaction to additional demand can also be that no 
additional inputs are bought, but that the prices rise, or substitutes from other
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branches are used, or additional input is bought from outside the country. These 
reactions depend on the capacity utilization of the involved branches and also on the 
reactions of input suppliers to additional demand. The total effect on the economy 
depends, therefore, on the mix of reaction and choices of the involved suppliers.
The reaction to a temporary rise in demand, like Euro 2000, will probably be:
1. To utilize the existing capacity and resources as much as possible, for 
example, overtime working for employees in the catering sector; and
2. If possible to raise the prices, especially for accommodation, where (room) 
capacity is fixed in the short run.
Value added and employment
The sum of the direct economic direct expenditures and the indirect effects is the 
turnover created by the event. However, from a social and policy point of view, the 
additional turnover is not very relevant, because it is a gross figure. What is 
important is the additional income (and employment). It was shown that one of the 
items in the input-output table is the value added created in a specific branch. This 
value added is one of the main results of the input-output analysis, because this is 
equal to the additional income that is created. The value added is also the basis for 
calculating the employment effects. By dividing the value added by the productivity 
per employee, the number of total employed employees is calculated.
4.5 Summary
One of the first points discussed was the question of which effects can really be 
considered to be additional economic direct expenditures for the Dutch economy. By 
definition, only expenditure effects in the short run count. To check the relationship 
with Euro 2000, a 0 and a 1 situation is created:
a) The 0 situation is that the Euro 2000 is hosted by another country (not 
the Netherlands);
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b) The 1 situation is that Euro 2000 is hosted by the Netherlands (and 
Belgium).
The criterion can be applied to three categories of expenditures: organizational 
expenditures, travel- and tourism-related expenditures; and other effects upon 
domestic demand. The expenditures by the visiting teams and the investments by the 
media for providing the international signal are additional in the category of 
organizational expenditures. The expenditures by the LOC are additional, under the 
condition that they are from foreign resources (Uefa). Expenditures in the stadiums 
and expenditures by the Dutch government are not considered additional.
The relationship between events and tourism was analysed, determining all the 
potential effects of an event upon tourism and all short-term effects that an event 
may cause were listed. By distinguishing three types of visitors (the 1-, 2- and 3-star 
motivated visitors) and other dimensions a framework was created. The other 
dimensions were the origin of the visitor (foreign, domestic and of city residence), 
the direction of motivation (positively or negatively) and two types of switching (in 
time and in space). In total there are 4 (3 stars+ 1 shift in time) times 2 (positive- 
negative) times 3 (different groups by places of origin) which amounts to 24 types of 
tourism effects, or target groups. Three groups were not relevant, leaving 21 possible 
short run tourism effects.
The conclusion concerning the tourism and travel expenditures can be summarized 
as follows. In general, the tourists coming or staying away because of the event 
should be considered additional, positively and negatively, respectively. Time 
switchers are generally not additional, whether positively or negatively.
The additionality of expenditures by "space switchers' depends on the perspective. 
From a regional point of view, in other words for the host cities, these effects are 
additional. However, from a national point of view, expenditures are merely shifted 
from one region to another. These are, therefore, not additional on a national level 
because their total effect is neutral.
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The expenditures by casuals, visitors who happen to be in the neighbourhood and 
use the opportunity to visit the event, are not additional, because they would have 
made these expenditures anyway.
Many of the effects that are frequently mentioned in the media do not qualify for the 
economic impact: expenditures on TV sets and VCRs; expenditures on alcoholic 
beverages (beer); expenditures on Euro 2000 merchandising; and, expenditures on 
additional commercials by the industry. None of these expenditures can be 
considered to be additional for the Netherlands.
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5 Methodology
5.1 Introduction
The evaluation consists of the construction of a number of interdependent accounts: 
three for each host city (3*4=12), and three for the region outside the host cities (rest 
of the Netherlands), which makes 15. These can be further consolidated for the three 
sectors at the national level, resulting in a theoretical number of 18.
The research project could be subdivided into four stages:
1. Data collection
2. The calculation of the economic direct expenditures
3. The input-output analysis
4. The construction of the accounts
Stage 1 could be further subdivided into four different areas of data collection,
a. Face to face interviews among the visitors coming to the matches;
b. Telephone interviews among the Dutch population;
c. Interview among the population in five different European countries, 
Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Italy;
d. Interviews with representatives of the business community.
Stage 2, the calculation of the direct expenditures, was done by combining the 
results of the interviews among visitors with the data on number of visitors, which 
was obtained from the Foundation Euro 2000.
Stage 3 used the results of Stage 2 to calculate the effects of the direct expenditures on 
value added and employment for the different regions and for the Netherlands as a 
whole.
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Stage 4 was in fact the writing of the report 'Kosten en baten EK 2000' (Meerwaarde 
2001), in which the different accounts are presented.
The practical issues surrounding stages 1 and 2 in the research, the data collection 
and the calculation of the direct expenditures are the subject of the next subsection.
5.2 Data collection
Data were collected on the domestic and foreign spectators, from among the Dutch 
population, the population in five other European countries (all participants of Euro
2000), and the Dutch business community by surveys.
The interviews among the supporters were conducted by the research consultancy 
Diopter. In each city, the best places to interview were identified: these were 
normally the public squares in the host cities on which special supporters7 events 
took place, around the stadiums and at train stations. The data collection was 
undertaken during the whole tournament by two teams, each consisting of five 
persons. Each team had 8 matches to monitor. The teams had a supervisor to 
coordinate their activities on the spot and to keep in touch with the researchers. 
Before each match the number of questionnaires was determined. This number 
depended on the matches played by the particular country and the number that had 
already been collected for this group of supporters. The questionnaires had been 
translated beforehand into the 15 different languages that were expected to be 
spoken during the tournament. This approach contributed substantially to the 
readiness of visitors to cooperate. Many supporters were willing to participate when 
they saw that the questionnaire was in their own language.
998 questionnaires were collected, of which 250 were from Dutch and 748 from 
foreign visitors. The basic assumption was that visitors from a particular country 
have a similar pattern regarding overnight stays and expenditures. Fieldworkers 
therefore stratified the survey to get a good representation among the different 
nationalities.
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Table 5.1 Response to the survey among visitors
Country of 
residence
# Matches in 
the
Netherlands N % # Spectators % Spectators
Italy 4 27 3.6 14,191 11.5
Turkey 3 40 5.3 9,002 7.3
Portugal 4 74 9.9 9,874 8.0
France 2 57 7.6 7,086 5.8
Germany 1 91 12.2 15,663 12.7
Spain 2 39 5.2 3,859 3.1
Norway 2 73 9.8 10,752 8.7
Sweden 2 89 11.9 4,965 4.0
Slovenia 2 62 8.3 6,088 5.0
Yugoslavia 1 7 0.9 1,245 1.0
Denmark 1 39 5.2 10,063 8.2
Romania 1 10 1.3 2,008 1.6
Czech Republic 1 30 4.0 7,357 6.0
UK 1 56 7.5 11,274 9.2
Other 54 7.2 9,550 7.8
Total 748 100.0 122,976 100.0
The Netherlands 250
Sources: Visitors' survey; Foundation Euro 2000
Table 5.1 above lists the total number of matches, questionnaires, and visitors for 
each participating country. However, the visitors are grouped by their country of 
residence, not by their nationality. Therefore the first column indicates where the 
supporters live, not which country (team) they supported. The reason for this is that 
the survey data had to be matched with the ticket data of Foundation Euro 2000. The 
ticket data was grouped by country of residence, because the tickets were delivered, 
and registered, at the addresses of the supporters, so not by country of support. By 
the way, from a methodological point of view this grouping is probably preferable, 
because an Italian supporter from Germany will tend to stay in the Netherlands a 
similar period to a German, which means shorter than the stay of an Italian from 
Italy. Or to put it more formally: the country of residence (and its distance from the 
Netherlands) is probably more powerful in explaining tourism behaviour than the 
nationality of the respondent.
Many of the interviewed Italians appeared to live outside Italy and were thus 
grouped under another country. This explains why the Italians are relatively 
underrepresented.
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An important issue to keep in mind is the difference between Visitors' and
several tickets. A spectator is someone holding only 1 ticket. If two matches sell 
60,000 tickets, there are 60,000 spectators. If a visitor on average holds 1.5 tickets, 
there are 60,000/1.5= 40,000 visitors. The number of foreign spectators was 229,000. 
From the survey it became clear that each visitor had on average 1.86 tickets, so the 
number of visitors was 122,900, which is the number found in Table 6.3, and the 
figure below.
Figure 5.1 Relationship between visitors, spectators and nights
Figure 5.1 illustrates that the number of nights can be calculated in two ways: 1) by 
multiplying the number of visitors with the nights per person, or 2) by multiplying 
the number of spectators (sold tickets minus no show) with the average number of
average number of nights per person. This is a mistake that was made by the 
hospitality organization of Euro 2000. They learned from a survey that the average 
supporter intended to stay three nights, and multiplied this figure with the number 
sold tickets. However, they overlooked the fact that the supporters had on average 
almost two tickets each.
'spectators'. A visitor is a person who may visit several matches. He or she possesses
Overnight stays
394,000
nights per 
person 
3.2
nights per 
ticket 
1.72
/
Visitors ^  Spectators229,000123,000 < -
tickets per 
person 
1.9
nights per ticket. This research followed the second route, as will be shown below. 
However, it is obviously wrong to multiply the number of sold tickets with the
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The survey among the Dutch population
After the tournament, 1,000 Dutch citizens were asked in a telephone interview to 
give their views on Euro 2000. The first objective of this survey was to identify the 
intangible costs and benefits for this group: What have they valued most? And what 
is their opinion on intangible costs, like nuisance? A secondary objective was to find 
out the effects of Euro 2000 on holiday behaviour: Do people stay at home, and if so, 
what proportion of the population? And would they have gone to foreign or 
domestic destinations? A third objective was to get information on the visits to the 
host cities by the Dutch themselves: Did the tournament "scare7 day-trippers away?
Of the 1,000 respondents, 200 came from each host city involved and 200 were 
selected from the rest of the country.
The survey in five European countries
An international promotion survey was conducted in five other European countries. 
The objective of this survey was to measure the impact of the event on image and 
name awareness of the host cities and the Netherlands. Two cities that were not host 
cities, Utrecht and Groningen, were included as well. This was done to differentiate 
between a general change in city name awareness and a specific one for the host 
cities. The survey was conducted by telephone in Germany, the UK, France, Spain 
and Italy. These countries were chosen because of the size of their population and 
therefore their importance for the Dutch tourism industry.
A secondary objective was to collect information on the impact of Euro 2000 on the 
intention to visit the Netherlands. For each country approximately 200 persons were 
interviewed by telephone on two separate occasions (total 2,024, see Table 5.2). The 
interviews were conducted by native speakers, employed by Interview*NSS. The first 
wave was interviewed from 3 until 11 December 1999, the second wave from 4 until 
21 September 2000. The first wave was just before the drawing of the group selection 
for Euro 2000, which was 12th of December. The interviews were conducted during 
the evening. If there was no answer, the number was recalled, in total 6 times. An 
appointment was made if the right respondent was not present or did not have time
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to answer. The results were weighed by the background variables (Nielson) region, 
age, sex, and income.
The image statements in the questionnaire were rotated to avoid bias caused by the 
sequence of the statements. Table 5.2 documents the response for each wave.
Table 5.2 Response to the survey in five European countries
France Germ any U K_______ I tali/______ Spain
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
w a v e  w av e  w a v e  w a v e  w av e  w av e  w a v e  w a v e w a v e  w a v e
Total telephone numbers 971 845 1043 863 1085 820 727 636 881 753
Total numbers unavailable 453 328 347 247 499 265 264 195 355 252
Repeatedly occupied/no answer 143 110 94 93 207 118 103 75 186 142
Number not in use anymore 185 110 170 99 168 69 47 53 30 11
Business numbers 46 50 33 24 43 27 49 44 47 70
Fax/modem/computer numbers 79 58 50 31 81 51 65 23 92 29
Total contacts 518 517 696 616 586 555 463 441 526 501
Respondent not available 6 1 - 3 11 8 9 3 30 6
Communication problems 6 11 31 40 13 15 13 38 17 33
Despite appointment no contact 58 17 36 34 57 22 33 34 84 37
No suitable respondent 3 4 2 6 12 7 27 11 32 62
Total relevant contacts 445 484 627 533 493 503 381 355 363 363
Refusal 221 260 388 289 244 270 151 135 113 147
Interrupted interviews 22 22 35 33 34 33 29 19 31 16
No interview for other reasons 1 2 1 11 14 0 0 1 1 0
Successful interview 201 200 203 200 201 200 201 200 218 200
Source: International Survey
The survey among the business community
The objective of the survey among the business community was to compare the 
results from the demand oriented impact analyses with experiences from the supply 
side, i.e. the business community. The sources were:
- The Koninklijke Horeca The Netherlands (Royal Hotel and Catering 
Industry in the Netherlands), which is the umbrella organization for the 
hotel and catering sector. A checklist was given before the tournament 
to representatives at the local, regional and national level;
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- Branch representatives for the retail industry and representatives of the
"city centre management' in the host cities. They received the same
checklist;
- Campsites in the surroundings of the host cities. These were phoned 
after the event to ascertain their occupancy rate during Euro 2000;
- The Dutch media, especially regional and national newspapers;
- Statistical information from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek
(CBS), on the turnover of the catering sector during June 2000
compared with previous years.
Besides the data mentioned above, some additional fact-finding was done, especially 
on the expenditures by the local and national public authorities, Uefa, the 
Foundation Euro 2000, and the media. These data were used to estimate the 
expenditures on organizational affairs.
5.3 Calculation of the direct expenditures
It was found that on closer inspection most of the economic effects referred to in the 
media was not really additional for the Netherlands. In this section, two effects that 
are additional by our criteria are presented: (1) the expenditures by visitors and (2) 
the organizational expenditures.
Expenditures by foreign visitors
The general principle of establishing the total economic direct expenditures by 
visitors is quite simple. The number of spectators (NOT visitors) multiplied with the 
average length of stay per ticket and the average expenditure per day per head (here 
visitor, not spectator!) gives direct expenditures. The average length of stay and the 
average expenditure per head is calculated from the visitors' survey, and the number 
of spectators from the data provided by the Foundation Euro 2000.
Implicitly, it was assumed that the country of origin basically determines the level of 
expenditures. As a consequence, the procedure was more complicated because the
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calculations included 15 countries of residence. The averages were thus calculated for 
the 15 foreign visitor groups (14 foreign participants and 1 group of other foreign 
visitors, including visitors from Belgium) and multiplied with their respective 
spectator numbers.
Another complication is the difference between a "match city" and a "sleep-city". 
Where the different supporter groups have spent their nights is documented, and 
also where they were during the match day: in the host city. However, their 
behaviour in-between times is unknown. Are these expenditures assigned to the 
"match city" or to the "sleep city"?
For the expenditures on accommodation, this question is easy to answer: these are 
spent in the sleep city. The problem is the expenditures on branches other than 
accommodation. Two assumptions solved this problem:
- It was assumed that the expenditures on the match day are exclusively 
in the "match city";
- It was assumed that the expenditures on other days are exclusively in 
the "sleep city";
Furthermore it was assumed that the expenditures on the non-accommodation 
branches are equal both on match days and on days when no match was played.
The first two assumptions indicate a distinction between the expenditures on match 
days and on non-match days, regarding the place where the expenditures were 
spent. This differentiation allows us give separate results for the city in which the 
night was spent and the city in which the match was played. To give an example: let
us suppose that a visitor stayed a week (7 days or 6 nights) in Utrecht (located in the
centre of the Netherlands), visiting 1 match in Rotterdam and 1 match in Eindhoven. 
Following our assumptions, his accommodation expenditures (6 nights) would be in 
Utrecht. His expenditures during the day would be:
- One day in Rotterdam;
- One day in Eindhoven;
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- 5 days in Utrecht, which is categorized under the 'rest of the
Netherlands'
The actual calculation consists of two main steps. The first main step is the 
calculation of the number of nights spent by visitors in the sleep cities. The second 
step is to go from the number of spectators and overnight stays to the actual 
expenditures by branch of industry and city (or region).
The following data were available for the first step: (1) the number of spectators by 
match and their origin42; (2) the number and place of overnight stays for the 748 
interviewed foreign visitors; and (3) the number of tickets these visitors possessed. 
The first step, calculating the number of nights, includes the following sub-steps (see 
Figure 5.2):
1. The number of spectators (tickets), clustered by match and origin, are 
regrouped by city and origin and summed up
2. A matrix is constructed of the average length of stay per ticket by city 
(ANT) by dividing the number of nights for each respondent by the 
number of tickets in possession, and than to average this for each 
country of origin. The formula for this calculation is:
^ f O S  AY 1 r,/
_ TP.ANTrs = — — (1) n
ANTiS = average number of overnight stays for group g in region r;
OS r,i = the number of overnight stays in city (region) r for respondent i; 
TP = number of tickets in possession of respondent i for the whole 
event;
n = number of respondents from origin g.
3. The average number of nights per ticket is multiplied with the total 
number of spectators.
42 Actually, these were constructed from different data sets provided by the Foundation Euro 2000.
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Table 5.3 Average number of overnight stays per ticket
Amsterdam Arnhem Eindhoven Rotterdam
Other
Netherlands Total
Italy 0.74 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.20 1.16
Turkey 1.28 0.23 0.74 0.76 0.21 3.22
Portugal 1.09 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.54 2.21
France 0.71 0.24 0.12 0.09 0.44 1.61
Germany 0.10 0.14 0.06 0.12 0.23 0.66
Spain 1.21 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.90 2.60
Norway 0.90 0.34 0.16 0.58 0.67 2.66
Sweden 0.46 0.00 1.11 0.03 1.07 2.66
Slovenia 1.06 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.52 1.70
Yugoslavia 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.29
Denmark 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.15 1.41
Romania 0.03 0.37 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.53
Czech Republic 0.99 0.00 0.03 0.02 1.04 2.09
UK 0.62 0.02 0.42 0.12 0.42 1.60
Other 0.50 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.77
Total 0.71 0.12 0.27 0.22 0.50 1.83
Note: The total average (1.83) is not weighted. The weighted average is 1.72.
Source: Calculation from Visitors’ Survey.
For illustrative purposes, the ANT-matrix is presented in table 5.3.
This table clearly shows that the number of overnight stays was highest for 
Amsterdam. Furthermore, just as would be expected, there is a positive 
correlation between the length of stay and the distance from the home 
country. The Yugoslavs and Romanians are the exceptions, but there were 
only 7 and 10 respondents respectively from these two countries, so the 
figures for these countries are not reliable.
4. To arrive at the total number of overnight stays, the ANT matrix is multiplied 
with the number of spectators from these countries.
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Figure 5.2 Step 1: Calculation of nights in host cities by country of origin
Number o f  Tickets 
by match ami origin
W 7
Survey a m on g  visitors
regroup calculate
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cities citie s
cr=• tickets night/ticket
Main step 2 is to go from the number of spectators and overnight stays to the 
expenditures by branch. A schematic representation of the calculations on match 
days and on non-match days is given by Figure 5.3.
For the non-match days (left column) the number of nights spent in each city (and 
outside the host cities) is multiplied with the average spending by overnight visitors 
per day for any branch of industry. However, it is important to note that this is the 
average spending for the people who stayed overnight, not for all respondents!
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Figure 5.3 Step 2: Calculating the expenditures
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5.4 Input-output analysis
Input-output analysis was used to determine the effects upon income and 
employment. An input-output table is a way of summarizing the relationships 
between different branches of industry. Another way saying this is that such a table 
describes the demand and supply of goods and services over branches of industry. It 
is a fairly standard technique for modelling short term variations in demand and will 
not be discussed in great detail here (Leontief 1966, Miller and Blair 1985). In a 
previous section (4.4) some of the assumptions underlying an input-output table 
were discussed, and to what extent these assumptions could be considered realistic.
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For this research the regional input-output models for Amsterdam and 
surroundings, Rotterdam and surroundings (Groot Rijnmond), Gelderland, which is 
the region in which Arnhem is located, and Noord Brabant, the region around 
Eindhoven were used (see figure 5.4).
Figure 5.4 The four regions of the input-output analysis
Source: RUG/CBS (1999)
The region Test of Netherlands', which is the Netherlands outside the four regions 
was the fifth region in the analysis. These tables are published by the Dutch 
Statistical office (CBS) and the University of Groningen (RuG) (RuG/CBS 1999). In 
the tables, 38 different branches have been identified. Not just the relationships 
between branches within the region but also those outside the region are 
summarized in the tables. This is quite a detailed analysis, as the scale of these 
regions is quite small: for example, the total added value of the region Noord Brabant 
(economically the largest of the four regions) is approximately 15% of that of the 
Netherlands. Because of this detailed analysis, all relationships outside the region but 
inside the Netherlands are assumed to be in 'the rest of the Netherlands'.
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Unfortunately, our data did not allow us to look at how much of the deliveries in the 
rest of the Netherlands were supplied by the four "host regions'.
To calculate the effects on employment, the resulting total value added was divided 
by the average labor productivity, specified by branch of industry and by region 
(RuG/CBS 1999). Labor productivity is here (thus) defined as the average value 
added per man year in a specific branch of industry in a specific region. The overall 
average of labor productivity was approximately €56,000 per person year.
5.5 Summary
The chapter treated the different stages of our investigation and the efforts to make 
the concepts operational.
In the chapter the question of how to quantify the effects was discussed. The three 
surveys undertaken were described: the survey among visiting supporters, the 
survey among the Dutch population, and the one among the population in five other 
European countries, and the enquiries within the business community.
The next stage was calculating the economic impact. The three main steps for this 
were explained:
1. The calculation of the number of nights spent by visitors in the sleep 
cities;
2. The calculation of the expenditures by branch of industry on match 
days and non-match days based on the number of spectators and nights 
and their average expenditures;
3. Summing the expenditures by branch of industry on match days and 
non-match days to arrive at a result of expenditures by branch of 
industry and region.
An important issue to keep in mind is the difference between visitors and spectators. 
A visitor is a person who may visit several matches. He or she possesses several 
tickets. A spectator has by definition only one ticket. Attention was paid to a pitfall in 
related to this issue. The pitfall is incorrectly multiplying the average number of
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nights per respondent (which is the same as per visitor) with the number of sold tickets 
(instead of the correct nights per spectator which is the same as per ticket).
The last stage discussed in this chapter was the calculation of the value added by 
using input-output models: one for every host region, and one for the rest of the 
Netherlands.
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6 Results
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is devoted to the results of the research on Euro 2000 and has a focus on 
facts and figures. It has three main sections, 1) basic figures (6.2), 2) the economic 
impact (6.3) and 3) costs and benefits (6.4).
For the evaluation, a broad array of different groups were interviewed, both inside 
and outside the Netherlands. The end objective was to construct a CBA and to 
determine the economic impact. Information from different great deal of information, 
not only on the economic impact, but also on different aspects of the valuation of the 
tournament by the groups approached. Therefore, the data from the surveys 
separately are presented separately, survey by survey, as well.
The survey of a sample of the visiting supporters is treated first (6.2), subsequently 
the data from the survey among the Dutch population (6.3), and finally the survey 
among the German, French, British, Italian and Spanish population (6.4).
It is no surprise that the spending behaviour of supporters is related to their country 
of origin. Of course, the match results of the visiting national teams on the playing 
field dictate the numbers and origin of visiting supporters. Supporters from countries 
like Germany and England will more easily travel back on the day of the match to 
their homes than supporters from Italy, Spain or Portugal. Ultimately therefore, the 
match results have a high impact on the economic results.
Before the figures are presented, a few words will be devoted to the course of the 
tournament. The expectations in the Netherlands for the Dutch national team were 
very high. And, at first, the team seemed to live up to these expectations. It qualified 
for the quarter final, after victories over the Czech Republic, France and Denmark. At 
that time, the game was already over for Germany and England. They were in the
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same group, and England celebrated a 1-0 victory over Germany. However, England 
was defeated by Romania (2-3), and Portugal (2-3) and Germany by Portugal (0-3).
Besides Romania, Portugal and the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, Italy, Yugoslavia and 
France qualified for the quarter finals. France knocked Spain out of the tournament. 
Italy defeated Romania in the quarterfinal. Portugal had its victory over Turkey. 
Yugoslavia was the opponent of the Netherlands. The match resulted in a 6-1 
mammoth victory for the Netherlands.
So the four teams for the semi final were France, Portugal, Italy and the Netherlands. 
Meanwhile, the Dutch press speculated about which opponent the Netherlands 
would meet in final.
However, the speculations overlooked a minor detail: the semi-final against Italy. 
This match revealed the fundamental weakness of the Dutch team: their inability to 
keep their nerve when taking penalties. The Italian team proved to be cool headed, 
won, and went into the final against France, which had beaten Portugal in the semi 
final. The ruling world champions turned out to be too strong for the Italians. France 
proved it supremacy in European football on the brink of the 21st century.
6.2 Basic figures
6.2.1 Visitors: numbers, nights and expenditures
In this section, the data on the visitors are presented. Most of these data were 
obtained during the visitors' survey, and included are the attendance figures 
(numbers of visitors). The attendance figures were obtained from the Foundation 
Euro 2000.
An important determinant of the economic impact is, of course, the number of tickets 
sold for a match, and subsequently the actual attendance, which is the number of 
tickets sold minus the no-show. Three aspects of the attendance figures are discussed 
here: (1) the total attendance for each separate match, (2) the participation of 
domestic and foreign spectators and (3) the no-show.
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Table 6.1 Euro 2000: capacity and spectators by match
_____________________________________________________________________ N e t C apacity  N u m ber sold %
Opening match
1 June 10 Brussels Belgium - Sweden 48,200 46,700 96.9%
Group matches
2 June 11 Arnhem Turkey - Italy 28,400 27,400 96.5%
3 June 11 Bruges Portugal - Denmark 28,500 28,100 98.6%
4 June 11 Amsterdam Netherlands - Czech Republic 51,300 50,800 99.0%
5 June 12 Liege Germany - Romania 28,750 28,500 99.1%
6 June 12 Eindhoven Portugal - England 31,800 31,500 99.1%
7 June 13 Rotterdam Spain - Norway 48,200 44,000 91.3%
8 June 13 Charleroi Yugoslavia - Slovenia 28,100 21,500 76.5%
9 June 14 Brussels Italy - Belgium 48,200 47,500 98.5%
10 June 15 Eindhoven Sweden - Turkey 31,800 29,500 92.8%
11 June 16 Bruges Czech Republic - France 28,500 28,100 98.6%
12 June 16 Rotterdam Denmark - Netherlands 48,200 48,200 100.0%
13 June 17 Arnhem Romania - Portugal 28,400 25,000 88.0%
14 June 17 Charleroi England - Germany 28,100 27,700 98.6%
15 June 18 Amsterdam Slovenia - Spain 51,300 44,000 85.8%
16 June 18 Liege Norway - Yugoslavia 28,750 27,250 94.8%
17 June 19 Brussels Turkey - Belgium 48,200 43,000 89.2%
18 June 19 Eindhoven Italy - Sweden 31,800 29,500 92.8%
19 June 20 Charleroi England - Romania 28,100 27,700 98.6%
20 June 20 Rotterdam Portugal - Germany 48,200 47,000 97.5%
21 June 21 Bruges Yugoslavia - Spain 28,500 24,500 86.0%
22 June 21 Arnhem Slovenia - Norway 28,400 24,000 84.5%
23 June 21 Liege Denmark - Czech Republic 28,750 23,500 81.7%
24 June 21 Amsterdam France - Netherlands 51,300 51,000 99.4%
Quarter finals
25 June 24 Amsterdam Turkey - Portugal 51,300 47,000 91.6%
26 June 24 Brussels Italy - Rumania 48,200 42,500 88.2%
27 June 25 Rotterdam Netherlands - Yugoslavia 48,200 48,200 100.0%
28 June 25 Bruges Spain - Portugal 28,500 28,100 98.6%
Semi finals
29 June 28 Brussels Portugal - Portugal 48,200 47,500 98.5%
30 June 29 Amsterdam Italy - The Netherlands 51,300 51,000 99.4%
Final
31 July 2 Rotterdam France - Italy 48,200 48,200 100.0%
TOTALS 1,203,650 1,138,450 94.6%
Source: Foundation Euro 2000
In Table 6.1, absolute numbers and the percentage of tickets sold per match are listed, 
according to the Foundation Euro 2000. The average rate was almost 95% per match. 
However, these figures are somewhat inflated, because for some less popular 
matches free tickets were distributed to fill up the stadium. Fortunately, these 
numbers were also available. Correcting for this, the average was 92% of all tickets 
were sold per match.
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So, what factors influence the level of attendance? From the table, it might be learned 
that the average attendance is highly dependent on the participating teams, which 
comes as no surprise. The most important factor is whether the national team of the 
organizing country (domestic team) plays or not. (The exception to this rule is the 
last group match of the Belgium team (match no. 17): there was a relatively low 
attendance for this match, because Belgium had been eliminated at that stage.) 
Another important factor is the participation of the English or the German team, 
which leads to high attendances. If the matches of foreign teams are examined, the 
data show that the attendance of visitors from Southern Europe (and to some extent 
also Eastern Europe) was below average.
Normally, the organizing country plays all games 'at home'. However, when there 
are two organizing countries, it is theoretically possible that an organizing country 
plays 'abroad'. During Euro 2000, there were no matches of organizing countries 
outside their home country. In other words: The Netherlands did not play in Belgium 
or vice versa.
If the matches of the national team are excluded, the sell-out rate of Belgium matches 
was slightly higher than the Dutch matches. This might be caused by the general 
interest of Dutch visitors, which was quite high, even for matches played in Belgium. 
It was much higher than the interest of Belgian supporters in Dutch matches. So this 
general interest was additional demand for the tickets of matches in Belgium and 
thus caused direct expenditures that had no equivalent in the Netherlands.
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Participation for domestic matches
Table 6.2 presents the attendance of Dutch and Belgian supporters during domestic 
matches.
Table 6.2 Euro 2000: share of domestic visitors
Place M atch D om estic  share
1 Brussels Belgium - Sweden 51.2%
2 Arnhem Turkey - Italy 29.1%
3 Bruges Portugal - Denmark 12.8%
4 Amsterdam Netherlands - Czech Republic 58.1%
5 Liege Germany - Romania 9.6%
6 Eindhoven Portugal - England 26.5%
7 Rotterdam Spain - Norway 38.0%
8 Charleroi Yugoslavia - Slovenia 17.0%
9 Brussels Italy - Belgium 56.7%
10 Eindhoven Sweden - Turkey 28.7%
11 Bruges Czech Republic - France 9.8%
12 Rotterdam Denmark - Netherlands 64.1%
13 Arnhem Romania - Portugal 29.8%
14 Charleroi England - Germany 15.2%
15 Amsterdam Slovenia - Spain 28.0%
16 Liege Norway - Yugoslavia 10.2%
17 Brussels Turkey - Belgium 59.5%
18 Eindhoven Italy - Sweden 31.5%
19 Charleroi England - Romania 14.1%
20 Rotterdam Portugal - Germany 33.8%
21 Bruges Yugoslavia - Spain 17.6%
22 Arnhem Slovenia - Norway 31.2%
23 Liege Denmark - Czech Republic 17.2%
24 Amsterdam France - Netherlands 60.8%
25 Amsterdam Turkey - Portugal 26.1%
26 Brussels Italy - Romania 19.4%
27 Rotterdam Netherlands - Yugoslavia 76.7%
28 Bruges Spain - France 7.8%
29 Brussels Portugal - France 10.8%
30 Amsterdam Italy - The Netherlands 56.8%
31 Rotterdam France - Italy 19.5%
Source: Foundation Euro 2000.
The average domestic share is around 32%. It is somewhat higher for Dutch matches. 
It is the practice during European Championships that the Football Association of the 
playing team gets an allocation of tickets, which varies between 5,000 and 10,000. For 
the organizing country, this allocation is around 10,000 tickets. The rest of the tickets
118
are distributed to "the general public', to sponsors and suppliers, to Uefa etc. The 
share increases therefore to over 50% when the national team plays.
The Internet factor
For the first time during a European Championship it was possible for the general 
public to order tickets via the Internet. The sale to the general public has particularly 
benefited from this option. This partly explains why the general participation of the 
Belgian supporters was lower than that of the Dutch supporters: the availability of 
Internet connections is much higher in the Netherlands than in Belgium.
Finally the attendance of the domestic supporters decreases as the tournament 
proceeds. This is probably caused by the fact that foreign interest increases as the 
national teams qualify for the quarter finals, semi finals or the final. It progressively 
becomes more difficult to obtain a ticket, and the price of the tickets rises.
Participation in foreign matches
How attractive is a tournament for visitors from neighbouring countries, apart from 
the matches of their national team? Table 6.3 shows these data, accumulated for the 
whole tournament for selected countries. It is obvious that only the larger and 
nearest countries contribute substantially to fill the stadiums. For the Netherlands, 
these countries are Germany and the UK.
The data in Table 6.3 concern the matches where the national team did not play. Of 
course, the share of foreign supporters rises substantially if their national team plays.
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Table 6.3 Euro 2000: shares of foreign spectators
The Netherlands Belgium
France 0.3% 0.8%
Germany 1.3% 2.0%
Norway 0.2% 0.8%
Sweden 0.2% 0.4%
Denmark 0.0% 0.1%
United Kingdom 3.0%
Belgium 0.8%
Finland 0.2%
Switzerland 0.2%
The Netherlands 6.8%
Source: Foundation Euro 2000.
The data also reveal how many visitors from one organizing country will go to
another such country. A match in Belgium was al foreign match for Dutch supporters
and vice versa. On average, the Dutch filled 6.8% of the seats in the Belgium
stadiums. Football fans from Belgium did not go as frequently to matches in The
Netherlands.
Internet and tourism
It was discovered that two factors are very important in statistically explaining the 
interest from foreign countries: (1) the number of Internet connections per capita in 
the specific country; and (2) the number of foreign tourists from that country 
(Oldenboom et al. 2002). The first factor indicates how easy or difficult it is for a 
spectator to obtain tickets. The supporter from a country where the Internet is 
widespread has an advantage. The second factor gives an indication of the ease of 
travelling from the specific country to the organizing countries (Belgium and The 
Netherlands), and of the attractiveness of Belgium and The Netherlands as tourist 
destinations. Of course, the number of tourists from a particular country is also a 
reflection of the size of the population of that country.
These two factors also account for the differences in interest of Dutch and Belgian 
supporters, respectively, for matches in their neighbouring country. More Dutch 
tourists spend their holiday in Belgium than vice versa, and the penetration of the 
Internet was higher in the Netherlands in 2002. The results indicate that there is no
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such thing as an 'organizing country bonus', i.e. an additional interest from the other 
organizing country which cannot be explained by tourism and the Internet.
No-show
No-show means that people who have bought a ticket do not show up for the match. 
This could be the case, for example, if a national team loses two group games and no 
longer has a chance to qualify for the quarter finals. Another situation might be that 
people have bought a ticket for a quarter final, speculating that their team would 
play, but it turned out that this was not the case. For the LOC this is not very 
important, the tickets have been paid for, but it is for the economic impact, because 
these people most likely go home and do not spend any more money.
The no-show is hard to explain statistically. The only factor of some relevance is -  
again -  the playing of the domestic national team, which has a negative influence. 
Furthermore, the no-show is somewhat higher during the quarter finals. This was 
caused by the fact that tickets had to be bought in advance; there was no guarantee 
that your national team would actually play in the quarterfinal of your choice. A 
substantial part of the ticket holders did not show up during the quarter finals as a 
result of this.
Spectators by host cities
Table 6.4 presents the total number of spectators who were in the Netherlands for 
Euro 2000. Besides the distinction between foreign and domestic spectators, the data 
are classified by type of spectator (supporter or other).
Table 6.4 Euro 2000: number of foreign and domestic spectators
Spectators From abroad Domestic Total
Supporters 229,000 227,000 456,000
Other spectators 109,000 57,000 166,000
Total 339,000 284,000 622,000
Source: Calculation based on data Foundation Euro 2000.
An important second step, essential to be able to calculate the economic impact later 
on, is to re-group the visitors from matches to host-cities (see Section 5.3 in the
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previous chapter). Table 6.5 below provides these figures. However, to construct that 
table the data from Table 6.4 were adjusted to exclude the Dutch visitors from the 
host cities. This is because this group should be excluded on the national and local 
level. The number of tickets owned by this group is approximately 16,000, which is 
the difference between the total of 622,000 from Table 6.4 and 606,000 from Table 6.5.
Table 6.5 Euro 2000: number of spectators in the host cities
Amsterdam Arnhem Eindhoven Rotterdam Total
Domestic Supporters
Other
Total
84.000
32.000 
116,000
17.000 
4,000
21.000
23.000 
6,000
29.000
90.000
13.000 
102,000
213.000 
55,000
268.000
From abroad Supporters
Other
Total
71.000
41.000 
113,000
35.000
11.000 
46,000
42.000
17.000
59.000
80,000
41,000
121,000
229.000
109.000
339.000
Total spectators Supporters
Other
155,000
73,000
52.000
15.000
65.000
23.000
170,000
54,000
442.000
164.000
Grand Total 228,000 67,000 88,000 224,000 606,000
Source: Calculations based on data from Foundation Euro 2000.
Overnight stays
The number of overnight stays was calculated by multiplying the average length of 
stay per visitor with the number of visitors, or, which is the same thing, the average 
duration of stay per ticket with the number of tickets. The number of visitors was 
obtained by dividing the number of spectators by the average number of tickets per 
person (see Section 5.3).
The number of visitors depends on the factors mentioned above: the geographical 
proximity and attractiveness of the Netherlands for a particular country, the number 
of Internet connections, and, of course, the number of matches played by the national 
team. The top-5 ranking of visitors from abroad is: Italy, Germany, Portugal, United 
Kingdom, and Norway (see Table 6.6). Recall that the supporters are grouped on the 
basis of their country of residence, not on their nationality. This further explains the 
relatively strong presence of the supporters from Germany. Their national team 
played only one match in the Netherlands, but the figures for Germany also include 
a large part of the Turkish supporters because many of the Turkish supporters at 
Euro 2000 lived in Germany. Likewise, many of the Italian and Portuguese
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supporters lived outside their country. Many Italian supporters lived in Belgium, 
Germany and the United Kingdom. Many of the Portuguese supporters resided in 
Belgium and France.
Table 6.6 Euro 2000: visitors and overnight stays by country of residence
Visitors Nights per visitor Total nights
Italy 14,000 2.1 30,000
Turkey 9,000 6.0 54,000
Portugal 10,000 5.6 56,000
France 7,000 2.8 20,000
Germany 16,000 1.1 17,000
Spain 4,000 4.7 18,000
Norway 11,000 5.2 56,000
Sweden 5,000 6.2 31,000
Slovenia 6,000 3.0 18,000
Yugoslavia 1,000 1.1 1,000
Denmark 10,000 1.6 16,000
Romania 2,000 1.1 2,000
Czech Republic 7,000 2.9 22,000
UK 11,000 3.4 38,000
Other 10,000 1.4 14,0000
Total 123,000 3.2 394,000
Source: Calculations based on Visitors’ Survey and data from Foundation Euro 2000.
It is remarkable that the Norwegian participation is much higher than that of 
Swedish supporters. Besides the enthusiasm of the Norwegian supporters, because it 
was their team's first appearance in the European Championships, the high number 
of tickets they ordered via the Internet can explain this. In 2000, the availability of 
Internet connections in Norway was even higher than in Sweden.
The duration of stay depends on the country of residence and, of course, on its 
distance from the Netherlands. 37% of the foreign supporters went home after the 
match, which means that 63% stayed at least one night in the Netherlands. The 
Scandinavians are 'big spenders', especially the Norwegians and Swedes. The 
supporters from Germany (including the Turkish) tend to stay a much shorter time, 
which is not surprising considering the shorter travel distances. However, it should 
be mentioned that it was especially the supporters from Germany and the UK who 
visited matches other than those of their respective national teams. This means, that 
although their number of overnight stays per ticket was lower, their ticket average 
per head was higher. The number of nights spent is important for the expenditures.
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Rotterdam was not very lucky in this respect: the Dutch, Turkish and German team 
all played in the port city, and their supporters stayed fewer nights than average.
Table 6.7 Euro 2000: number of overnight stays by region
Amsterdam Arnhem Eindhoven Rotterdam
Rest of 
The Netherlands Total
Supporters 164,000 30,000 51,000 53,000 96,000 394,000
Other visitors 62,000 15,000 27,000 54,000 37,000 196,000
Total 226,000 44,000 78,000 107,000 134,000 589,000
Source: Calculations based on visitors’ survey and data from Foundation Euro 2000.
If possible, visitors will try to find accommodation not too far from the stadium they 
want to visit. In other words, there is a direct relationship between the number of 
visitors to a host city (in other words the number of tickets sold for matches in that 
city) and the number of overnight stays there. Another important factor to consider is 
the accommodation capacity in a host city. Visitors will be drawn to the cities with a 
high accommodation capacity, because it is easier to find a place to stay, they have a 
better choice, and also the the choice in accommodation is a good proxy for the 
overall tourism infrastructure in a city. Amsterdam has the largest capacity and 
naturally attracts the largest share of overnight stays. Nevertheless, a large share of 
the media and officials preferred Rotterdam, probably because the organizational 
headquarters of Euro 2000 were situated in Rotterdam.
From Table 6.8, it can be learned that hotels were the favourite place to stay, followed 
by campsites. The category 'other' also takes a considerable share. This category 
includes spending the night in cars, parks, the airport, or youth hostels.
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Table 6.8 Euro 2000: overnight stays by region and type of accommodation
Amsterdam Arnhem Eindhoven Rotterdam
Other
Netherlands. Total
Hotel 145,000 24,000 45,000 76,000 69,000 359,000
Pension 9,000 1,000 1,000 2,000 6,000 20,000
Friend or relative 15,000 3,000 6,000 14,000 22,000 60,000
Campsite 32,000 13,000 17,000 10,000 13,000 84,000
Other 25,000 4,000 8,000 6,000 23,000 66,000
Total 226,000 44,000 78,000 107,000 134,000 589,000
Source: Calculations based on Visitors’ Survey and data Foundation Euro 2000.
Expenditures
The average expenditure was €117 per person per day. This figure is comparable to 
the average expenditures for foreign tourists, which were €126 per day in 1998. The 
average length of stay was 4.2 days for the supporters and 3.7 days for the average 
tourist. The "tourism variable" turned out to be a good explanatory factor for the 
number of supporters who came. All these findings point to the conclusion that 
visitors to this event were not very different from average tourists, and that sports 
events are comparable to other kind of tourism attractions. Of course some of the 
attributes are quite specific:
- Most of the visitors were men, according to our sample 91%. (Foundation 
Euro 2000 reported a different percentage.) Most of the women were from 
Portugal, Spain, Norway, Sweden and Slovenia.
- 60% of the respondents were younger than 30, while just 1% were older than 
60. The average age was 29.
- The largest share of the supporters came by car (40%). Another popular travel 
mode was plane (20%). Train and bus were less popular, both having a 10% 
share.
6.2.2 The attitude of the Dutch population
In July 2000, just after the event, 1,000 Dutch citizens were interviewed by telephone. 
One of the first questions was:
In retrospect, how do you judge the decision of the Netherlands to host Euro 2000?
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Table 6.9 Attitude towards decision to be host country (% of respondents)
The Netherlands Host cities
Very positive 21 29
Positive 62 55
Neutral 12 12
Negative 2 2
Very negative 0 1
Don't know 2 2
Total 100 100
Source: Residents’ Survey
Table 6.9 shows that the vast majority of the respondents had positive feelings 
toward the hosting of the event. The results of a comparable question for the 
inhabitants of the host cities lead to the conclusion that the same applies to the 
population in the host cities (Table 6.10).
Table 6.10 Attitude towards the decision to be host city (% of respondents)
In % Amsterdam Arnhem Eindhoven Rotterdam Total
Very positive 24* 32 28 35* 29
Positive 54 56 52 56 55
Neutral 18* 8* 14 5* 12
Negative 1 1 4 1 2
Very negative 0 1 - 1 1
Don't know 2 3 1 1 2
Total 100 100 100 100 100
*= Significant deviation from average (5% risk level). 
Source: Residents’ Survey
A majority of the inhabitants of the host cities were positive about the decision to 
host the event, and a considerable share was very positive. The inhabitants of 
Rotterdam and Arnhem were particularly enthusiastic. In Amsterdam, a more 
reserved attitude prevailed, while the population of Eindhoven was of average 
enthusiasm.
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Table 6.11 Attitude towards future hosting of major events (% of respondents)
In % Amsterdam Rotterdam Arnhem Eindhoven
Rest of 
The Netherlands Total
Never again 2 3 3 3 4 4
Now and then 44 32 30* 31 40 40
More often 52 64* 67* 63* 53 54
Don't know /no opinion 2 1 1 2 3 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
*=Significant deviation from average 
Source: Residents’ Survey
The next logical question then is whether the Netherlands should try to host these 
major sports events more often in the future. The majority thought that this is a good 
idea. Perhaps surprisingly, the citizens of the host cities supported the idea even 
more than the rest of the country. Again, the respondents reacted more 
enthusiastically in Rotterdam and Arnhem, but those in Amsterdam were more 
neutral, like the rest of the country.
These findings and others, yet to be presented, make it very clear that the support 
for, and appreciation of, the event was very high.
Personal judgments on specific issues
Table 6.12 Personal experiences with Euro 2000 (% of respondents)
Personal plusses and minuses Positive Negative Neutral Don't know/n.a.
Socializing with friends and family 80 1 16 3
'Orange feeling' 78 6 15 1
Proud of the Netherlands 75 2 22 0
Performance of the Dutch team 73 15 12 0
Media attention 72 15 13 0
The results, the course of the tournament 67 9 23 2
Pride in host city 63 7 29 0
Safety in the host cities 59 10 26 5
Access/traffic near residence 57 3 35 4
Performance of foreign national team 53 11 32 5
Safety in the rest of the Netherlands 49 11 35 5
Access/ traffic near work 40 7 29 24
Events related to Euro 2000 40 6 39 15
Other issues related to traffic and transport 38 8 42 12
Source: Residents’ Survey
The respondents were interviewed about their personal feelings towards specific 
aspects of Euro 2000. The questions were formulated in a neutral way that could
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invite a positive as well as a negative reply. For instance, respondents were not 
asked: "How do you feel about the Dutch team losing the semi-finals?' but, more 
neutrally: 'How did you value the performance of the Dutch team?' Respondents 
could then answer whether they considered this aspect to be a plus point, a minus 
point, or were not really concerned either way.
Socializing with friends and family was most often mentioned as a positive point. 
80% of the respondents mentioned this a positive point. Sometimes football on 
television is seen as disturbing family life, but these results suggest that this was not 
the case, at least not during Euro 2000. National pride follows closely. In the 
Netherlands the Oranjegevoel or 'Orangistic feelings' refers to the feelings invoked by 
the colour of the shirts of the national team.43
Even the performance of the national team (beaten in the semi final) was generally 
valued positively, although on this point opinions seem to differ the most, together 
with the coverage of the event by the media.
Public plus and minus points
Besides the personal plus points, the respondent was asked to look at the event from 
a more public point of view and to score minus or plus on several points. This is a 
consequence of our theory on how to evaluate the event. A distinction was made 
between public and private costs and benefits (see Section 4.5). In theory, it is quite 
possible that a respondent does not particularly care very much about the 
performance of the Dutch football team, but at the same time, h e / she may consider it 
to have been an embarrassment for the Netherlands and the Dutch image abroad. 
The Dutch image abroad may be considered as something of public interest, because 
all the Dutch may benefit from it if it is positive.
Table 6.13 reveals that the awareness in other countries of the Netherlands was most 
frequently mentioned as a positive aspect. Also the behaviour of the Dutch
43 The word 'orangistic' (meaning 'patriotic') derives from the name of the Dutch Royal family -  
The House of Orange. The Dutch national football team is known by its supporters as "Oranje" 
(Orange).
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supporters is above criticism, in contrast with the behaviour of foreign supporters. 
The latter negative opinion is remarkable, because there were hardly any riots or 
other disturbances in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the Dutch population seemed to 
be quite satisfied with their own hospitality -  about which the Italians were less 
enthusiastic, but, more about this later.
Table 6.13 Attitude towards the public value (% of respondents)
Don't
Positive Negative Neutral knoiv/n.a.
The awareness of the Netherlands abroad 84 2 12 3
The behaviour of the Dutch supporters 82 6 11 1
The hospitality of the Dutch population 78 3 14 5
The atmosphere in the host cities 78 3 11 9
Safety during the tournament 78 6 13 2
The performance of the Dutch national team 
Benefits for the hotel and catering sectors in the host
73 12 14 0
cities 69 7 12 0
The awareness of the host cities abroad 69 4 20 6
The involvement of the Dutch business community 
The benefits for the hotel and catering in the rest of the
64 8 20 8
Netherlands 63 8 20 9
Change in image abroad 61 5 25 9
Safety in the rest of the Netherlands 55 9 27 9
Access/traffic in the host cities 51 9 20 20
Access/traffic in the rest of the Netherlands 48 3 32 16
The behaviour of foreign supporters. 40 31 27 2
Source: Residents' Survey
Effects on day trips and vacations
If the Dutch had cancelled their vacations abroad en masse, and spent their time and 
money at home, it would have had consequences for the Dutch economy. It could be 
argued that this money spent at home, instead of abroad, is a positive contribution to 
domestic demand. The straightforward question was:
Did you adjust your holiday plans because of Euro 2000?
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Table 6.14 Adjustment of holiday plans (% of respondents)
In % Amsterdam Arnhem Eindhoven Rotterdam
Rest of the 
Netherlands
Total The 
Netherlands
Yes 3 4 5 8 4 4
No 97 96 95 92 96 96
Don't know - - - - - -
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Residents’ Survey
It turns out that approximately 4% of the population, or approximately 600,000 
persons, did adjust their holiday plans. All these respondents stayed at home. No 
respondent who had fled the country because of the tournament was found.
Again in Rotterdam this percentage is above the average. When probed further, 43% 
of this group said they normally spent their holiday abroad, but did not go that 
particular year. This is the group that is relevant for the present research.44
The others either went on holiday in the Netherlands, in which case not going abroad 
just means a domestic shift in expenditures, or else they shifted their holiday in time.
The final question then to the relevant group is: Do you always do this during 
football events, or only this time for Euro 2000? It turns out that 85% always stays at 
home during these kind of events. Now as explained earlier, this means that the 
hosting of Euro 2000 is not the cause of their expenditures (if the event had been 
organized by another country, they would have stayed home to watch television 
anyway). What is left is 15% that really stays at home because of the hosting of Euro 
2000. Thus the group is 15% of 43% of 4%, which is 0.25%. The Dutch population is 
15 million, so 0.25% is approximately 40,000 people. Their expenditures can be 
considered additional for the Netherlands. However, this study does not quantify 
their expenditures, because the percentage found is not significantly different from 0.
44 The share of the Dutch population going abroad on their holiday in 2000 was 57% (NRIT: 
2001)
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City trips
Also from the viewpoint of the economic impact, it is interesting to know whether 
the Dutch population frequented the host cities, and their centre, more, or less. The 
following questions were asked:
Do you regularly (more than twice a year) frequent one or more of the following cities: 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Eindhoven or Arnhem?
(When more cities were mentioned, the one most frequented was noted.)
I f  so: did you, because of the Euro 2000 event, frequent this city more often or less often than 
you normally do?
Table 6.15 Change in domestic trips to the host cities (% of respondents)
%
More often 11
Less often 31
No difference/Don't know 59
Total 100
Source: Residents’ Survey
The distribution of the answer to this question is presented in Table 6.15. The 
inhabitants of the host cities were asked a similar question, about their visits to the 
city centre.
Table 6.16 Change in visits to the city centre by inhabitants (% of respondents)
In % Amsterdam Arnhem Eindhoven Rotterdam Total
More often 10 20 18 19 15
Less often 18 16 25 23 20
No difference/Don't know 72 63 57 58 65
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Residents’ Survey
The influence of Euro 2000 on the travel behaviour of the majority of the respondents 
seems to have been modest. However, from both questions, it is clear that people did 
indeed stay away from the host cities because of the tournament and that the net 
effect on visits was negative. This is as true for the inhabitants of the host cities, as it 
is for the day-trippers from the rest of the Netherlands. A remarkable exception is the
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citizens from Arnhem, where more people were attracted to the centre than were 
scared away.
6.2.3 Image and awareness in other European countries
The aim of the survey in different European countries was to have an indication of 
the promotion value of the event for the Netherlands. Five European countries were 
surveyed: France, Germany, the UK, Italy and Spain. Some technicalities of the 
survey were discussed in Section 5.2. For a better understanding of some of the 
results the performance of these countries in the tournament should be taken into 
account. Fortunately for this research, the performance of these countries was quite 
diverse. Germany and England had the poorest performance; both were kicked out 
before the quarter finals. Spain reached the quarter finals, but was then defeated (by 
France). Italy and France both reached the final, which was won by France.
To have an impact on foreign countries it is a prerequisite that people watch the 
matches. Therefore, it was asked beforehand and afterwards whether the respondent 
was going to, or had watched the matches. Subsequently, the respondents were 
asked whether they knew which countries had organized Euro 1996 and Euro 2000.
Table 6.17 Intented (1st) and actual watching (2nd) of Euro 2000 matches (% of 
respondents)
France Germany UK Italy Spain Total
1 s t 2 n d 1 s t 2 n d 1 s t 2 n d 1 s t 2 n d 1 s t 2 n d 1 s t  2 n d
Yes 7 1 . 8 6 8 . 8 7 6 . 4 6 9 . 0 6 2 . 3 5 3 . 8 6 7 . 4 6 0 . 8 7 9 . 2 5 6 . 9 7 1 . 5  6 2 . 8
No 2 8 . 2 3 1 . 2 2 3 . 1 3 1 . 0 3 7 . 7 4 5 . 4 3 1 . 2 3 8 . 4 2 0 . 8 4 3 . 1 2 8 . 1  3 7 . 0
Don't know 0 0 0 . 5 0 0 0 . 8 1 . 4 0 . 8 0 0 0 . 4  0 . 2
Total 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0  1 0 0
Source: International Survey
Table 6.17 shows that the interest was lowest in the UK and Spain and highest in 
France and Germany, with Italy taking the middle position. It was expected 
beforehand that, because of the media attention and social pressures, people would 
be inclined to follow the championships, despite their intention not to do so. Rather 
surprisingly however, less people actually followed the championships than was 
expected beforehand. The numbers were lower particularly in the UK, Spain and
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Germany. These results might be explained by the relatively poor performance of the 
national teams. The interest in France was quite high, and almost up to expectations, 
which is in line with that country's performance. However, somewhat out of line 
with the observations for other countries, the interest in Italy was (also) much lower 
than expected, despite the good performance of their team.
The respondents were asked if they knew which countries had hosted the 
championship. It turned out that a majority of all respondents (i.e. including those 
not watching), 55.1%, did not know which country had hosted the championship. 
However, approximately one-third of all respondents knew that either Belgium, the 
Netherlands or both these countries had hosted the championships.
Combining the figures from the tables above also leads to the conclusion that some of 
the people who followed the tournament, had no idea where the matches they 
watched were actually taking place in the world.
How long does it take before this awareness wears off? An approximation for this 
effect is shown by the figures on Euro 1996. Did the respondents remember which 
country hosted Euro 1996 (England)?
Of course, many British people knew that it was in their country. The score of 
Germany is also relatively high, probably because they won the Championship in 
1996. In the other countries, approximately only 10% of the population knew where 
the championship of 1996 took place.
First wave: image of the Netherlands
The first survey in December 1999 revealed that the image of the Netherlands is quite 
traditional and uniform in the five countries. 'Flowers' and 'windmills' still were the 
most well known trademarks of the Netherlands abroad. However, some differences 
could be observed between Italians and Germans and the other countries. Italians 
and Germans had on average quite a positive image of the Dutch and the 
Netherlands. Both countries considered the Netherlands a beautiful country, not 
insignificant or small, and saw the Dutch as people like themselves.
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This last view is even more pronounced in the image the British have of the 
Netherlands. However, the British have a less high opinion of the beauty of the 
Netherlands. Here may be a relationship with usual tourism destinations, which are 
more concentrated on urban environments (cities, e.g. Amsterdam, Delft etc.) rather 
than the countryside, nature reserves and offshore islands.
Spaniards think that the Netherlands may be a beautiful country, but it is rather far 
away, small and cold. The French agree with the Spaniards on insignificance, 
(relatively insignificant) and the climate. However, they also have a rather negative 
opinion of the people living in the Netherlands (low hospitality, not reliable) and of 
the country as a whole. They are actually rather negative in general.
Table 6.18 Image of the Netherlands (first wave) (% of respondents)
All
respondents (%) Significant deviations
Positive_______________ Negative
1 Flowers 92.8 Spain: 88.3
2 Windmills 89.1 Italy: 97.4 Spain: 79.7
3 Beautiful 84.6 Italy: 93.8/ Spain: 90.8 UK: 70.5
4 Hospitable 74.4 Germany and UK: ca. 85 Spain and France: ca: 65
5 Holiday destination 73.1 Italy: 83.4 France: 61.5
6 Tolerant 70.9
7 Tidy 70.9 France: 58.6
8 Fond of sports 61.7 UK: 53.5
9 Reliable 61.1 Spain: 70.5 France: 50
10 Varied 60.3 Germany: 71.6 France 48.7
11 Foreign language 59.3 Spain: 68 Italy: 48
12 Drugs 57.2 Italy: 45.5 France: 68.1/ Germany: 67.3
13 Cold/bad weather 49 Germany: 33.9/ UK: 31.2Spain: 66.2
14 Similar people to us 46.5 UK: 69.4 Spain: 29.7
15 (Too) far away 24 Germany: 11.4/ UK: 6.8 Spain: 47
16 Language conflict 23.5
17 Insignificant/ small 17.2 Germany: 10.5/ Italy: 4.0 France: 25.7/ Spain: 25.4
18 Boring 8.2 Germany: 2.9
19 Dangerous 8
Source: International Survey
Is it possible to generalize about other nations' specific opinions of other nations on 
the Netherlands and the Dutch? It is not possible to compare the statements in an 
'absolute' way, for it is not known how, for example, the Italians look upon other 
European nations apart from the Dutch. It could be that, as a rule, Italians give more 
positive answers to statements on other nations than the French, a sort of 'national
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bias'. In other words: the differences shown in the table are relative to the other 
countries in the survey. A more complete research study might also incorporate 
statements on countries other than the Netherlands.45
Having no information on this matter, it will be assumed that there is no such 
'national bias'. The image statements can then be structured by making a distinction 
between the image of the physical characteristics (weather and landscape) and the 
image of the Dutch population abroad.
On this basis, Germans are of the opinion that the Netherlands is a beautiful country 
(high scores on 'beautiful' and 'holiday destination') and the people are nice (high 
scores on 'hospitable'). Italy likes the country ('beautiful'), but has an average 
perception of the inhabitants. The opinions of respondents from the UK and Spain 
can be considered to be exactly the opposite of each other: the UK respondents think 
the people are nice ('similar to us'), but the country is not very beautiful, while the 
Spaniards have the opinion that the country is beautiful (score 90.8%), but the people 
are not particularly nice (low scores on 'hospitable' and 'similar to us', but high score 
on 'reliable'). The French have the worst view of both country and people: not 
beautiful and not very nice.
The distribution of the opinions in several nations over these aspects are summarized 
in the following table.
Table 6.19 Summary of the image of the Netherlands
---------- People
Country —
Nice/Neutral Not so nice
Beautiful Germany, Italy Spain
Not so beautiful UK France
45 (Also) in this respect it was a pity that a joint research project with Belgium did not work out.
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Second wave: changes in image, awareness and intentions to visit the Netherlands
Now what has happened to the image of the Netherlands because of Euro 2000? The 
weather was very fine, so did this affect the view of the French and the Spaniards on 
the Netherlands as a cold country with bad weather? No, this was not the case. In 
general the conclusion can be that any image of the physical aspects (weather, 
landscape) was not affected in any of the surveyed countries. However, some 
changes in the image of the Dutch people could be observed (Table 6.20).
Germany and Spain are left out of the table, because in these countries, no significant 
changes were observable. Also the statements on which none of the countries 
showed any significant change were removed. It is notable that the changes that 
could be observed, mostly related to some characteristic of the Dutch people and not 
to any of the Netherlands' physical attributes, like landscape, weather, etc.
Remarkably, most changes were visible in France and in Italy, which were the 
finalists. Furthermore, the changes in the minds of the French were mostly positive: 
after the tournament, the Netherlands was considered less insignificant, more 
reliable. However, the French seem to have realized that the Dutch were even less 
similar to themselves than they thought before the tournament.
Interesting, on the last point, the Italians and the British seem to have changed their 
minds the other way round: now they consider the Dutch more similar to them than 
before. It would, however, appear that the Italians have become less enthusiastic 
about the Dutch: less respondents find them hospitable and reliable and for less 
people the Netherlands is a holiday destination. This may partly be ascribed to an 
incident during the final, in which a reporter of the Italian national television was 
beaten and arrested by the police. This caused a diplomatic dip in the relationship 
between the two countries. Another reason might be that Italy lost the final.
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Table 6.20 Changes in image of the Netherlands abroad (% of respondents)
France Italy UK
1st Wave 2nd Wave 1st Wave 2nd Wave 1st Wave 2nd Wave
All respondents (n) 201 200 201 200 201 200
Hospitable
(A) (B) (C) P ) (G) (H)
Corresponds 64.3 67.9 74.3 59.6 * 85.3 86.3
Doesn't correspond 7.6 6.1 2.8 4.4 1.2 4.8
Makes no impression 28.0 26.0 18.1 36.0 11.3 7.1
Don't know - - 4.8 - 2.2 1.8
Similar people to us
Corresponds 39.9 30.6 52.7 61.8 * 69.4 80.3
Doesn't correspond 43.0 53.8 * 33.3 24.1 16.1 15.1
Makes no impression 17.0 15.7 10.4 14.0 11.7 3.0
Don't know - - 3.5 - 2.9 1.6
Foreign language
Corresponds 64.2 74.1 * 48.0 58.7 55.5 68.3
Doesn't correspond 11.3 12.7 17.5 29.5 * 28.2 24.9
Makes no impression 24.5 13.2 * 32.1 11.7 15.6 5.7
Don't know - - 2.3 - 0.7 1.1
Holiday destination
Corresponds 61.5 58.2 83.4 73.6 * 66.7 69.7
Doesn't correspond 31.6 32.4 9.3 18.2 19.4 23.9
Makes no impression 7.0 9.5 7.3 8.2 14.0 4.8
Don't know - - - - - 1.5
Insignificant/ small
Corresponds 25.7 16.4 * 4.0 7.4 19.9 20.9
Doesn't correspond 59.1 72.3 * 83.6 83.6 64.6 69.9
Makes no impression 15.2 11.3 11.8 9.0 15.2 8.9
Don't know - - 0.6 - 0.4 0.4
Reliable
Corresponds 50.0 62.7 * 62.8 54.2 59.3 72.2
Doesn't correspond 4.3 6.2 2.6 3.5 1.9 5.7
Makes no impression 45.7 31.2 23.1 42.3 * 36.0 19.9
Don't know - - 11.5 - 2.8 2.2
Fond of sports
Corresponds 59.1 65.4 65.0 75.4 53.5 62.8
Doesn't correspond 13.4 10.7 12.6 8.3 18.0 12.3
Makes no impression 27.5 23.9 19.0 16.3 26.2 22.5
Don't know - - 3.5 - 2.3 2.5
Note: asterisk * means: significant change at the 5% risk level 
Source: International Survey.
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Changes in name awareness of the host cities
After the second wave, it was possible to compare the name awareness of different 
cities before and after the tournament. At first sight, the results of this comparison 
are rather puzzling. The name awareness of the cities has risen enormously in France 
and also to some extent in Germany. On the other hand, the awareness in the UK has 
dropped off after Euro 2000, and the same happened for Spain. The results for Italy 
are more in line with the expectations, because there the name awareness of the 
participating host cities all rose. It should be remembered that Italy played in 
Rotterdam, Arnhem and Eindhoven and that Amsterdam, above all, has an 
awareness score of almost 100% in every country.
An explanation that may come to mind is the performance of the national team: 
France won the tournament, and the UK performed rather poorly, being kicked out 
before the quarter finals. Is it possible that the British do not want to be reminded of 
Euro 2000 and have psychologically blocked all references, including the names of 
the host cities from their memory? This, however, is inconsistent with the behaviour 
of the Germans. The Germans performed as poorly as the English, but were better at 
remembering the names of the host cities. And Spain actually did better than both 
Germany and England, reaching the quarter finals but scored rather poor on name 
awareness.
Table 6.21 Changes in name awareness of Dutch cities abroad (% of 
respondents)
France
2  s t  2 n d
wave wave
Italy
2  s t  2 n d
wave wave
Spain
1 s t  2 n d
wave wave
UK
1 s t  2 n d
wave wave
Germany
1 s t  2 n d
wave wave
Total
1 s t  2 n d
wave wave
Amsterdam 98.7 99.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.9 100.0 100.0 99.5 100.0 99.6 97.0
Rotterdam 90.2 95.3 82.8 89.4 94.3 92.9 94.9 87.6 92.1 97.4 90.8 90.0
Utrecht 26.8 43.5 30.4 30.4 51.7 41.3 52.4 32.5 70.8 71.0 46.5 42.7
Groningen 22.5 31.3 24.8 23.2 25.0 20.9 25.3 15.7 53.3 59.1 30.2 29.2
Eindhoven 50.5 68.6 41.5 52.3 47.5 39.6 66.0 58.6 71.9 75.0 55.4 57.2
Arnhem 28.2 36.2 17.7 20.0 12.9 15.9 63.7 51.9 70.4 73.5 38.4 38.6
Source: International Survey
Two cities that were not host cities were included in the survey (Utrecht and 
Groningen). This was done in order to differentiate between a general rise in 
awareness of Dutch city names (a decline was not expected) and a specific one for the
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host cities. If the results for these cities are inspected, it is clear that there is a general 
'trend7 for France and Germany (positive) and for the UK and Spain (negative).
In search of a further explanation, it is interesting to look at the figures for the 
interest in the whole event (see Table 6.17). It can be seen that the interest in Euro 
2000 was the lowest in the UK and Spain and the highest in France and Germany, 
with Italy taking the middle position. The level of interest follows the change in 
name awareness quite closely; there seems to be a relationship between the interest 
in the event, and the change in name awareness. However, it cannot be explained 
how a low interest can cause a decline in name awareness. A low interest leading to a 
stable awareness would have been more likely.
Furthermore, it seems plausible that the interest for individual matches, and thus the 
impact upon name awareness of the host city, is related to the type of match 
concerned: was it a group match, a quarter final, semi-final, or the final? However, 
contrary to this expectation, if the type of games is defined according to these four 
types, a good explanation could not be found. If the number of the game is taken (i.e. 
the first being number 1, the last (the final) being 31), a satisfactory result was found 
indeed. In other words: the impact on name awareness of a host city increases during 
the course of the event.
It was also tested whether there was a general increase in awareness of the host cities, 
apart from the fact that a national team had played, but this was not the case. In 
addition the hypothesis of an extra general increase in awareness caused by holding 
the final in the city of Rotterdam had to be rejected. So our analysis indicates that 
there is no significant bonus for the host city for holding the final, apart from the fact 
that this city has the last match, and therefore a high match number.
After testing several specifications, the following specification best explains the 
changes in awareness.46
46 A logistic transformation of the variable AA and AB was applied, because these variables are 
percentages. After transformation it can be assumed that the error distribution is similar to the normal 
distribution and therefore the normal statistical tests can be applied, like R2 and t-statistics.
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AA = a j * WA + a 2 * GN + a 3 * AB + c (1)
where:
A A = awareness (in %) after the event;
AB = awareness (in %) before the event;
GN = match number of the match played in the host city (1 to 31);
WA = percentage of watchers in the country (according to our survey).
Table 6.22 Regression on name awareness of host cities
Variable WA GN AB C
coefficient 0.06 0.03 0.87 -3.78
t- statistic 8.5 5.9 23.7 8.7
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.98
The t-statistic indicates whether the value of the coefficient is significantly different 
from zero, or in other words, whether it contributes to the explanation of the value of 
the awareness after the event (AA). All coefficients are significant at the 1% 
uncertainty level.
Of course, there is a strong correlation between the awareness before and after the 
event, which is indicated by the coefficient and t-statistic of AB. The value of the 
coefficient is close to 1. The most relevant coefficient is that of the host city variable: 
this variable is very significant, with a t-statistic of 5.9 (Table 6.22). The conclusion is 
that there has been a significant positive effect on the name awareness of a host city 
in those countries whose national team played there. However, it should be added 
that these effects are not very large and are by no means on a level comparable with, 
for example, the effects of the Olympics (Ritchie and Smith 1991).
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Table 6.23 Change in name awareness in selected countries (% of respondents)
Host city Country Awareness (in %)
1st wave 2nd wave
Arnhem Italy 18 20
Eindhoven Italy 42 52
Eindhoven UK 66 59
Rotterdam Germany 92 97
Rotterdam Italy 83 89
Rotterdam Spain 94 93
Rotterdam France 90 95
Source: International Survey
Effects on intention to visit the Netherlands
A potential side effect of the tournament is that, because of the media attention, more 
tourists are likely to visit the Netherlands in the future. To establish an indication of 
the magnitude of this effect, the respondents were asked before and after the 
tournament whether they intended to visit the Netherlands within the next two 
years. The first wave of interviews was in December 1999 and the second in July 
2000. Depending on the respondent's state of mind in December or July, a visit to the 
Netherlands might seem more or less likely. To minimize the influence of the timing 
of the survey, a horizon of two years was chosen.
Table 6.24 Change in intention to visit (% of respondents)
In % France Italy Spain UK Germany Total
Wave 1 st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1 st 2nd 1 st 2nd 1st 2nd
Definitely 4 13+ 4 6 5 1 6 7 19 21 10 12
Probably 11 21+ 19 18 6 14 14 18 18 18 15 18
Probably not 21 21 21 18 15 19 25 20 23 30 21 22
Definitely not 50 35+ 48 44 69 49+ 39 49- 27 22 42 37+
Don't know 15 10 9 14 5 16 34 11* 14 10 13 11
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
(+) significant change (5% risk level) increased intention
(*) significant change (5% risk level) neutral
(-) significant change (5% risk level) decreased intention
Source: International Survey
Again, a positive change in attitude in France and a negative change in the UK can be 
observed. For the other countries, the changes are not very spectacular. The group 
that is definitely not intending to visit has decreased by 5 percentage points, but this
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is hardly an indication to expect a substantial increase of inbound tourism in the 
Netherlands.
Another important question is whether foreign tourists have deliberately avoided the 
Netherlands because of the tournament (see Hultkrantz 1998), i.e. the crowding-out 
effects on tourism. A survey in 1990, before the World Football Championships in 
Italy, showed that German tourists in particular are sensitive to potential annoyance 
and disturbances by football supporters. Before the event 3% of a survey group of
2,000 respondents indicated that they definitely avoided Italy because of the World 
Football Championship. However, 2% of the respondents said that the championship 
would be a reason for them to visit Italy (NRIT 1994). These results seem to suggest 
that a Football Championship can have serious side effects on tourism.
For the Germans, additional questions were included in the second wave to see 
whether the effect could be found in this survey as well. The group that visited the 
Netherlands was asked the following question:
When considering your visit to the Netherlands, did you take into account that the 
Netherlands hosted Euro 2000?
• Yes, I've shifted my visit in time, before or after the event
• Yes, I've planned my visit during Euro 2000
• No.
From the 28 respondents who visited the Netherlands (which is 14% of the total 
sample), three indicated that they had shifted their visit in time, either before or after 
the event. No respondent was found who (re)scheduled his visit on purpose to let it 
coincide with Euro 2000. No indications were found that the Championship in itself 
had attractive value for German tourists, apart from the spectators visiting the event.
If the respondent did not visit the Netherlands, the following questions were asked:
Did you plan to visit the Netherlands? I f  yes
Did you cancel your visit because of the hosting of Euro 2000?
Unfortunately, this last part was programmed in the wrong way, and the people who
answered 'no' and not those who answered 'yes', were asked this question. It is
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interesting, however, that from this group of 89 persons, still as many as 6 answered 
that they did not consider going to the Netherlands because of the hosting of Euro 
2000 (these respondents would have been missed if the questionnaire had been 
programmed correctly). Of the total sample, this is 3%. This is, probably 
coincidentally, the same percentage that was found during the World Football 
Championships in Italy. To find the total number of scared tourists the number of 
people that considered going, but stayed away should be added, but this is the figure 
that is not known because of the programming mistake.
The most interesting figure is the net result of people avoiding and attracted to Euro 
2000. To calculate this, from the figure above (total number avoiding), the number of 
people who came especially for Euro 2000 should be deducted (apart, of course from 
the spectators going to the matches). However, this figure was found to be 0. 
Nevertheless, these figures are not very reliable because of the small sample of 200. 
The conclusion can only be that there are indications that there has been some 
crowding-out of other tourists.
6.3 The economic impact of Euro 2000
6.3.1 Composition of the economic impact
Earlier the economic impact of Euro 2000 was defined as the 'additional expenditures 
caused by the event'. A formal distinction was made between the 0 situation, in 
which the event would have been hosted by one or more other countries, and the 1
situation, which is the actual situation in which Belgium and the Netherlands
together hosted Euro 2000. This definition of the two situations helps to decide 
whether expenditure is really caused by the tournament. Some economic effects were 
described, which may at first glance seem to be a part of the economic impact of Euro 
2000, but on closer inspection turn out to be not really additional. In other words, 
they do not pass the 0/1 criterion. For the technical details of the calculation, the 
reader is referred to subsection 5.5.2.
Another important issue to bear in mind besides the issue of additionality is that, in 
this chapter, only those economic effects are discussed which are related to
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expenditures in the year 2000. This is because 'economic impact' was defined that 
way. Some effects, like promotion of city and country, may very well generate 
additional expenditures after 2000, but these effects are not discussed here. This 
choice does not imply that other types of effects are not important. The issue of their 
role in the CBA will be taken up in Section 6.4. (Whether there have been 
promotional effects has been discussed in the previous section.)
The direct expenditures are composed of:
1) Expenditures by spectators;
2) Organizational expenditures;
3) Effects on tourism and day-trippers.
Unfortunately, there is only circumstantial evidence on the magnitude of the 
crowding-out effects. This evidence is presented below in subsection 6.3.2. In the 
following subsection 6.3.3 the direct expenditures originating from the organization 
and the visitors are presented.
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6.3.2 Crowding-out effects: evidence
Table 6.25 Overview evidence for crowding-out effects
(Potentially)
negative
Evidence
(a) (Potentially)positive
Evidence (b)
Additional 
on regional 
level
Additional 
on national 
level
Impact on 
regional 
level
Impact on 
national 
level
Foreign Tourists staying 
away altogether
Yes Tourists
additionally
attracted
No Yes Yes - ~
Time shifters to 
period before or 
after the event
Yes Time shifters to 
event period
No No No 0 0
Space shifters 
within the 
Netherlands to 
region outside host 
cities
? Space shifters 
within the 
Netherlands to 
host cities
? Yes No ? 0
Domestic Dutch fleeing the 
country
No Dutch staying at 
home
Yes Yes Yes + +
Dutch evading the 
host cities (centre)
Yes Dutch attracted to 
the host cities 
(centre)
Yes Yes No *■ 0
Table 6.25 copies the structure of the summary Table 4.4, but four columns have been 
added: 1) Evidence (a); 2) Evidence (b); 3) Impact on regional level; and 4) Impact on 
national level. Columns 1) and 2) summarize the findings of earlier sections. These 
findings, combined with theoretical insights on Additionality' of specific effects (on 
the regional and national level), gives as a result the last two columns: respectively, 
the impact on the regional and national level.
To give an example: some evidence was found that tourists have avoided the 
Netherlands, while no evidence was found for the opposite effect, of additional visits 
by tourists (apart, of course, from the visitors to the event). Therefore, the balance of 
these effects is negative. Moreover, this is indeed an 'additional source' (or, in this 
case, drain) of income, the impact is negative both at the regional and national level. 
This is indicated by th e '-' signs in the last two columns.
Evidence was found for several effects with a neutral effect on a countrywide level 
(but not necessarily neutral at the regional level). Examples are the foreign and Dutch 
time and space shifters (rows 2, 3 and 5 of the table). The effect of the domestic
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population avoiding the city centres may have a significant impact on the turnover of 
retail business. Furthermore, it was found that there is evidence for two tourism 
effects, which have impact at the national level: first the already mentioned effect 
that foreign tourists had avoided the Netherlands (last column, second row) and 
second the effect that some of the Dutch stayed at home because of the tournament 
(last column, fifth row). Unfortunately, the exact magnitude of these two effects is 
not known.
6.3.3 Expenditures by organization and visitors 
Direct expenditures of spectators
The total expenditures of foreign spectators were €108 million; the expenditures by 
the Dutch were €14 million. In total, this is €122 million. However, part of the Dutch 
expenditures is not additional. On the basis of our criteria, €4.5 million is considered 
additional and thus €9.5 million as not additional. These figures can be found in 
Table 6.26.
As discussed earlier (subsection 4.3.2), the €4.5 million are hypothetical expenditures, 
because these are the expenditures of Dutch spectators travelling abroad, if the 
tournament had been hosted by another country. They are derived from Dobson et 
al. (1997).
To calculate direct expenditures at a regional level, the expenditures by the Dutch 
should be known by region. This is the case for the total expenditures (€14 million) 
by the Dutch. However, the additional expenditures (€4.5 million) are known as a 
lump sum only. Therefore, assumptions should be made on where (i.e. in which 
cities) this money was spent. It was assumed that the distribution of the additional 
expenditures over the host cities is the same as the overall distribution of the Dutch 
expenditures: compare the first and second row (additional) of Table 6.26.
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Table 6.26 Expenditures of Dutch spectators in the host cities (in million €)
Total NL Amsterdam Arnhem Eindhoven Rotterdam Rest NL
Gross direct expenditures 14.1 6.7 1.0 1.3 4.6 0.5
Additional 4.5 2.2 0.3 0.4 1.5 0.2
Shift 9.5
From -9.5
To 4.5 0.7 0.9 3.1 0.3
Total after shift 4.5 6.7 1.0 1.3 4.6 -9.0
On the 3rd row, the total shift in expenditures is shown, and the 4th and 5th row 
indicate that these expenditures flow from the rest of the country (-€9.5 million) to 
the host cities (+€9.5 million). The last row gives the total direct expenditures by 
domestic spectators in a region, taking into account the shift in demand.
This last row combines with the expenditures by foreign spectators to arrive at the 
total additional expenditures by spectators in the regions (Table 6.27). The table 
reveals that the major share, more than 90%, of the direct expenditures was received 
by the host cities: among the host cities, Amsterdam had the largest share. This is 
because Amsterdam is the main destination for any traveller to the Netherlands and 
has the best tourism infrastructure (accommodation, transport, catering). The last 
column of Table 6.27 gives the expenditures that are additional on the national level: 
€112.6 million.
Table 6.27 Expenditures of domestic and foreign visitors (in million €)
Amsterdam Arnhem Eindhoven Rotterdam Rest ofNL Total NL
Foreign 44.2 11.5 17.3 28.0 7.0 108.1
Domestic 6.7 1.0 1.3 4.6 -9.0 4.5
Total spectators 50.9 12.5 18.7 32.6 -2.0 112.6
Totals may not exactly add up because of rounding
The data also allowed a subdivision by branch of industry to be made.
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Table 6.28 Expenditures in host cities by branch of industry (in million €)
Amsterdam Arnhem Eindhoven Rotterdam Other Total NL
Accommodation 10.1 2.1 3.8 5.6 2.1 23.9
Catering 22.2 5.6 8.0 15.9 -4.4 47.4
Retail foodand drink 3.0 0.8 1.1 1.7 0.4 7.1
Merchandise 5.6 1.5 2.1 3.6 0.1 12.9
Travel 5.0 1.2 1.8 3.1 -0.1 11.1
Attractions, museums 1.4 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.1 3.0
Other 3.5 1.0 1.3 2.0 -0.3 7.4
Total 50.9 12.5 18.7 32.6 -2.0 112.6
Note: Totals may not exactly add up because of rounding
The branches of industry that stand out in particular are accommodation and 
catering. Together, these branches accounted for 60% of the expenditures. It is 
notable that the share of catering was even higher than that of accommodation.
Direct expenditures of the LOC
To determine the direct expenditures from the organization of the event for the 
Dutch economy, the flows of money surrounding the event should be mapped: the 
financial relationship between Uefa and the local organizing committee (LOC) and 
the different sources of income: broadcasting rights, ticket-sales, hospitality 
arrangements, etc. The financial statements of Uefa are not public and neither are 
those of the LOC. However, by using information from different sources, an estimate 
can be made. First of all, this study had access to some budget statements from the 
LOC concerning the tournament. Furthermore, from remarks by officials it became 
clear that the income from ticket sales was higher than expected beforehand (and 
budgeted). The surplus for the LOC, which was said to be €19 million, was published 
in a press statement (Uefa 2000). These different sources combined gives the 
following estimation. The financial statements of the Uefa are presented in Table 
6.29.
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Table 6.29 Financial statements of Uefa (in million €)
Costs Benefits
Contribution to the LOC 59 Broadcasting rights 98
Premiums to the participating nations 76 Sponsors 54
UEFA solidarity fund 49 Ticket sales 65
UEFA share 32 From Dutch origin 19
Total 216 Total 216
Source: calculation based on data from Foundation Euro 2000.
The exact financial provisions and agreements between Uefa and the LOC are subject 
to negotiation, each time the European Championships are organized (every four 
years). As a general rule, the ticket sales should cover most of the organizational 
expenditures in the host country. The LOC might get a part of the sponsorship and 
broadcasting income, but that probably depends on the financial situation in the 
bidding country.
If the sources are correct, the total income of the LOC was approximately €59 million. 
The financial statement of the LOC would be:
Table 6.30 Financial statement of the LOC (in million €)
Costs
In the 
Netherlands Benefits
Contribution from UEFA and ticket
Stadiums (rent etc.) 15 9 sales and sponsoring 59
Personnel 7 7
Safety and ticketing 5 3
Communication and events 4 2
Accommodation and travel 4 2
Other 6
Net benefit 19 14
Total in the Netherlands 37
Total 59 Total 59
Source: Estimation based on data from Foundation Euro 2000.
As is clear from comparing the two tables, a profit was made by the LOC, but the 
Uefa takes the largest piece of the cake. A profit is by no means guaranteed for the 
LOC, in 1996 the English FA made a loss on organizing the event (Dobson et al. 
1997). The profit is more or less guaranteed for Uefa: this organization is not exposed 
to real financial risks, because it does not bear the operational costs of the 
tournament.
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Besides the income from Uefa, the LOC had earnings from their accommodation 
agency and from local sponsors. The income from local sponsors was probably 
around €8-10 million. However, according to the criteria this is not additional for the 
Netherlands. The income from the accommodation agency is again unknown, but 
this income is earned through the expenditures of foreigners on accommodation, 
which is already part of the visitors' direct expenditures.
One should be aware that the total amount of expenditures of €59 million did not all 
come into the Dutch economy; a part was spent in Belgium. How exact the 
distribution of these expenditures was, could not be verified. According to the LOC, 
the distribution was approximately 60/40 for respectively the Netherlands and 
Belgium. The costs for personnel were allocated to the Netherlands, because the 
LOCs headquarters were in Rotterdam. In Table 6.30, third column the expenditures 
for the Netherlands following these lines are presented. A total of €37 million direct 
expenditures of the LOC in the Netherlands is the result.
Yet another correction has to be made to this figure because not all of the 
expenditures of €37 million are from abroad and thus additional. The Dutch 
spectators bought a part of the tickets. From the ticket database, it is clear that 29% of 
the tickets were sold to Dutch spectators, which amounts to €19 million. This share 
should be subtracted from the total ticket income. It balances at €18 million, which 
figure is used for the input-output analysis.
The Dutch FA received bonuses from Uefa for the performance of the Dutch team 
(which reached the quarter finals). Again, the question is: Are these bonuses 
additional income? If the 0/1 criterion is applied the straightforward answer is 'no': 
these bonuses would have been received just the same, if the tournament had been 
played in another country. It can be argued, however, that the Dutch had some 
advantage playing at home, and therefore earned a higher bonus. This is true, but the 
magnitude of this effect is (yet) unknown. The bonus is excluded but a reservation is, 
therefore, that no home advantage is taken into account.
The participating teams had to pay tax on the bonuses that they received from Uefa. 
According to the Dutch ministry of Finance, this amount was €3 million. This income
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passes the criterion of additionality. The figure is not used for the input-output 
analysis, because it does not flow directly into the Dutch economy. It is, however, 
found on the cost benefit account for the public sector.
Other organizational expenditures
Besides the money spent by the LOC, there are other parties related to the 
organization of the event, who spent their money in the Netherlands. The first 
example is the participating football teams. From the 14 teams visiting, 8 stayed in 
the Netherlands. They had to pay for accommodation and catering. According to the 
data that were received from the Euro 2000 Accommodation Agency, which was 
linked to the LOC, these teams have spent 13,000 nights in the Netherlands and 
Belgium. If a cost of €450 per person per night is assumed, this means that the total 
expenditure on Dutch territory would have been €3.5 million.
A second organization-related item concerns the expenditures by the media. The 
expenditures of journalists are included in the visitors' expenditures, but besides 
these costs, some costs were incurred to provide for the international broadcasting 
signal and other facilities. The provision of these facilities was the task of a 
foundation called FORTO 2000, which was based in Amsterdam. The total budget of 
Forto 2000 was €16 million. Like the expenditures of LOC, the overhead (personnel) 
expenditures (€3.6 million) are reckoned to have flowed into the Dutch economy. The 
rest of the expenditures are again distributed on a 60/40 basis to the Netherlands and 
Belgium.
Expenditures by the central government and combined visitors’ and organizational 
expenditures
The central government contributed approximately €0.5 million to each host city for 
covering the costs of organization. In fact, this could be considered a shift in 
expenditures from the rest of the Netherlands to the host cities. However, these 
expenditures were not included in the input-output analysis, as it was supposed to
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be more consistent to treat all government related expenditures outside the input- 
output framework.
Table 6.31 Organization related expenditures by region (in million €)
Amsterdam Arnhem Eindhoven Rotterdam Other Total
LOC 3.2 2.6 2.6 7.9 1.7 18.0
Visiting teams 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 3.5
T elecommunication 4.4 1.1 1.1 2.2 2.2 11.0
PM Central government* 0.5* 0.5* 0.5* 0.5* 0.0 1.8*
Total 7.6 3.7 3.7 10.1 7.5 32.6
* Not included in total (sum may not equal total because of rounding)
Table 6.32 Overview of additional expenditures (in million €)
Amsterdam Arnhem Eindhoven Rotterdam Other Total NL
Visitors' expenditures 50.9 12.5 18.7 32.6 -2.0 112.6
Organizational expenditures 7.6 3.7 3.7 10.1 7.5 32.6
Total 58.5 16.2 22.4 42.7 5.5 145.2
6.3.4 Comparison of prognosis and realization of direct expenditures 
There is a short history behind the prognosis for the Euro 2000 event. The first 
prognosis was made in 1992 by the Nederlands Economisch Institute (NEI), which is 
based in Rotterdam and formerly associated with the Erasmus University of 
Rotterdam. This prognosis was made three years before the official announcement of 
the awarding of the event to the Netherlands and Belgium, which was in 1995. 
Apparently the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs did not trust the figures of this 
research and ordered a counter research report, by a research institute called NRIT. 
However, this counter prognosis was not published. In 1994 the NEI made a second 
prognosis, and again a second opinion was ordered from NRIT, but again this was 
not published. The motivation of the Dutch Football Association is understandable: 
they wanted to show the positive economic benefits for the Netherlands, and the 
public sector of Euro 2000. The exact role of the counter expertise is not known. 
Supposedly they had to provide arguments against any claims from the Football 
Associations for support (money), but to let these arguments play their role in the 
public discussion, it would have been necessary to make them available to the media. 
Whether they were actually used for this purpose, in closed meetings, is not known.
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At the end of 1999, just before Euro 2000, the author of this thesis also published a 
prognosis. This prognosis referred to the prognoses by the NEI and NRIT and 
compared the figures from these studies. The NEI calculated direct expenditures of 
€278 million, while the Meerwaarde prognosis was much lower, €122 million. The 
publication triggered an interesting debate in the media on the economic impact of 
the event.
The main difference between the Meerwaarde and the NEI prognosis concerned the 
additionality of expenditures. The NEI prognosis included the investments in the 
stadiums to prepare for Euro 2000, which were set at €80 million, and also included 
expenditures on safety by the government and expenditures by the Dutch. If these 
entries were excluded, the prognosis of the NEI was also around €122 million. Their 
prediction of the visitors' expenditures however, was somewhat higher and of the 
organizational aspects somewhat lower.
Now that the realization is revealed, the figures can be compared with the prognoses 
of expenditures. There were no prognoses on the regional level, so the comparison is 
confined to the direct expenditures at the national level.
Table 6.33 Comparison prognosis and realization (in million €)
Prognosis Realization
1) Spectators
a) Foreign spectators 86.2 108.1
b) Domestic spectators 4.5 4.5
Total spectators 90.8 112.6
2) Organization related
a) LOC 21.8 18.0
b) Visiting teams 4.5 3.5
c) Telecommunication 4.5 11.0
Total organization 30.9 32.6
Grand total 121.6 145.2
The most interesting part of the comparison is the difference between the prognosis 
and the realization of foreign expenditures. The prognosis was based on a total of
351,000 tickets sold abroad (which number was already known at the time), of which 
85% would actually result in a foreigner showing up at the match (i.e. 15% no-show),
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meaning an actual figure of 300,000. Furthermore, the average length of stay would 
be 1.7 nights, and the average expenditure €106 per day. This results in a total 
expenditure of €108 million.
The average length of stay was, in fact, exactly 1.7 nights. The average expenditure 
per day was €118, so this is approximately 12% higher than expected. Also the 
number of spectators was 12% higher than our forecast suggested, 339,000. The 
cumulative effect of these two underestimations explains the difference of about 25% 
between forecast and realization.
6.3.5 Indirect effects, value added, and employment
To calculate the indirect effects upon the Dutch economy, the direct expenditures 
were fed into an input-output model, or to put it more accurately: five input-output 
models. Before this could be done, the direct expenditures had to be corrected:
1) First, VAT was to be deducted from the expenditures;
2) Second, the expenditures that would lead straight away to additional import 
of goods and services had to be disregarded.
From the total gross direct expenditures of €145.2 million, €15.9 million flowed 
directly into the pockets of the government. On the basis of average import quotes 
per branch of industry, another €4.4 million was estimated to be spent abroad. The 
rest, or €124.9 million, can be considered to be the net direct expenditures of Euro 
2000.
Table 6.34 Turnover, employment and value added (in million €)
Direct
expenditures
Indirect
turnover
Total
turnover Employment Value added
Agriculture and industry 7.4 34.5 41.9 210 14.6
Trade 12.3 6.1 18.4 222 11.3
Accommodation and food 65.4 2.3 67.7 619 35.1
Transport and travel 10.1 1.2 11.4 77 7.2
Services 29.7 25.9 55.7 708 34.2
Total 124.9 70.1 195.1 1,837 102.5
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Table 6.34 shows that the initial direct expenditures trigger a total turnover of more 
than €195 million. However, the gross turnover includes intermediate deliveries as 
well, and therefore the value added indicates the effect on income more adequately. 
The total additional value added caused by Euro 2000 turns out to be €102.5 million. 
Of this amount, 68% was earned in the accommodation, catering and services 
companies. This is also where the employment effects are the largest, in total 619 of 
1,837 person years. The additional employment is calculated by dividing the value 
added with the labor productivity (see section 5.4).
The average value added multiplier then is 102.5/145.2 = 0.7, or 102.5/124.9 = 0.8 if 
the net direct expenditures are used as the denominator. However, it should be noted 
that this calculation gives an ex post multiplier, and this multiplier was not used to 
arrive at the results.
Of course, it is also interesting to look at the distribution of the value added and 
employment over the regions, for these are the main indicators to determine the 
benefits for the host cities. This is done in Table 6.35.
Table 6.35 Value added and employment in the host cities
Amsterdam Arnhem Eindhoven Rotterdam Other Total
Net direct expenditures in million € 49.8 14.3 19.4 36.7 4.7 125.0
In % 40% 11% 16% 29% 4% 100%
Value added In million € 34.9 4.7 6.8 25.9 30.2 102.5
In % 34% 5% 7% 25% 29% 100%
Employment In man years 641 84 120 466 526 1,837
in % 35% 5% 7% 25% 29% 100%
Although 90% of the direct expenditures were in the host cities, the value added is 
more evenly distributed: the rest of the Netherlands receives 29%. The data on labor 
productivity are specific for each branch of industry and each region, but the 
differences between regions are not very large. The distribution of employment is, 
therefore, practically identical to that of the value added.
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6.4 Costs and benefits for the Netherlands
This section is devoted to the central question: Did the benefits of Euro 2000 balance 
the costs? A differentiation is made between the financial and the non-financial costs 
and benefits. Furthermore, three main interests, have been distinguished :
- The business community;
- The Dutch population;
- The public sector (represented by the government and the local authorities).
In the next sections an account is introduced for each of these three interests. In this 
account, the positive and negative effects that are, or could be, relevant are specified. 
Subsequently, these effects are weighed in quantitative terms.
In theory, 15 different accounts are thinkable, i.e. five regions times three groups. The 
presentation of this level of detail would, however, be detrimental to the readability 
of this chapter, because of the similarity of the findings for different regions. It was, 
therefore, chosen to group the accounts by the above mentioned three main interests, 
and pay attention to the regional differences under the group heading.
6.4.1 The business community 
Financial costs and benefits
First, the costs and benefits related to the financial part of the account are discussed.
/The financial part of the account is where the economic impact (as defined in Chapter
3) of the event is visible.
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Table 6.36 Account for the business community
Costs Benefits
Financial costs Financial benefits
• Direct costs and expenditures related to 
Euro 2000 (promotion, security, damage)
• Intermediate supplies+imports • Direct expenditures by visitors and 
organization
• Value added • Indirect turnover (incl. intermediate 
supplies)
• Tourists staying away • Dutch spending money while staying at 
home
Non-financial costs Non-financial benefits
• Nuisances and damage, unavailability of 
public space in host cities (behaviour of 
foreign supporters)
• Travel congestion in host cities 
(Rotterdam)
• Travel congestion in the rest of the 
Netherlands
• Specific promotion for sponsor firms and 
improvement of relations with customers and 
public sector.
• Promotional value for the city
• Promotional value for the Netherlands
The financial costs and benefits listed in Table 6.36 are restricted to those which have 
their impact on a national scale. Local effects are not listed in the table. For example, 
the Dutch have to some extent avoided the centre of the host cities (see section 6.2.2). 
This is, however, only a cost for the local business community, as other firms, outside 
the host cities, should have benefited from this shift in demand. Therefore this effect 
is not listed in Table 6.36.
Value added is the closing entry, to balance the financial part of the account; 
therefore it is on the left side -  although of course it is a benefit to the owners and / or 
employees of the business community.
On the first line of the account, the direct costs for the business community are 
mentioned. Some of these costs may have immediate or future benefits. An example 
of a cost that (hopefully) causes additional income in the future is the contribution of 
(local) sponsors to the LOC. They hope to benefit, in the future or on short-term, 
from additional sales resulting from their sponsorship. That this hope is often not in 
vain is illustrated by one of the (international) Uefa sponsors, Carlsberg, who 
reported an increase on their sales of 11% during the period of the tournament and 
5.4% over 2000 as a whole. It considered sponsoring Euro 2000 The most successful
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activity for the brand on a global basis'. 47 Based on budgetary information of the 
LOC, the contribution by Dutch firms is estimated at €8-10 million.
Apart from sponsoring the event itself, firms could sponsor other Euro 2000-related 
initiatives. For example, in most host cities, public initiatives (by the local authorities) 
were partly sponsored by the local business community. The total sum of these 
contributions was €2.1 million. This was a benefit for the local authorities, but a cost 
for the local business community. These expenditures will be considered again in 
subsection 6.4.3.
In addition to these visible costs, private costs for decorating the city centre were 
partly borne by the local business community and so also were the expenditures for 
additional security personnel during night time hours. The exact amount is not 
known. However, according to liaison persons for the business community these 
costs were modest. (Furthermore, there was hardly any damage resulting from 
violent supporters, as will be discussed in the section on non financial costs and 
benefits.)
Table 6.37 Value added in host cities by branch of industry (in million €)
Amsterdam Rotterdam Arnhem
Rest of the 
Eindhoven Netherlands Total
Agriculture and industry 2.8 1.9 0.1 0.3 9.5 14.6
Trade 4.1 2.5 0.8 1.1 2.9 11.3
Accommodation and food 13.4 8.5 2.4 3.6 7.2 35.1
Transport and travel 3.0 1.9 0.4 0.6 1.4 7.2
Services 9.3 9.4 0.8 0.9 13.9 34.2
Total 32.4 24.2 4.5 6.5 34.9 102.5
On the positive side, there is the impact by the direct expenditures, indirect turnover 
and the value added created. Table 6.37 is the result of the input-output analyses 
performed on the direct expenditures. It shows the value added by host city. The 
table shows that the absolute winner is the rest of the Netherlands, because of the 
economic services rendered to the host cities and the resulting value added created
47 Information disclosed at the website www.carlsberg.com on March 22, 2002 in a press release 
announcing the sponsoring of Euro 2004 and Euro 2008.
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there (€ 34.9 million). Among the host cities Amsterdam is the winner, which is not 
surprising either because the largest share of the hotel capacity is located here. The 
relative impact was largest in the smaller host cities of Arnhem and Eindhoven. This 
is not surprising: the crowd of spectators was just that more visible in these cities, 
because of the smaller size of their central areas.
Accommodation and catering
The total gross direct expenditures for the accommodation and food industry were 
€71 million. This is an increase of almost 8% on the total average consumption for 
this sector for a single month. The largest increase was in the cafes and fast-food 
outlets.
The accommodation providers also benefited. The total number of around 380,000 
nights spent in hotels by Euro 2000 spectators implies an increase in the occupancy 
rate of 7.5% and an increase compared with the figures of the previous year (1999) of 
almost 14%. However, from indirect evidence it seems clear that some crowding-out 
took place. For the other accommodation providers, campsites, youth hostels and 
apartments, the relative impact was considerably lower. The 85,000 additional nights 
on a total capacity of around 900,000 'beds', only indicates a rise in occupancy of
0.3%. In June 1999, almost 4.4 million nights were spent in such accommodation, so 
this means an increase of, at the maximum, 2%. There seems to have been less 
crowding-out effects in these sectors.
To see whether these effects can be observed in the national statistics, the increase 
from June 1997 to June 1998, from July 1997 to July 1998 and from June 1999 to June 
2000 are compared in Table 6.38.
The year 1998 is relevant because in that year the World Football Championships 
took place in France.
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Table 6.38 Indices of food and accommodation providers in 1997,1998 and 2000
Index 1995=100
June>97 June % '98 Change
July‘97 July % '98 Change
June
'99
June % 
'00 Change
Food and accommodation total 122 129 5.7% 123 127 3.3% 139 152 9.4%
Hotels, B&B, Conference 
facilities 139 152 9.4% 126 132 4.8% 162 177 9.3%
Restaurants, cafeterias, snack 
bars 121 125 3.3% 124 129 4.0% 136 147 8.1%
Of which: restaurants 126 133 5.6% 126 132 4.8% 141 150 6.4%
cafeterias 111 113 1.8% 120 122 1.7% 127 139 9.4%
Cafes 109 117 7.3% 114 118 3.5% 124 140 12.9%
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2000a, 2000b).
The table confirms the findings that especially the cafes, hotels and cafeterias 
experienced a major increase in turnover. If these date are compared with the 
increase between June 1997 and 1998, it is obvious that especially the increase in cafes 
and cafeterias is exceptional. The restaurant sector lagged behind these subsectors, 
which is a confirmation of other research that the restaurants are not among the 
winners during major events. They suffer from the decrease, or shift in domestic 
demand. A comparison between June and July 98 (not in the table) tells us that the 
cafes did quite well in 1998 as well, perhaps because of the fact that the Dutch 
national team was still in the tournament in France at that time.
It cannot be inferred that the increase in turnover in the hotel industry was due to 
Euro 2000, because a large increase was registered in 1998 as well, as is illustrated by 
Table 6.38.
So, although the crowding-out effects on regular tourists, which especially may have 
hurt the hotel industry, may have reduced the impact of Euro 2000, the data suggest 
that the overall effect on the turnover the food and accommodation sector was 
neutral to positive. The balance was absolutely positive for the campsites around 
Amsterdam, as discussions with these accommodation providers have confirmed.
A critical remark was heard from the hotel owners in Rotterdam and Eindhoven. 
According to them, the LOC communication placed too much emphasis on possible 
shortages of hotel rooms during the event and then cancelled untaken reservations
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(options) at a very late stage, so they could not be rented out anymore. This resulted 
in the presence of expensive vacant rooms in Rotterdam. The LOC denied its 
responsibility, and commented that they had acted in conformity with the 
contracts.48 Perhaps in defence of the LOC, it might be remarked that some hotel 
owners refused to accommodate groups of supporters, thereby aggravating this 
problem. A related problem was the low quality of the prognoses and information on 
the number of visitors and overnight stays 49
The retail sector
The retail sector did not benefit substantially from Euro 2000. The total direct 
expenditures for this branch were only €20 million. The turnover in this branch 
increased by just 3% during June while the growth in May was almost 6%. The shift 
in domestic demand, away from the host cities (documented in section 6.2.2), had a 
much larger impact on the turnover of the retail shops. This applies to all host cities 
but Arnhem, where people attracted to the city centre outnumbered the crowds 
avoiding the centre.
A part of the negative impact in the retail sector in the three other host cities is 
probably compensated outside the host cities, i.e. some domestic demand shifted 
from the host cities to other regions. Another part of this decrease in consumption 
might have been time shift consumption, for example, the buying of television sets 
before the event.
48 Communication Stichting Euro 2000.
49 The authorities relied on information made available by the LOC, especially on ticket sales. 
However some of this information was only available at a very late stage. N o attempt was made to use 
other sources, such as the evaluation of Euro 1996. This information was used for a prognosis of the 
economic impact however. This is a good example of a lack of intelligent information sharing (see 
COT 2001).. Moreover, a mistake that was made was the multiplication of the number of sold tickets 
with an average length of stay per visitor of around three nights, ignoring the fact that the average 
visitor had two tickets. (Communication April 24, 2000, Ernst & Young to EC Centre.)
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Although these shifts in demand are to a large extent neutral for the Netherlands as a 
whole, the effect is that the shop owners in the host cities prefer events with a 
domestic public to those attracting international visitors.50
Other branches of industry
The Dutch railways received €3.2 million from the Ministry of Transport for the 
transport of supporters. On the day of the match, supporters could use free public 
transport by train by showing a ticket for the match. Other sectors that have 
benefited besides public transport are the amusement providers (museums, cinemas, 
amusement parks, red-light districts). However, to some extent these industries also 
suffered from decline in domestic demand similar to that in the retail sector.
During the championship, the umbrella organization of international transporters 
complained via the media about lost revenues (Annex E). Because of the intensive 
checks at the Dutch borders to intercept hooligans, there were substantial delays. 
These delays formed a 'not negligible' cost for the transporters. However, despite 
requests for a quantification, no estimation of the exact amount was communicated.
Non-financial effects
The non-financial effects for the business community consisted of the eventual 
promotional value for city and country, which might benefit the community in the 
longer run. The general feeling about this aspect was positive, according to several 
spokesmen (Meerwaarde 2001), although the respondents have no hard evidence to 
support these feelings: for example the hotels did not have additional bookings 
registered for the years following Euro 2000. Another intangible benefit for the 
business community in the host cities is the cooperation in connection with the public 
sector around the tournament. This took some time to become established, but most 
institutional arrangements then worked quite well. Especially the installation of a 
specific 'EK-centrum' (EC centre, EC meaning European Championship), which was
50 Communication from W. Vetter, Chamber of Commerce Eindhoven, 29 June 2000 to E. 
Oldenboom.
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a specific arrangement between the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Justice, Transport 
and Internal Affairs, with a budget of around €3.5 million operated quite effectively 
(COT 2001:103).
The only remark heard in this respect was that the concern for the safety issues was 
sometimes too dominant. This led to the frustration of private initiatives. An 
illustration of this was the use in public squares of wide screens on which the 
matches could be seen. Top-level consultation between the mayors of the host cities, 
advised against the use of these screens, because they involved a safety risk. 
However, the mayor of Arnhem City Council ignored the advice and gave 
permission to erect the screens. According to the local business community this 
decision contributed substantially to the local impact and the success of the event. 
This is confirmed by our survey, see subsection 6.2.2. It was shown that the 
population of Arnhem visited the city centre a great deal more than those of other 
cities, and also the popularity of the event itself was higher than in Eindhoven and 
Amsterdam.
On the debit side of the non financial part of the account is the nuisance, which might 
be related to a large size football event like Euro 2000. However, the business 
community is positive about this aspect. The strict safety procedures, although 
sometimes restricting the festive initiatives, generally contributed to a safe 
tournament, almost without violence and material damage. It has to be added that 
the Netherlands were also lucky in this respect, because the high risk matches (for 
example, England vs. Germany) were mostly in Belgium.
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6.4.2 The Dutch citizens
The account for the Dutch citizens
Table 6.39 Costs and benefits for the Dutch citizens
Costs (debit) Benefits (credit)
Financial costs Financial benefits
• Expenditures on tickets, merchandise • Value added (income)
Non-financial costs Non-financial benefits
• Nuisances, unavailability of public space in 
host cities (behaviour of foreign supporters)
• Travel congestion in host cities (Rotterdam)
• Inconveniences in the rest of the Netherlands
• Employment and income effects in the 
Netherlands
• Socializing with family and friends
• National pride
• Promotional value for the Netherlands abroad
Financial costs and benefits
The financial costs directly related to Euro 2000, i.e. the expenditures of Dutch 
supporters, were €14 million for expenditures on food, drink, merchandise, etc., and 
€19 million on tickets, a total of €33 million. Of course, the benefits of these 
expenditures are intangible in the form of enjoying the matches.
The value of the total expenditures on tickets does not reflect the social value of the 
event for the visitors. It is an underestimation, because for some matches, capacity 
was sold out long before the match took place, especially for the matches of the 
Dutch team. This indicates that the tickets could have been sold at an higher price, 
and therefore some of the owners have enjoyed a surplus value (see subsection 3.3.2). 
The emergence of a black market, fiercely combatted by the LOC, proves that the 
ticketing system was not Pareto-efficient.
Now suppose that a Pareto efficient auction system would have been used for 
distribution (a part) of the tickets. How would have this have affected the CBA? First 
let's assume that the total valuation of the tickets by the actual owners, measured by 
the Compensating Variation or Willingness To Pay (WTP), was an additional €25 
million on top of the actual price paid. This means that the total value was €65 
million plus €25 million is €90 million.
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Now assume that the tickets are sold by an auction, which leads to a Pareto efficient 
outcome, and that the total revenue is €100 million. This is €10 million over the 
amount of the actual valuation. The difference of 10 million is the social cost of the 
Pareto inefficiency, caused by the actual distribution system. The matches which 
have the highest attendence are those of the domestic team and the tickets for these 
matches will do a surplus over the actual price. In the case of an auction, most of the 
additional money will therefore be paid by domestic supporters.
If these additional auction benefits would accrue to the supporters, the total social 
value would have increased by this amount. However, this income is (most likely) 
not enjoyed by the supporters, reselling their tickets, but by the Uefa and LOC 
organizing the auction. Compared to the actual situation during Euro 2000, the case 
of an auction means that the fans who in the old situation were skilful enough to 
obtain a ticket for a popular match, are the losers in the new situation, because they 
have to pay more for the same ticket. Therefore, although total revenue of the tickets 
rises, without compensation for the losers, a definite judgement about total welfare 
cannot be made.51
The economic impact for the hosting country (the Netherlands) of an auction 
depends on which organisation actually receives the money. As argued earlier, most 
of the money will be from domestic supporters. If the money is received by the Uefa, 
the balance for the Netherlands deteriorates, because money flows out of the country. 
If the money is retained by the LOC, the effects on the balance for the Netherlands is 
neutral. In that cause an auction means a redistribution from the fans to the LOC.
The value added accruing to the Dutch population is booked as a financial benefit, 
which was estimated at €103 million (see section 6.3.5).
The relative impact of the event on the national income is modest. Total value added 
in 2000 was €369,285 million, so the additional income earned because of Euro 2000 
was 0.06%. Furthermore, real growth in that year was 3.5%. (Of course the local 
impacts were higher.) This economic impact is, therefore, understandably not the
51 In other words: the Hicks-Kaldor principle (see subsection 3.3.3) is not accepted here.
165
aspect that is most valued by the Dutch population. Intangible benefits, like 
socializing with family and friends, the promotional value, the atmosphere in the 
host cities, are valued more highly.
Intangible effects
The non-financial effects are reflected in the answers on how, in retrospect, the Dutch 
population valued the decision to host the event. Now this was certainly very 
positive: more than 80% agreed that it was a "good thing'. Furthermore, 95% were of 
the opinion that the Netherlands should be prepared to host events like these in the 
future.
The most frequently mentioned aspect was socializing with family and friends (80%). 
Evidently, football events are, in the end, more socially stimulating than disruptive, 
although some reports in the media want us to believe otherwise. Feelings of national 
pride (orangistic feelings 78%, and proud to live in the hosting country, 75%) follow 
immediately. Other important positive aspects were the performance of the Dutch 
national team (73%) and the attention in the media (72%), although these aspects 
were the most controversial. Both aspects scored relatively highly as negatively 
mentioned points as well -  a score of 15%.
Dissonant voices were almost unheard. Inconvenience in the rest of the Netherlands, 
which was feared in advance because of the concentration of police in the host cities, 
did not materialize. Only in Rotterdam did more of the respondents give a relatively 
high score to the decreased accessibility of their city (centre). On the other hand, 
Rotterdam was the city in which the support for the whole of the event was most 
widespread, together with Arnhem. (Rotterdam has the most long-standing policy 
on sports events.)
The event: public good?
In the domestic survey the respondents were asked to differentiate between 
judgments from a personal point of view on the tournament and judgments from a 
public point of view. The idea was that any (net) financial support could be justified
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by the public benefits of the events. An example of a public good is the promotion of 
the Netherlands abroad; a private benefit would be the socializing with family and 
friends. So the question is: How do the respondents weigh the private and public 
benefits of the event?
In this respect, the first issue to consider is whether the citizen understands the 
theoretical difference between a private and a public benefit.
To get an idea about this, the answers to two questions can be compared:
1) If your personal experience were to be decisive, would you be of the opinion that 
the Netherlands should host these events never again, sometimes, or more often?
2) If you look at it from the point of view of the national interest, would you be of the 
opinion that the Netherlands should host these countries events never again, 
sometimes or more often? (Italics added by the author).
So the first question asks for a judgment from a personal point of view, the second 
from a public point of view. If the answers to these questions show a great difference, 
this could be taken as an indication that the respondents had indeed made a 
distinction between their own interest and the general interest.
Table 6.40 Public and private attitude towards hosting (% of respondents)
Future hosting of major event: Personal interest National interest
Never again 4 4
Now and then 40 44
More often 54 51
Don't know /no opinion 3 0
Total 100% 100%
However, from the data it is clear that the distribution of the answers over the 
categories 'never', 'sometimes' and 'more often' do not differ very much for the two 
questions. If a tentative conclusion is drawn, the private benefits seem to be more 
highly rated than the public ones. This is further confirmed by the answer to the next 
question:
For these events, the government provides public money, for example, for the police. However, 
on the other hand, the government receives income, by additional taxes. I f  you net these two,
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there is a deficit or credit balance for the government. What would you think is most 
appropriate:
1. The government spends more than it receives ?
2. The income and expenditures are balanced?
3. The government receives more than it spends ?
4. Other?
Most people (59%) think that government income and expenditures should be 
balanced. However, the group who thinks that the government should make a 
'profit' is larger than the group who would like the government to spend more than 
it receives. The figures are 23% and 15%, respectively. This seems to support the 
conclusion that the benefits of a private nature were more highly valued than those 
of a public nature.
The public aspect of the event that was most frequently mentioned in a positive way 
was the promotional value for the Netherlands abroad (84%). As is known from 
another survey, this effect has materialized in France (see subsection 6.2.3).
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6.4.3 Central and local government
Table 6.41 Costs and benefits for the public sector
Costs (Debit) Benefits (Credit)
Financial costs Financial benefits
• Central government: contributions to host 
cities
• Safety
• Events
• Other expenditures
• Host cities: contribution from central 
government
• Tax income (VAT, income, other)
• Retributions
• Sponsoring
Intangible and external costs Intangible and external benefits
• Damage to reputation or image
• Insecurity
• National and local promotion
• Improvement of relations with private 
sector
Table 6.42 Income and expenditures of Dutch national authorities (in million €)
Costs Benefits
Police 14.3 VAT 15.8
Local initiatives 1.8 Excise (tax on alcohol) 1.8
Public relations 2.0 Income tax 20.5
EK centre 3.6 Tax on Uefa bonuses 3.2
Expenditures ministry of Health and
Sports 0.7
Expenditures ministry of Infrastructure 3.2
Expenditures ministry of Justice 0.9
Credit balance 14.7
Total 41.3 Total 41.3
Source: Expenditures: Minister of Internal Affairs (2000)
The potential costs and benefits for the public sector are listed in Table 6.41. Table 
6.42 is the financial part of this table.
From Table 6.42 it can be learnt that the event resulted in a credit balance for the 
central government. The calculations indicate a net positive amount of €14.7 million 
(the prognosis was €6.8 million positive).
The figures on costs refer to the budget, not the realization. There has been no 
financial account of the realized costs. The income tax has been calculated by means 
of the input-output analysis and information on the premium tax received from the 
LOC. VAT and excise were calculated on basis of the expenditures of visitors to 
different branches of industry, and the average VAT rate. (There are two VAT rates
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in the Netherlands: a rate of 6% on food and necessities (including cultural 
expenditures) and a normal rate of 19%).
The tax rate on premiums was the result of negotiations between the LOC and the 
Ministry of Finance. In 2000, a law was drafted under which a sportsman or woman, 
living for a short time in the Netherlands, would be taxed at a rate of 20% of his or 
her gross income. This law would also apply to the Euro 2000 teams. The law was, 
however, not yet effective during Euro 2000. The agreement was then that 18% tax 
would be levied over 45% of the premiums. The argument was probably that 
approximately 45% of the premiums would be handed over to the players. Because 
the premiums were, according to the Uefa, €74.7 million, half of which was awarded 
tot the teams playing in the Netherlands, the amount would then be 
€74.7*50%*45 %*18 % =€3 million.
Like the central government the city councils had their costs and benefits of the 
tournament, see Table 6.43.
Their expenses were not completely negligible: together the host cities have spent 
€9.4 million. Part of this was financed from sponsorships by the local business 
community, which amounted to €2.1 million. Another part of these expenses was 
financed by the central government: €2.6 million. On top of these sources Arnhem 
managed to get a contribution from the EU of €0.5 million. How and why Arnhem 
managed to obtain this, could not be verified. These resources are "direct income', 
because they were directly used in the budget of the local public coordinating 
organization.
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Tax income did not flow into the budget of the local organization. Furthermore, the 
situation in the Netherlands is such that most taxes are collected centrally; local taxes 
are only of marginal importance. Therefore the income earned by the local 
government was almost negligible: €0.8 million on parking and €0.9 on tourist tax, 
which together add up to €1.7 million. However, this leaves a deficit in the local 
budgets of (€9.4 - €1.7 - €2.1 - €2.6 - €0.5 =) €2.5 million. This amount was financed by 
reallocation within the local budgets.
Hence, the total balance then for the public sector was equal to the positive balance of 
the central government, netted with the negative balance of the local authorities, in 
other words: €14.7 million -  €2.5 million = €12.2 million.
Intangible and external effects
In the previous sections, it was shown that the event was well received by the 
population and the business community. It created additional income and 
employment, although the public valuation of this effect might be lower in times of 
scarcity on the labour market, as was the case in the Netherlands in 2000.
On the whole, the Dutch population had a positive attitude toward the decision to 
host Euro 2000. Socializing with family and friends was considered an important 
positive effect of the event. In addition, there was a large majority who wanted to 
host more of these major events in the future. These findings relate to the event 
evaluated from a private interest point of view. Viewed from a public point of view, 
the results may be different. This is illustrated by the fact that only a minority 
wanted to spend more public money on such events than is received in return by 
taxes, etc. More people wanted these two amounts to be in balance, or were even 
willing to let the public sector make a profit. If this can be interpreted as an implicit 
norm for a public CBA, a conclusion might be that the majority does not feel that the 
external benefits outweigh(ed) the external costs. In other words: they enjoyed the 
event as a private matter, but are not in favour of spending more public money on 
such events.
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In particular the promotional value stands out as a highly valued positive external 
benefit of the event. However, this judgment should be related to the actual findings 
on these promotional effects. It turns out that the promotional effect has not been 
very large. It was possible to show some additional awareness for Rotterdam, 
Arnhem and Eindhoven. This rise is specific and only visible in the countries whose 
national teams played in these cities. Amsterdam did not benefit because its 
awareness abroad is almost 100% in each of the surveyed countries. A general 
improvement of the Dutch image was visible in France, the winner of the 
tournament. There also seems to be some additional tourism interest from this 
country.
6.5 Summary and conclusion
During Euro 2000, more than 600,000 spectators followed the matches in the Dutch 
stadiums. A substantial part, 55%, was of foreign origin. Approximately 340,000 
foreigners accounted for almost 600,000 overnight stays. Three-quarters of these 
foreigners stayed in the host cities and the rest in other parts of the Netherlands.
The interest from foreign football fans appears to correlate quite closely with the 
general tourism patterns. Germany and the United Kingdom take the lead, as is also 
the case with tourists. Another important factor for this tournament was the 
availability of Internet connections, which accounts for the interest from Scandinavia, 
and especially Norway.
There was widespread support among the Dutch population for the hosting of the 
event. In retrospect, more than 80% of the population expressed support for the 
decision to host the event. This positive attitude is further strengthened by the fact 
that 94% were of the opinion that the Netherlands should be a candidate for future 
hosting: 40% wanted it to be on a "now and then' basis, and 54% more often.
From a personal perspective, especially socializing with friends and family, 
'orangistic' feelings and pride in the Netherlands scored highly. The score for these 
points fluctuates between 75 and 80% (i.e. percentage of respondents indicating these 
factors as positive points). Negative points are far less frequently mentioned. Some of
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these are the (disappointing) performance of the Dutch team and the intense 
attention in the media (both mentioned in a negative sense by 15% of the 
respondents). Issues dominating the papers before the event, security and 
accessibility, were valued relatively neutrally. It seems that there was not much 
(negative) experience with these items.
What are the benefits from a public point of view, according to the respondents? The 
most-mentioned positive aspect is the increasing awareness of the Netherlands in 
other countries (84%). Widespread appreciation is also given to hospitality, the 
behaviour of the Dutch supporters, the general happy atmosphere and safety. The 
most mentioned negative aspect was the behaviour of foreign supporters, mentioned 
by 31%. This is remarkable, as the only disturbances by foreign supporters took place 
in Belgium, and the Dutch home supporters were the only ones to express their 
frustration violently after losing the semi final in Rotterdam.
Short-term tourism effects
In this chapter the different short-term tourism effects have been discussed in various 
places. Indications for changes in tourism behaviour and demand at the regional and 
national level were found. At the regional level, the host cities were on balance less 
frequently visited by Dutch citizens. This effect is, however, likely to be compensated 
at the national level. At the national level, indications for a decline in incoming 
tourism were found, which has a negative impact, as well as indications for an 
additional number of Dutch staying at home, which has a positive impact on the 
national economy.
Millions watched the tournament on television. Did this change the awareness 
and/or the image of the Netherlands abroad? The first survey in December 1999 
revealed that the image of the Netherlands is still quite traditional and uniform in the 
five countries. Flowers and windmills still are the most well-known trademarks of 
the Netherlands abroad.
There was no change in image of the Netherlands observable in Germany and Spain 
(both eliminated at an early stage in the tournament). Some changes were observable
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in France and Italy and in the UK. However, the changes related to characteristics of 
the Dutch people, not to any physical attributes of the Netherlands. The general 
attitude in France (the winner of the tournament) towards the Netherlands seems to 
have improved slightly, while in Italy it seems to have deteriorated.
These results are further strengthened by the findings on the factors that explained a 
rise in awareness for a host city in a specific country. What is remarkable is that only 
cities, in which the national team has played, have some additional awareness. This 
awareness is further determined by the place of the match in the tournament: the 
later the match (i.e. the nearer to the final), the more awareness it creates. A final 
factor is rating (the percentage of people watching matches) of the Euro 2000 
matches, which needs no further explanation.
Economic impact
The gross direct expenditures of Euro 2000 were calculated at €145.2 million, of 
which €112.6 million can be attributed to the expenditures of the visitors. The 
organizational expenditures were estimated at €32.6 million. An earlier prognosis 
had estimated the total economic direct expenditures at €122 million.
Considering the fact that Amsterdam had the largest share of overnight stays, 38%, it 
is, therefore, not surprising that it also received the largest share of expenditures, 
40%. Rotterdam followed suit with 29%, Eindhoven with 16%, Arnhem with 11% and 
the rest of the Netherlands had 4%.
The total additional value added was €102.5 million. Of this amount, the 
accommodation, catering and services companies earned 68%. This is also where the 
employment effects are the largest. Total additional employment was 1,800 man- 
years.
Because of the economic relations within the Netherlands, 29% of the total value 
added was realized outside the host cities.
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Cost and benefits
For the business community as a whole, the benefits outweighed the costs. The total 
additional expenditures of €145.2 million, were benefits for industry. The value 
added created in the private sector was €102.5 million. Apart from the costs of 
production the industry spent money on promotion and security, together having 
expenditures of at least €23 million, and on additional advertising, estimated at €55 
million. Of the €55 million, 10% can be attributed to the organizing of Euro 2000, the 
rest is the normal effect of a large football tournament.
However, after the event, articles in newspapers suggested that the event was not 
very beneficial in economic terms (see Annex E). This may be due to the fact that 
some branches of industry suffered from shifts in demand, and the losers were more 
inclined to attract attention from the press than the (less visible) winners.
Some branches of industry experienced a local decline in demand, known as the 'Los 
Angeles-effect', which was probably compensated by other branches or regions. 
Examples are the retail shops and restaurants in the host cities. Some branches 
experienced a boom or decline that was not related to Euro 2000, but is rather typical 
for any international football championship. These were, for example, the electronics 
industry, the beverages industry, the advertising/business services and travel 
industry. Although these effects only count at the regional level, or do not count at 
all, they may influence the attitude towards the event in a negative way.
The real winners were: the accommodation sector (especially the campsites near 
Amsterdam), and catering (cafes, fast-food) sectors in the host cities. The results for 
the hotel subsector are rather ambiguous because of the crowding-out effects on 
foreign tourists. The retail sector profited, but probably more outside the host cities 
than inside. This is caused by the effect that domestic consumers tended to stay away 
from the host city centre, as surveys among the Dutch population have revealed.
One of the more intangible benefits was the co-operation of industry with the central 
and local authorities, which was valued positively.
Compared with the national income, the additional income (value added) created is 
very modest, and the economic impact is perhaps therefore not among the highest
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valued aspects of the event. Nevertheless, there was widespread support among the 
Dutch population for the hosting of the event. In retrospect, more than 80% of the 
population did support the decision to host the event. From a personal perspective 
socializing with friends and family, orangistic feelings and pride in the Netherlands 
were particularly valued. Negative points are far less frequently mentioned. Some of 
these are the performance of the Dutch team and the intense attention in the media. 
The issues that dominated the papers before the event, security and accessibility, 
were valued relatively neutrally. It would seem that there was not much (negative) 
experience with these items.
Public costs and benefits
For the public sector (central and local government together), the financial benefits 
outweigh the costs. The net benefit for the central government is estimated at €14.7 
million (the prognosis was € 6.8 million positive).
Together, the host cities spent €9.4 million. The local business community financed 
part of this by sponsorships, and another part of these expenditures were financed by 
the central government. The income earned by the local authorities was almost 
negligible. The event left a deficit in the local budgets totalling €2.5 million. This 
amount was financed by reallocation within the local budgets.
Hence, the total balance for the public sector was equal to the positive balance of the 
central government, less the negative balance of local authorities, i.e. €12.2 million.
However, for an evaluation of the public costs and benefits the external effects are 
also of relevance. Widespread appreciation by the Dutch is encountered for (their 
own) hospitality, the behaviour of the Dutch supporters, the general happy 
atmosphere and safety. The most-mentioned negative aspect was the behaviour of 
foreign supporters, mentioned by 31%. This is surprising, as the only disturbances by 
foreign supporters took place in Belgium, and the Dutch home supporters were the 
only ones who expressed their frustration violently, after losing the semi-final in 
Rotterdam.
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This does not mean that there is a majority among the Dutch for large-scale 
investment in sports events. A majority thinks that the public sector should (at least) 
break even; economically this can be interpreted that they do not feel that the 
(intangible) external benefits outweighed the (intangible) external costs.
The most frequently mentioned external benefit by the population is the increasing 
awareness of the Netherlands in other countries (84%). It was found that there is 
some additional name awareness of the host cities, but only in the countries whose 
team played in one of those cities. Furthermore, it seems to have exercised a positive 
influence on the image of the Dutch population in France. (France won the 
tournament). Also the Netherlands' image as a tourist destination in France seems to 
be improved to some extent. No influence was found in France or any other 
surveyed country on the image of the Dutch countryside, or other physical 
characteristics such as the weather.
The improvement of the Dutch image in France is an unexpected benefit from the 
tournament. It raises the intriguing question whether this is a general phenomenon. 
Is it the case that the image of the host country is especially improved in the winning 
country? If this is true, and it seems not too far-fetched, then it can be further 
exploited by targeted tourism campaigns. It may be wise for Austria and Switzerland 
in 2008 to cash in the host dividend and to launch a marketing campaign in the 
winning country, unless of course they win the championship themselves.
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7 Discussion
7.1 Introduction
In the first chapters, the theoretical concepts and methodologies of this study were 
introduced. In the following chapters, the concepts were applied to a specific case, 
that of Euro 2000, which yielded various results in terms of economic impact and 
costs and benefits. Here is the place to bring the theoretical and applied sections 
together in an appraisal of the results and the theory. The leading question for this 
chapter is: What are the main theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions 
of this research, as viewed against the background of the existing literature?
The implications of this research will be discussed in three separate sections, which 
treat in turn the theoretical (7.2), methodological (7.3), and empirical contributions 
(7.4).
7.2 An assessment of the theoretical contribution
A considerable amount of theoretical and empirical work on the evaluation of sports 
events had already been done before the conception of this thesis. Sports event 
research is now a mature research field in which a consistent flow of articles explores 
and adds to the knowledge and understanding of the main issues.
The literature on the evaluation of sports events focuses to a large extent on the 
assessment of specific impacts (among which "economic impact" is of course 
particularly addressed by economists). For policy purposes, what is important is not 
only the magnitude of a specific impact(s), but also the relevance of such impacts. 
Different types of impacts have to be compared and weighed to be able to compare 
events. Finding a common denominator or yardstick can do this, or in other words: a 
valuation scheme.
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The issue of how to bring those impacts into a comprehensive valuation scheme is 
addressed less frequently. The standard tool for this purpose is CBA. However, 
almost no cross-references can be found from event literature to the literature on 
CBA. A specific unresolved issue in the literature is the relationship between 
economic impact analysis (EIA), which is often used in event evaluation, and CBA.
In this thesis, an attempt has been made to bridge the gap between the existing 
literature on sports events, and the literature on CBA and welfare economics.
When these subjects are brought together for cross-fertilization, the problem arises 
that economic impact, which is thought to be among the main benefit of sports 
events, is excluded as a benefit in much of the CBA literature.
After exploring the welfare-theoretical foundations of CBA, it was possible to prove 
that EIA is not, in principle, incompatible with CBA. The key for integration is to take 
real income as the main indicator for wealth, a path of reasoning compatible with 
welfare theory. Economic impact analysis can thus be applied as a tool for the 
determination of real income growth.
However, besides providing a potential solution for the reconciliation of EIA and 
CBA, welfare theory also pointed in another direction, which seemed at first sight to 
thwart this solution. The point raised by welfare economics (and its more recent 
offspring: public choice theory) is that governmental interference is justified only in 
specific circumstances, such as for the provision of goods with external effects or 
public goods. Is economic growth, measured by economic impact analysis a public 
good? Some authors claim it is an external effect, generating economic development. 
Even if this argument is accepted, government interference is not the only option. A 
counter-argument against subsidies in the case of externalities, eloquently put 
forward by Coase, is that negotiations between parties should lead to a more efficient 
provision of sports events than unconditional government subsidies.
A theoretical and methodological solution for reconciliation of EIA and CBA, put 
forward in this thesis, is to make the CBA itself part of the analysis. The way to do 
this is by breaking down the traditional CBA into separate CBAs for public and 
private interests. Although the technique of differentiation into separate accounts is
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not new (see Lichfield, Kettle and Whitbread 1975; Brunet 1995; Preuss 2000), the 
theoretical foundation of this breakdown, which at the same time links CBA and EIA, 
is new.
In this thesis, EIA is considered to be a subset of CBA. This subordination of the EIA 
to CBA has two aspects: a theoretical-epistemological aspect and a methodological 
aspect, or, which is the same, methodological consequences. The theoretical aspect, 
illustrated in Annex A, is to be found in the connotations of the term 'economic', as in 
'economic effects': Does it refer to (measuring) specific social phenomena or does it 
refer to a method of valuation? The first meaning is closer to the EIA, which is an 
assessment. This approach is in itself more restricted, because it distinguishes 
between effects which are economic, and effect which are not. The second approach, 
referring to a method of valuation is more encompassing. The CBA is a method of 
(e)valuation and therefore a CBA can include a EIA, but the reverse is not possible.
The second, methodological aspect, is that the EIA is a part of the CBA account. The 
approach defended in this thesis is that for each specific group an account is 
introduced, which consists of two parts: an financial part, which lists the financial 
transactions with other groups, and is in fact the EIA, and a non-financial account, 
which lists non-financial costs and benefits.52 These might be valued by using 
economic techniques, such as WTP. This aspect is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
An important characteristic of the approach introduced in this thesis, which is at 
variance with the approach by Lichfield et al. (1975), is that public and private 
benefits are treated in separate accounts. The benefits and costs are to be assessed by 
assessments of tangible and intangible benefits. For the assessment of tangible, 
financial the EIA can be used. The increase in private wealth is then measured by the 
increase in income, and private intangible effects. The increase in public wealth is 
measured by the net income in taxes and the valuation of external effects.
52 In the Planning Balance Sheet Analysis (PBSA) by Lichfield et al. (1975) transaction between 
groups are specifically mentioned to be included into the accounts, however, no explicit reference is 
made to EIA or Input-Output analysis.
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The framework for this thesis was that the economic assessment was oriented 
towards financial effects in the short run. The economic analysis that was used, 
which is based upon Keynesian assumptions, is quite appropriate for this objective. 
For most current policy needs, this short-term focus is appropriate. However, effects 
in the long run might become more relevant as policies on sports events evolve. In 
this case, a purely demand oriented approach might be too narrow. In that case, 
other economic theories could be explored, which focus more specifically on the 
development of urban economies and the role of sports events in this. However, I do 
not think that such an approach is incompatible with the concept of CBA used in this 
thesis.
The alternative approach to CBA, as developed in this thesis, has consequences for 
the use of CBA in its political context and perhaps also for the role and position of 
the economic researcher. The most important consequence is that the nature of CBA 
changes from an instrument of prescription to an instrument of discussion. The 
traditional CBA claimed that it could show the gains and losses to society as a whole, 
and its result was often taken as an absolute judgment: either the project was socially 
feasible, or it was not. The political discussion was, in principle, restricted to 
weighing this outcome against other 'political priorities' and against intangibles that 
could not be assessed in the CBA itself. The political decision makers had to rely on 
the professional judgement of the economists (see section 3.3.1).
The CBA by multiple accounts is intended as a structuring device for that part of the 
political process in which arguments are weighed. It should serve as a quantification 
of the arguments used in the political discussion, not as a replacement for the 
discussion itself. It aim is not to provide an absolute judgement, but to show which 
interests gain and which interests lose. The researcher making the CBA is more of a 
translator and helper to structure the arguments, than a judge. He or she is closer to a 
servant of the public discussion, a part of the checks and balances, than to an oracle 
who can be either worshipped or ignored.
Some might be unhappy by this perhaps more modest role for economic research. 
Some resistance might be expected from professional economists, who see their
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status as 'social engineers' adversely affected. Politicians and lobbyists too might find 
economic research that shows interests, but gives no definite answers, less attractive. 
Some might just be annoyed by 'unclear results'. Others will find that economic 
research that cannot be employed to help to further their specific interests, is simply 
not useful enough to be funded.
It may be clear that the approach was inspired by an attempt to develop and refine 
tools for relatively practical purposes. This approach in itself might be criticized, as 
was done by Roche (1994) among others, because it does not seek to explain social 
processes as such,. It is an instrumental approach.
A response to Roche’s critique on planning approaches
Discussing research approaches to events, Roche (1994) made a fundamental 
distinction between two types: 1) planning approaches; and 2) explanatory 
approaches (Section 2.2, and see also Hall 1992). This thesis follows Roche in this 
distinction, but labels these approaches instrumental and critical, respectively.
The early publications on event evaluation had in common that their methodology 
was typically based on the (practical) demands for planning and policy purposes. As 
their central theme is the correct way to make a social or economic impact 
assessment, these approaches are labelled instrumental.
A  critical approach sets out to explain the dynamics of political processes (in the 'real 
world'), and how (evaluation) research is used in these processes. It is labelled 
critical because it tries to reveal the 'real political processes', which are often steered 
by power struggles and sometimes manipulation (Coakley 2003).
According to Roche (1994), instrumental approaches presume unbiased and rational 
decision making processes and transparent political procedures. In reality, political 
processes are far from 'rational' and unbiased. Roche does not reject instrumental 
techniques as such, but warns that an instrumental approach might overlook the 
political limitations and bias of the use of research. In other words: there is an 
imminent weakness in (unqualified) instrumental research, because it may be 
presented without qualification of the partiality of the results, for example, it gives
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benefits without costs. Interest groups may manipulate the flow of information, and 
defend the investments by claiming public benefits for the community but their real 
agenda is of course advancing their own goals. (In fact, to raise public support is no 
doubt the most important motive for special interest groups to fund public 
(published) research.) According to Roche (1994: 12), decisions concerning the 
hosting of events often are taken and defended by a small elite or power-holders. 
Private interests are pursued using public money, often using private-public 
partnerships as a vehicle. Roche does not stand alone in this observation. (Thorne 
and Munro-Clark 1989, Bramwell and Rawding 1994, Crompton 2001; Schimmel 
2001; Smith and Ingham 200353). Hall (1989b: 219) summarizes this point as follows:
"Hallmark events are, first and foremost, political events ... [they] are not the result of a 
rational decision making process. Decisions affecting the hosting and the nature of hallmark 
events grow out of a political process. The process involves the values of actors (individuals, 
interest groups and organizations) in a struggle for power."
In opposition to this 'naive', instrumental approach, Roche considers that the task of 
the social sciences is to explain political processes by developing a detached and 
critical point of view.
This critique points to the responsibility of the researcher for not only monitoring the 
quality of his or her methods, but also for drawing the right inferences from the 
presented outcomes. Of course, no researcher can be held fully responsible for the 
abuse of any results, but in order to discriminate between correct use and abuse, a 
researcher should have a view on the 'correct use' of his results. This is not too 
controversial, but what might be controversial is that the political process as such 
should be 'critically' analysed by the social scientist.
A first argument against this position might be that this falls outside the scope of 
economics. This argument is not convincing. Economists have long occupied
53 Schimmel's, Crompton's and Smith & Ingham's case concerns the financing of sports stadiums 
in the United States, but many of their criticisms can be extended to the policy of sports events (see 
Crompton 1995, in which the discussion on sport stadiums is merged with that on sports events, see 
also Gratton and Henry 2001b).
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themselves with theories on political processes and decision making, a field of 
research that is known as "public choice" (see Arrow 1963, Buchanan and Tullock 
1962, Olson 1965, Mueller 2003).
A second argument against this point of view might be that the researcher should be 
very reluctant to participate in political discussions, because political opinions are 
based on value judgments, and analysis mixed with value judgements is bad 
science.54
Of course, a theory on the mechanics of public decision making is not necessarily a 
"normative" theory. Moreover, a theory of public decision making that pays attention 
to different interests involved in decision making is a more realistic and therefore 
better approach to evaluation of sports events, than the approach that seems to 
presuppose some kind of benevolent public authority. The latter approach is clearly 
too naive.
54 The positivist approach, in which a line can and should be drawn between analysis and 
normative judgements is (still) quite influential in economics (Hodgson 1993: 29). (see for a more 
recent example Dejonghe 2004). Without a complete discussion of the philosophical literature on this 
subject, it is accepted here that the positivistic point of view is not tenable. In the end, the work of even 
the most impartial social scientist is related to a normative value system. Still, any scientist should 
refrain from taking sides too easily. As Samuelson (1983: 212) declared
"[...] where personal beliefs in right and wrong enter into the analysis, it is usually not to the advantage of the 
latter
In some cases critical analysis of sports events is impaired by an apparent desire to unveil a 
"conspiracy of the dominant classes, public servants and the sports industry". For example, in 
describing the efforts of local politicians in attracting investments, Smith and Ingham (2003: 257) state: 
"[...] the economic and political leaders [are united] in a campaign of "boosterism”: the managed attempt to 
unite efforts to spur economic growth (the goal of the capitalists) with the interests of the city as a whole, thereby 
promoting the interests of the dominant classes and legitimizing political solutions to the urban question of 
(re)development."
To regard the authorities as a simple instrument of class interests is too schematic (see for a critique of 
this approach Olson 1965).
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The point raised by Roche can therefore be interpreted as follows: an instrumental 
analysis complemented by a theory concerning political processes makes the 
approach more scientifically relevant (Becker 2001).
Does this mean that the concept of rational decision making should be abandoned? 
Roche (1994) and Hall (1989b) seem to suggest that this is unavoidable. However, the 
rationality concept by Roche (1994) and Hall (1989b) lacks clarity. The elites or power 
holders that pursue their own goals, using, or abusing public processes and money, 
are behaving in a rational way. From a social or aggregate point of view, the outcome 
may be called "irrational', or 'sub-optimal', but this does not alter the individual logic 
of their decisions.55
I think it is possible to further strengthen the scientific base of CBA by multiple 
accounts, by using notions from the public choice perspective, and, more specifically, 
from game theory. The public choice approach uses 'economic' assumptions to 
analyse public processes. The main assumption is that people make rational choices, 
optimizing their situation by following their self-interest (Mueller 2003). The 
approach is based on methodological individualism, which might be described as the 
assumption that social arrangements have no purpose apart from those that are 
ascribed by the individuals that constitute them (Hodgson 1993). The difference 
between this approach and the sociological approach can be summarized as that the 
sociologist assumes that social institutions are the riverbed and it is this which 
should be studied to explain the river of group conduct, while the economist sees 
social institutions as the building designed by the collective of individuals, and it is 
necessary to demonstrate the inherent logic of the choices which led to this design.
Game theory can be used to analyse political and collective decision making, as if it 
were games, characterized by players, procedures and pay-offs. A game is 
characterized by: the number of players; the set of actions taken by the players 
during the game, which is their strategy; the procedure to determine the outcome; 
and the outcome itself, which is the pay-off to the players.
Roche suggests using the concept of 'situational rationality'.
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One of the most described and analysed games is the 'prisoner's dilemma'.56 The 
stable strategy for the prisoner's dilemma game is defection. The prisoner's dilemma 
game demonstrates that individual rationality may lead to collectively sub optimal 
outcomes (Van den Doel 1978: 76). These concepts may be used to clarify the role of 
information in political processes. The role of information and communication is 
crucial in many games. In many games, the pay-off is higher if the strategies of the 
players are coordinated (Mueller 2003: 14). For example, if the suspects in the 
prisoner's dilemma game know beforehand that they can trust each other, the 
optimal strategy changes from defection to co-operation (Axelrod 1984). Of course, in 
the real world trust is institutionalized by contracts and fines. In the stylized world of 
games, as in the real world, the players need information because they have to base 
their strategy on the expected pay-off and -  depending on their intelligence -  the 
strategy of the opponent. In these cases, players have an incentive to communicate 
and a desire for information, as it may be derived from experience, from their 
opponents or from other sources.
The relevance of these games for this research is that, in collective bargaining 
situations, the possible pay-offs (which may actually be negative, i.e. losses) are not 
always clear. This is especially the case if the decision to be taken collectively is of a 
non-recurring nature, in which the players cannot draw on their experience. They 
need 'outside information' for their decisions. This description of a one-time event 
with unknown pay-offs fits the nature of a large international sports event quite well. 
It could be considered a re-formulation in game theoretic terms of the characteristics 
(described in the introduction) of a major international sports event.
This is where the multiple account CBA steps in. The approach helps to clarify the 
game: it lays down the methodology for measuring the pay-offs for the participating 
players 57 The game is the decision-making process concerning the hosting of sports
56 Here it is assumed that the reader is familiar with this game (see Van den Doel 1978; Axelrod 
1984; Mueller 2003).
57 For a similar approach, see Dasgupta and Pearce (1972). Following a distinction by Knight, 
these authors distinguish uncertainty (unknown probabilities) from risk (known probabilities). Game
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events. The players are the groups who have an interest in the outcome of the game: 
in this case, the hosting of a sports event. Instrumental approaches should show 
information that is relevant for the interest groups. An important condition for our 
evaluation technique is thus that it should show the pay- offs differentiated by interest 
group involved in the hosting of sports events.
This can serve as the critical rationale for the use of CBA. Moreover, this rationale
also illuminates the nature of the information that should be provided by an
instrumental approach. The pay-offs, or distributional effects are an essential part of 
the necessary information.58
Economic and sociological approaches
This thesis aims to contribute to a discourse on similarities and differences between 
sociological and economic approaches and to the integration of sociological and 
economic methodology. In this context it is interesting that the concept of the 
differentiation between public and private interests, and between costs and benefits 
can also be found in recent sociological publications that attempt to standardize the 
measurement of social impacts of events (Delamere 2001, Fredline et al. 2003). The 
analytical framework of this thesis might provide a starting point to bridge the gaps 
between marketing, sociological approaches, CBA and welfare economics, however, 
more conceptual work is needed.
7.3 An assessment of the methodological contribution
This thesis draws on earlier contributions to sports events literature. The most 
important studies in this respect were the analysis of Burns et al. (1986), Ritchie and 
Smith (1991), Getz (1991), Hall (1992), Dobson et al. (1997) and Preuss (2000).
theoretic approaches are specifically suitable for decision making under uncertainty (unknown 
probabilities).
58 This points once more to the fundamental problem of the Hicks-Kaldor principle (see Chapter 
3). The evaluation technique of our choice should show the pay-offs to the players, not some 
aggregated net benefit.
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Burns et al. (1986) provided the framework for the concept of additionality that was 
applied in this thesis. An improvement on their concept is the introduction of the 
explicit reference situation: the 0 situation.
The original concept of additional expenditures (benefits) stressed the geographical 
aspect of this concept. For example the expenditure of resident visitors were not 
additional, because in the 'normal situation' they would have flowed into the local 
economy any way. It is exactly this 'normal situation' that needs explicit definition. 
The improvement introduced in this thesis is that additionality not only depends on 
the location under consideration, but also on the alternative to the investment (event) 
under scrutiny, the 'normal situation'. This 'normal situation' was labelled the 
reference or 0 situation. The 0 situation should be as realistic as possible, in order to 
obtain the results with the highest relevance.
The use of the 0 situation did indeed have consequences for the results. An example 
of such a consequence is the group Dutch who did not go on holiday, because they 
wanted to watch Euro 2000 on television. Now whether the expenditures of this 
group should be considered additional depends on which 0 situation is chosen. If the 
position is taken that the 0 situation would be no tournament at all, these 
expenditures should be considered additional. However, this alternative is less 
realistic than this 0 situation: the tournament would be hosted by another country. 
Now, in this more realistic situation, a large proportion of the Dutch would have 
stayed at home as well (they do this for every European Championship, as is 
revealed by the residents' survey). Therefore, their expenditures should not be 
regarded additional for the Dutch economy.
Another example is the question of additionality of the subgroup 'residents staying 
home, which otherwise would have gone abroad to support the national team'. 
Although earlier Burgan and Mules (1992) had already recognized that the 
expenditures of this group were additional, they did not establish a link with a 
reference situation.
A second methodological improvement was the structuring of tourism flows during 
events. Burns et al. (1986), Getz (1991) and Preuss (2000) did conceptual work on
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different tourism flows during events. An innovation compared with Preuss's 
approach is the explicit link between motivations by visitors, and the additionality of 
their expenditures. This motivation was measured in stars, and visitors were thus 
classified according to their motivation. Of course this concept is related to the 
'drawing power' or market area of an event (Getz 1991: 6).
In this thesis, tourism flows were structured by four dimensions: 1) the motivation 
(measured in stars) 2) the origin of the group (foreign, national, local), and 3) the 
direction: attracted or repelled (positive or negative). This classification generates 24 
groups, which could be considered additional or not, depending the level of analysis 
(local or national).
Besides providing a framework for the financial interests of different groups in 
society, the methodology employed made it possible to include intangible costs and 
benefits as well. The approach used, was based on Ritchie (1984), Ritchie and Smith 
(1991) and Hall (1992). The methodology for assessing the expenditures by visitors 
was based on Dobson et al. (1997).
7.4 Empirical contribution
The economic impact of Euro 2000
In the previous section attention was paid to potential effects on tourism, and their 
inclusion in the economic impact analysis. A number of these effects could effectively 
be quantified by the surveys.
An important aspect is the effect on the behaviour of the Dutch population. A new 
result was the effect on holiday behaviour. From the survey it became clear that, 
despite rumours in the press, there are hardly citizens who flee the host city during 
the event.
From the same survey, the well-known 'the Los Angeles' or 'London' effect could be 
underpinned. Earlier quantifications of this effect were based upon information by 
service suppliers (restaurants, theme-parks, retailers), and not on demand side 
information (Hall 1992: 59, Hatch 1986). It became clear that during Euro 2000 there
190
was a substantial group of residents (approximately 20%) of a host city who avoided 
the city centre, while on average 15% increased their visits. Moreover, 31% of the 
"out of town population" who regularly visit one of the host cities had cut down on 
their visits during the event (while 11% indicated that they had visited the centre 
more often). These results confirm the observation that there are substantial 
'crowding-out' effects on visitor patterns in host cities during major sports events. 
However, now it can be added that part of these effects is caused by domestic 
demand and should be discounted as economic impact for the national level. These 
effects might still influence the attitude towards events by the retail shops and 
restaurant owners (who are most affected) in the host cities.
A remarkable result concerning the expenditures and behaviour of foreign tourists is 
the similarity with the results for Euro 1996 (Dobson et al. 1997). Two key indicators 
were almost exactly the same: the number of overnight stays per ticket (1.7) and the 
number of tickets per person (1.9).
This seems to indicate that the results are quite robust. Total expenditure by foreign 
visitors for Euro 2000 was calculated at €108 million, while during Euro 1996 it was 
calculated at £195 million or €240 million (Dobson et al. 1997, remember part of Euro 
2000 was in Belgium).
There is one major issue, which I felt unable to research into sufficient depth, because 
of lack of time (funding) and data. This concerns the tourists who are scared of by the 
event. Empirical research into this effect is scarce: Hultkranz' study (1998) is one of 
the few examples. The clue's provided in the surveys for Euro 2000 were not 
sufficiently strong to quantify this effect for this event.
Social and promotional impact of Euro 2000
The results for the social impacts were on the whole in line with findings from other 
events.
It was found that the perceived promotional effect of the event ranks highest among 
the intangible benefits, as perceived by the population. This is confirmed by other 
studies (Delamere 2001; Fredline et al. 2003; Carlsen et al. 2001; Emery 2001). Ritchie
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and Smith (1991) were the among first to assess empirically the impact of a major 
sports event on the awareness of a city abroad, by comparing the awareness of 
Calgary abroad before and after the winter Olympics. A similar methodology was 
applied to assess the impact of Euro 2000 on the awareness of the host cities and the 
impact on the image of the Netherlands and the Dutch as a nation.
It was found that there was a significant but small effect on awareness of the host 
cities names in foreign countries. The effect was much less than in the case of the 
Calgary Olympics, which is not remarkable, as the Olympics are named after the host 
city, while the host city name is not to be found in the communication or slogan of 
European Championships. A change in image could not be detected. However, there 
seems to be a reinforcement effect on existing images, which is not always a positive 
effect.
An innovation in this respect was that the relationship between the effects in specific 
countries and the performance of their national team was tested. It was found that 
there is a significant positive relationship between the performance of a national 
team, and the impression that the tournament has left in that specific country. Image 
and awareness of the Netherlands in France, the winners, showed a considerable 
improvement, while especially in England (not surviving the group games) the 
indicators even deteriorated. This result demands a further psychological 
examination.
Cost and benefits
An academic consensus seems to be that investments in sports (stadiums) can hardly 
ever be defended on economic grounds and that the factual proof for economic or 
social contribution to city marketing objectives is not solid (Noll and Zimbalist 1997, 
Gratton and Henry 2001b, Sandy et al. 2004). Lavoie (2000: 166) concludes that 
economic impact studies "only prove that reduction in unemployment is a profitable 
venture". Often no differentiation is made between city marketing policies based on 
sports events and investments in sports stadiums. To some extent this can be 
justified: undoubtedly there are similarities and common issues in the political
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decision process concerning sports stadiums and sports events. In the case of 
international sports events that require large-scale investments in venues, as is 
almost always true for the Olympic games, this is quite understandable. However, it 
seems that conclusions derived from the economics of professional sports, and the 
rationale of subsidizing sports stadiums, are sometimes too easily stretched to 
include major sports events. In the case of Euro 2000, this thesis defends the position 
that the public authorities made a financial profit on the event, even if economic 
impact is excluded as a public benefit. A total credit balance of €14.7 million was 
calculated for the overall public sector (local and central government). Of course, 
Uefa made the largest profit, estimated at €81 million.
The argument of Lavoie (2000) misses two important points. First, in the case of 
sports events these ventures might be undertaken at a low public cost. Sports events 
may require large-scale investments, but this is not a law of Medes and Persians; they 
might be organised using existing venues and thus may involve little public 
investments. Second, international sports events by their nature bring additional 
expenditures to a city and country, whereas in the case of a sports franchise most of 
the economic effects are mainly of a switching nature.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, the theoretical, methodological, conceptual and empirical findings of 
this thesis have been discussed, with reference to the research questions and 
literature of Chapters 2 and 3.
The most important contribution of this thesis is the attempt to bridge the gap 
between assessments and evaluations, in particular between CBA and EIA. Two 
insights are essential for this: first that private interests should be separated from 
public interests and second that real income is the measure for private benefits. 
Moreover, the approach is not specifically confined to EIA as a tool for measurement 
of the impact of an event upon economic growth. It might be applied to other 
techniques as well, based on other economic theories.
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A more fundamental critique, put forward by Roche, is that approaches similar to the 
one adopted in this thesis, are not scientifically relevant, because they do not attempt 
to explain political processes. It was acknowledged that a realistic approach towards 
political processes is to be preferred above a naive approach that presupposes a 
benevolent public authority. It was suggested that public choice approaches might 
provide a fruitful complement to the approach suggested in this thesis.
On a more conceptual level the introduction of a 0 situation was discussed to assess 
which expenditures might be additional. This is a refinement of the existing 
methodologies on economic impact assessment.
Furthermore a refinement of the typology of tourism effects was applied, based on 
motivation, origin and direction. A new element in the results, related to tourism, 
was the effects on residential tourism and recreational activities, which are still a 
relatively unexplored issue. However, it should be added that the crowding-out 
effects on foreign tourism could only be assessed in qualitative terms.
Many of the social effects are confirmed by other studies on sports events. A 
remarkable result was that the promotional effects in foreign countries seem to 
depend on the performance of the national team of that country during the event.
Finally, it was demonstrated that Euro 2000 was a success, by financial as well as by 
social indicators. This conclusion may help to counter a somewhat over-pessimistic 
view in some of the recent literature on the impact of sports events.
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8 Summary and conclusion
8.1 Background and theory
The economic evaluation of major sports events is the subject of this thesis. It is the 
combination of high commercial interests, high risks in terms of investments or 
public order, and their 'footloose' character divorced from local tradition that all 
might explain the interest in economic prognosis and evaluation studies.
In this thesis, an attempt was made to bridge the gap between the literature on sports 
events and the literature on cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and welfare economics. The 
central research questions were: Can an economic impact analysis (EIA) be 
integrated in a CBA? What are the role and place of external effects in a CBA? No 
consensus can be found in the literature, even if the scope of the literature search is 
broadened from sports events to include publications on CBA in general.
On closer inspection of the theoretical foundations, it was found that, in principle, 
EIA is not incompatible with CBA. The key to integration is to take real income as the 
measure for wealth, instead of consumers' surplus (as is the standard practice in 
CBA). However, a point raised by theorists on economic welfare is that government 
interference is justified only in specific circumstances, such as goods with external 
effects or public goods. This seems to exclude EIA from CBA. On the other hand, the 
important role of EIA in policy discussions cannot be denied.
The theoretical and methodological synthesis put forward here is to break down the 
traditional CBA into separate CBAs for public and private interests. The economic 
impact is included in the private accounts, but some of the (employment) effects may 
be considered public interests, and could therefore be located in the public account as 
(non-financial) 'external effects'. This CBA with multiple accounts is the framework 
used for evaluating Euro 2000.
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Making the concepts operational
Besides providing a framework for the analysis of financial interests of different 
groups in society, the methodology used made it possible to include intangible costs 
and benefits as well. Three spending categories could be identified: organizational 
expenditures; travel- and tourism-related expenditures; and other effects on domestic 
demand.
Regarding the organizational expenditures, those made by the visiting teams and the 
investments by the media for providing the international broadcasting signal are 
additional. The expenditures by the Local Organizing Committee (LOC) are 
additional, under the condition that they are financed by foreign resources (Uefa).
Regarding the potential effects on tourism, a classification was made, which 
distinguished 21 different effects or groups. Whether the expenditures of each of 
these groups are additional is the next question; this depends on the strength of their 
motivation and on the perspective taken (regional or national).
The next stage was the quantification of these effects. The raw data were provided by 
surveys, some of which were by telephone, some face-to-face. The three different 
surveys undertaken were: among visiting supporters (visitors' survey, among the 
Dutch population (domestic survey) and among the population in five other 
European countries (international survey).
8.2 Results
Visitors, nights and expenditures
More than 600,000 spectators followed the matches in the Dutch stadiums. A 
substantial proportion, 55%, was of foreign origin. Approximately 340,000 foreigners 
accounted for almost 600,000 overnight stays. The interest from foreign football fans 
appears to correlate quite closely with the general tourism patterns.
The gross direct expenditures of Euro 2000 were calculated at €145.2 million, of 
which €112.6 million can be attributed to the expenditures of the visitors. The total
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expenditure of foreign visitors for Euro 2000 was calculated at C108.159, while during 
Euro 1996 it was calculated at £195 million or €240 million (Dobson et al. 1997; 
remember that part of Euro 2000 took place in Belgium).
Amsterdam received the largest share of the expenditures, 40%. The total additional 
value added was €102.5 million. Total additional employment was 1,800 man-years.
Special attention was paid to the potential spending impact of resident behaviour. A 
substantial group did not go on a holiday abroad (or postponed it), because they 
watched Euro 2000 on television. Their expenditures however are mostly not 
additional for the Dutch economy because they would have behaved this way during 
any European Football Championship in any other country. Expenditures of 
residents staying home, who otherwise would have gone abroad to support the 
national team, are additional. Hardly any citizens fled the host city during the event.
Cost and benefits
In 1996 Uefa made a profit of €29 million, while the English FA lost money on the 
organization of the tournament (Dobson et al. 1997).
In 2000 the profit for Uefa is estimated at €81 million. The Dutch and Belgian FAs 
made an operating profit of €19 million, which was split between these two 
associations. Furthermore the Dutch FA received a bonus of €6.5 million60 because of 
the Dutch performance on the playing field. However, this last sum is not counted as 
a benefit, as it is not the result of hosting Euro 2000.
For the business community as a whole, the benefits outweighed the costs. The 
winners were: the accommodation sector (especially the campsites near Amsterdam), 
and catering (cafes, fast-food) sectors in the host cities. The results for the hotel 
(sub)sector are less unequivocal because of the crowding-out effects of Euro 2000 on 
foreign tourists. The retail sector profited, but probably more outside the host cities
59 To be precise: €108.1 million spent by foreign visitors and €4.5 million spent by Dutch 
supporters not going abroad.
60 10.2 million Swiss Francs (Uefa 2000) (for exchange rates applied, see Annex C).
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than inside. This was caused by the fact that domestic consumers tended to stay 
away from the host city centre.
Industry spent money on promotion and security, together accounting for at least €23 
million, and on additional advertising, of which € 5.5 million can be attributed to the 
effect of hosting Euro 2000.
Some branches of industry, such as retail shops and restaurants, experienced a local 
decline in demand, known as the "Los Angeles-effect'. These results confirm the 
observation in the literature that there are substantial 'crowding-out' effects on 
visitor patterns in host cities during major sports events. Now, as a result of this 
present research, it can be added that a substantial part of these effects is on domestic 
visits and should be discounted as an economic cost at the national level.
Some branches experienced a boom or decline which was not related to the hosting 
of Euro 2000, but is rather typical for any international football championship or 
sports event. These were, for example, the manufacturers of consumer electronics, 
the beverages industry, the advertising/business services and travel industry. 
Although these effects do not 'count', or count only at the regional level, they may 
influence the feelings towards the benefits.
There was widespread support among the Dutch population for hosting the event. In 
retrospect, more than 80% of the population agreed with the decision to host the 
event. This support is further underlined by the fact that 95% were of the opinion 
that the Netherlands should be a candidate for future hosting.
The methodology of multiple accounts establishes an explicit distinction between 
private and public benefits.
From a personal perspective (i.e. the private benefits), socializing with friends and 
family, 'orangistic'61 feelings and pride in the Netherlands were particularly valued. 
Negative points were far less frequently mentioned.
See footnote 44.
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For the public sector (central and local government together), the financial benefits 
outweighed the costs. The net benefit for the central government is estimated at €14.7 
million (the prognosis was €6.8 million). The total balance for the public sector was 
equal to the positive balance of the central government, less the negative balance of 
the local authorities, or €12.2 million.
However, for an evaluation of the public costs and benefits, the external effects are 
also of relevance. The population mentioned "increasing awareness of the 
Netherlands in other countries" most frequently (84%) as a public benefit of Euro 
2000. Surveys on image and awareness in foreign countries measured these effects. 
They proved to be existent but quite modest. Nevertheless, it was possible to 
establish a relationship between the effects in specific countries and the performance 
of their national team. As the French performed the best, the improvement of the 
Dutch image in France is an unexpected benefit from the tournament.
A majority of those interviewed were of the opinion that the public sector should (at 
least) break even; hence the majority did not feel that the external benefits had 
outweighed the external costs.
8.3 Conclusion and further research
The alternative approach to CBA offered in this thesis has consequences for the use 
of CBA in its political context and also for the role and position of the economic 
researcher. The most important consequence is that the emphasis shifts from 
prescription to discussion. The CBA by multiple accounts introduced in this thesis is 
intended as a structuring device for that part of the political process in which 
arguments are weighed.
A common view in the literature is that investments in sports (stadiums) can hardly 
ever be defended on economic grounds, and that evidence for economic or social 
contribution to city marketing objectives is not solid. However, it seems these 
conclusions, derived from the economics of professional sports and from the 
rationale of subsidizing sports stadiums in the USA, are sometimes too easily 
stretched to include major sports events. This misses two points. First, in the case of
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sports events, these ventures might be undertaken at a low public cost. Sports events 
may require large-scale investments, but this is not a law of the Medes and the 
Persians; they might be organized using existing venues and thus would involve 
little public investment. Second, international sports events, by their very nature, 
bring additional expenditures to a city and country, whereas in the case of a sports 
franchise most of the economic effects are mainly of a switching nature.
Further research and policy issues
The research has laid out a conceptual framework for the analysis of foreign and 
domestic tourism flows and has established their relevance for economic impact 
calculations. However, more empirical work is needed to quantify these flows in 
greater detail. The most important flow that could not be determined in a satisfactory 
way is the magnitude of tourists scared off by the event. This is one of the most 
pressing empirical questions that needs better answers than we have at the moment. 
Economic impact studies will continue keep their somewhat poor reputation if this 
question is not be tackled satisfactorily in the future, both methodologically and 
empirically.
The prediction of key figures for major sports events still often lacks an empirical 
basis. However, now there is a good opportunity to compare the data from Euro 1996 
and Euro 2000 and perhaps other major sports events in more detail, in order to come 
to a better understanding and prediction of foreign visitors flows to major sports 
events. A remarkable result is the similarity with the results for Euro 1996. Two key 
indicators were almost exactly the same: the number of overnight stays per ticket 
(1.7) and the number of tickets per person (1.9). Further analyses and modelling of 
data is possible and needed for better prognoses. For a first attempt at modelling 
these flows, see Oldenboom et al. (2002). In this study a model is used to predict the 
expenditures during a European Championship which would take place in the 
Scandinavian countries in 2008. Based on figures from Euro 1996 and Euro 2000, the 
model can best be understood to predict the expenditures in two main stages:
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In the first stage the number of overnight stays inside and outside the host cities are 
predicted. This is done by prediction of the number of visitors per match (depending 
on which teams play the match), and information on their average stay (both figures 
are known for Euro 2000). Of course, it is not known in advance which teams will 
meet: therefore scenario's are used which simulate different courses of the 
tournament. This stage results in a specific pattern over the hosting country of 
overnight stays, depending on the scenario.
The second stage is to use this specific pattern of overnight stays to predict the 
expenditures on match days (predominantly in the host cities) and on non-match 
days (predominantly in the 'sleep cities').
This thesis draws attention to several relevant findings for policy making. First, the 
forecast of visitor flows during an event could make safety measures much more 
effective. The same holds for hospitality arrangements by the authorities. A lack of 
knowledge about touristic behaviour of visiting fans resulted in much uncertainty 
during Euro 2000. Much of this uncertainty can be reduced by using the findings of 
this thesis and the model described above. A second policy issue is the hazard of too 
much stress on safety issues at the cost of promotional opportunities. The thesis 
provides an example of a host city, Arnhem, which took the risk of placing public 
screens, despite the warnings of safety risks. Taking this risk resulted in a significant 
higher support among the population of this host city. Third, an event like this has 
the potential for raising the name awareness of host cities abroad, and even some 
effects on image may be visible. However, most of the promotion potential of the 
tournament is now roamed off by Uefa. This organisation receives the commercial 
and media revenues. The host countries and cities hardly have an idea about this 
potential and tend to focus on the economic impact by visitors. The results of this 
thesis may be used for rethinking the negociation strategy of host countries when 
bidding for major events. In stead of focusing on visitors expenditures, authorities 
should try to coordinate their act towards Uefa and negociate more opportunities for 
promotion, for their cities and local industries.
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Therefore, an important but unfortunately rather neglected area of empirical research 
is the impact of sports events on the image of a city, including the psychological 
mechanisms involved. A relationship was found between the promotional impact in 
a country and the performance of that country's football team on the playing field. 
This opens the door to a series of questions that could link economic and socio- 
psychological research. A first question is of course whether this result can be 
reproduced. And if so, how long does the positive impact on the winning country 
(France) last? A second issue is the interaction between performance and 
expectations. Were the promotional effects of Euro 2000 in England so low because of 
the disappointment of the English? Can disappointment have a negative impact on 
awareness levels of city names? What is the role of expectations in this process? 
Answers to these questions will help to understand the mechanisms of image 
formation and have practical relevance for host cities trying to maximize the 
promotional spin-off.
Another question for future research, which is quite pressing, is the evaluation of 
sports events policy (as opposed to single sports events). It is common sense that 
hosting sports events should be part of city marketing strategy, aimed at the longer 
term. Is it really true that such a strategy adds to the impact of sports events in 
general? Can CBA be used to evaluate such a strategy, or are other tools needed? Is 
the conventional economic impact study sufficiently well-equipped to analyse the 
longer term effects of such a strategy? Some authors stress the role of strategic 
networks in this process (Van den Berg et al. 2000). Is this a hype or does it really add 
value to the competitive strength of a city? Can the concept of Porter's diamond be 
used to analyse the strengths of local networks? Answers to these questions might 
bring the economic theory better in touch with the issues that local policy makers are 
facing.
There are also a number of interesting issues to pursue on a conceptual and 
theoretical level. CBA and EIA are tools, i.e. instrumental knowledge: their purpose 
is oriented to support policy processes, not to explain those processes. However, an 
instrumental analysis geared towards political decision making, complemented by a 
theory explaining political processes would make any approach towards major
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sports events more realistic and scientifically relevant. The public choice perspective, 
and in particular game theory might be a good candidate, because it provides a 
conceptual framework for analysing political processes and strategic interactions 
between interest groups. A one-time game with unknown pay-offs is a rather good 
description of the nature of a large international sports event for a host country. 
Questions on which game theory might shed some light are: Can game theory 
predict the demand and use of information? Why are ex ante evaluations more 
common than ex post evaluations? Under which conditions is co-operation between 
interest groups feasible? In this thesis, the potential can only be signalled. Further 
research and conceptualization is needed to test whether it is possible to use game 
theory.
This thesis also hopes to contribute to a further exchange between, and integration of, 
sociological and economic methodology. The analytical framework of this thesis 
might provide a starting point, but more conceptual work is needed to bridge the 
gaps between a social evaluation, CBA, welfare economics, and the development of 
standardized attitude scales. In this context, Harsanyi's welfare economic approach 
is particularly relevant, because this approach differentiates between private and 
public interests, and postulates that aggregation is allowed for personal attitudes 
towards public interests. It might thus provide a theoretical base for an integrated 
approach. The challenge is to find how to aggregate personal attitudes in a way that 
makes it possible to use them in a public discussion, or to integrate attitude 
statements into a formal cost-benefit framework.
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Annex A Economic research: subject and method
What is economics about? Throughout the history of economic theorizing, this 
question has been answered differently by each generation of economists. Some saw 
economics as the science of wealth, or as the science of money, or as the science of 
human choice. Traces of these different answers can, implicitly, still be found, for 
example, in modern interpretations of the term 'economic impact'. Therefore it is 
worthwhile to make a short excursion into the history of economic thought though a 
complete overview of the different answers is beyond the scope of this thesis (see 
Kirzner 1976, Schumpeter 1954, Hodgson 1993).
For our purpose economists answering the question can be grouped into two 
categories:
1. A group that define economics as a study of a specific class of activities in 
society, or specific social sub sector in the society. The next question is: which 
(social) activities can be labelled economic?
2. A group which sees economics as a set of methodologies -  or way of thinking, 
or even ideology.
The first point of view is in line with the historical roots of economics. The aim of the 
inquiries of the early classical economists like Adam Smith was to study "a class of 
objects which together comprise wealth" (Kirzner 1976: 25). Later economists focused 
specifically on the 'production, distribution and consumption of wealth' (Clark 1931) 
A modern variant of this approach is implicitly encountered in Ritchie's table (see 
Table 2.1). However, the object in this case, is not wealth, but the economy, as a social 
subsystem.
The second notion (method approach) is the more popular among modern 
economists. Robbins's famous definition: 'economics is the science which studies 
human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have
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alternative uses', defines economics as the science of rational human choice. As 
choice is an integral part of human behaviour in general, following this definition 
there is no 'social subsystem' that is a priori studied by economists.62
Taken to their extreme, both of these propositions might be sterile. According to 
Coase (1988: 3), the identification of the economic discipline with the logic of choice 
has to some extent sterilized economics so it has become a social discipline with 
'consumers without humanity, firms without organization, and even exchange 
without markets.' On the other hand, just the study of 'real world objects' without a 
set of common methodologies as tools is a recipe for information without knowledge 
accumulation. An illustration is the once dominant school of institutional economics 
in the United States, which was intellectually overshadowed by the formalistic 
neoclassical economics. According to Hodgson (1993: 22) the institutionalists dug 
their own grave by focusing too much on data gathering and description and paying 
too little attention for the development of methodology.
The distinction touches upon a more fundamental issue: namely, the scope of 
economics (epistemology). For the purpose of this thesis, the confusion can be 
satisfactory eliminated by making an explicit difference between a (research) subject 
approach and a method approach.
The subject approach defines economics by the subject that is studied by it, for 
example, the economy (studied as if it were a separate social subsystem, Kirzner 
1976). A method approach on the other hand defines economics by its methodology, 
for example by applying the concept of maximizing behaviour to all social situations, 
e.g. family life.
Economic research on events can thus be divided into two types:
1) Research investigating the impact of an event upon 'the economy'. An example of 
this type of research is economic impact analysis;
62 This may be further illustrated by the application of economic theory in political environments 
(Downs, noted in Mueller 2003) and social settings such as marriage (Becker, noted in Coase 1988).
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2) Research using economic methods or concepts, valuing different types of social 
impacts by economic methods. CBA is an example of this type of economic 
research.
In Figure A .l the difference between a method and an object approach is illustrated. 
In both the object and method approach, broad and narrow approaches can be 
distinguished. The method approach narrowly applied restricts itself to financial 
flows, while the object approach narrowly applied restricts itself to firms. Many 
studies known as economic impact analysis belong to this last category: their 
principal topic is the value added in firms.
Figure A.1 Economics relating to an object or to a method
bject
w
N arrow
(Industry)
Broad
(All sectors of society)
Narrow
(Financial effects)
(1)
1) Limited economic 
impact analysis: 
value added in firms
2) Partial CBA: 
financial cost benefit
(2)
1) Economic impact, tax 
impact, distribution impact, 
regional impact
2) Partial CBA: financial effects 
firms, public sector, citizens
Broad
(All social effects)
(3)
1) Economic impact + 
promotional benefits 
for industry
2) Partial CBA for firms 
(including non 
financial effects)
(4)
1) Economic impact+ future 
benefits + external effects + 
distribution effects + costs
2) Complete CBA
An economic impact study (EIA) then refers to an assessment of the impact upon the 
economy, which is essentially a subject approach. It should immediately be 
acknowledged that the concept of 'the economy' as a separate sub system is a 
theoretical construction: it cannot be observed in reality.
Coase (1988) cites some studies in which economics (rational choice) is applied to animal behavior, so 
even the restriction to humans is unnecessary.
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A cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is an economic methodology for social evaluation. It 
applies a method, namely to quantify social effects in money and to compare them, 
to social phenomena. It does not stop at the boundaries of the economy, it takes 
social effects into account no matter whether they belong to the Economy7 or not.
For pragmatic reasons, in this thesis the second approach is dominant, because it 
allows more freedom and it may encompass the first approach: that is, looking with 
economic spectacles, but not necessarily at economic objects.
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Annex B Consumers’ surplus
The fundamental principle on which the original idea of consumer's surplus rested, 
was that the slope of the demand curve reveals information about the marginal 
utility to a consumer of a product. Therefore, a better measure for 'wealth' than price 
times quantity (p*Q) supposedly is the total area under the demand curve, for this 
area measures not only the valuation of the 'marginal unit' bought by the consumer 
(the price), but also those of all the other units, i.e. the intra marginal units (Mishan 
1976). Another formulation is that the consumer's surplus is the amount that a 
consumer would be willing to pay, minus the actual price. Thus, as long as the 
demand curve is downward sloping and the subject consumes more than one unit, 
some surplus in 'wealth' is experienced. Moreover, this surplus can be measured in 
money.
The concept was first described by Dupuit (1844), and some years hence used by 
Marshall (1920) and later revitalized by Hicks (1939) and subsequently criticized by 
Samuelson (1983).
The concept of consumer's surplus can be best explained from the assumption of a 
measurement of utilities in cardinal units (which is not the same as interpersonal 
comparability). Although the cardinal nature of utility might in itself be criticized, 
here this is beside the point. If consumers' surplus cannot be defended for cardinal 
utilities, it cannot be right for ordinal ones.
Samuelson (1983: 199-202) has shown that, in the two-commodity case and a change 
in price of Q, there is no (proportionate) relationship between the change in utility 
and the change in consumer's surplus, thus falsifying the original concept. To show 
where the problem arises -  but not as a proof -  take a closer look at the case 
involving two commodities.
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The idea is based upon the downward sloping demand curve of a commodity, Q. 
This downward slope is supposed to indicate the decreasing 'valuation' for each 
marginal unit of Q. The downward slope seems to indicate that a consumers is 
prepared to pay more for the first than for the second unit, and even less for the third 
unit etc. The consumer actually pays the market price for each unit, so he seems to 
have a surplus: the price he was willing to pay for the first unit minus the market 
price, plus the price he was willing to pay for the second unit minus the market price, 
etc., until the quantity that he has actually bought is reached. The summation of these 
surpluses, the consumer's surplus, is the shaded area under the demand curve in 
Figure B.l.
Q
Figure B.l Consumer's surplus
However, why should a consumer be willing to pay more for the first than for the 
second unit? Now this is stated very clearly by Marshall (1920: 94-95 underlining 
indicate italics in the original):
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"Suppose, for instance, that tea of a certain quality is to be had at 2s. per lb. [...] [the 
consumer] buys perhaps 10 lbs. In the year; that is to say, the difference between the 
satisfaction which he gets from buying 9 lbs. and 10 lbs. is enough for him to be willing to pay
price, then 2s. is his marginal demand price."
The assumption that a declining demand curve is related to diminishing utility can 
be shown to be incorrect.
For analytical purposes a two commodities economy is introduced, Q and X. Let us 
suppose that a subject maximizes utility U, under the budget restraint I. The demand 
curve is a reflection of the optimal quantity of Q for a subject, given different prices 
and a constant income. Every point of the demand curve is characterized by the 
following optimality conditions:
Now let us analyse the relationship between marginal utility and price changes. As
should also rise, to hold the equation. Now let us suppose that Q is a commodity for 
which the marginal utility is not declining, but constant, i.e. the numerator is a
rises, a new optimum is found if more pieces of X are bought; this means, under the 
budget constraint, that less pieces of Q can be bought. In other words: a situation in 
which the demand curve is declining, while the marginal utility (valuation?) is
pieces of an incomplete set. As her set becomes more complete, the marginal utility of pieces might 
even rise. Marshall himself gives other examples: wallpaper, needed to cover a wall, or a short concert 
or holiday, 'may fail of its purpose of soothing and recreation' (1920: 94 n. 1) because it is over too 
soon.
2s. for it: while the fact that he does not buy an eleventh pound, shows that he does not think 
that it would be worth an extra 2s to him. That is, 2s a pound measures the utility to him of 
the tea which lies at the margin or terminus or end of his purchases; it measures the marginal 
utility to him. I f the price which he just willing to pay for any pound be called his demand
a)
the price of Q rises (right hand side), the value of the fraction on the left hand side
constant a.63 The marginal utility of X is 'normal' and declining. When the price of Q
63 An example might be the demand function of a collector of pottery, who is looking for missing
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constant. Although the consumer has no intra marginal utility gain, so no 
"consumer's surplus' in utility terms, a 'consumer's surplus' according to the demand 
curve can still be observed. Ergo: a declining demand curve is not a reflection or 
approximation of a declining marginal utility.
Normally, it is supposed that the marginal utility of Q and X decline with 
consumption. This means that a new optimum is found when less Q and more X is 
consumed, because then the numerator rises (less Q means a higher marginal utility 
for Q), whereas the denominator falls (more X means a lower marginal utility for X). 
However, it is not at all necessary to find a new optimum that both numerator and 
denominator 'help' in the right direction. The only demand is that the result is a 
Targe enough' rise in the fraction on the left hand side. Therefore, the marginal utility 
of Q might even decline, as long as the decline is compensated by a larger decline in 
the marginal utility of X.
The following thought-experiment can demonstrate that the concept of consumer's 
surplus contains an inadmissible 'free lunch'. Suppose that the subject's properties 
are insured against theft and that Q1 is indeed stolen from the parking lot, just after it 
was bought. Now what would be a fair compensation value for the loss of Q1 from 
the insurance company? According to the concept of consumer's surplus, it would be 
the sum of decreasing marginal value of each additional unit Q, because this would 
be the 'real worth' of the stolen goods to the subject. However, this is more than the 
original amount p*Ql, the additional amount being the consumer's surplus. Being 
rewarded with this compensation, and spending it on Q1 and other products, the 
subject would reach a higher utility level than before he was robbed. A more 
reasonable compensation therefore, is a compensation value that encourages the 
subject to buy so much Q so his former utility is reached. In this example the right 
compensation value then is of course exactly the amount p*Ql.
To show the relationship between real income, price change and compensating 
variation (C.V.), it is supposed that a consumer wants to buy a quantity Q of a certain 
product but is confronted with a change in price.
Let's define:
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Io : the income of the consumer before a change in price, which is taken as the base 
for real income IoR;
I ic : the compensated income after the price changes; this is the minimum income 
required to stay on the same indifference curve after a price change.
For real income ItR at t=0, it may be written:
/„fi=/0= 4  a)P\
In which p i R stands for the true cost o f  l iv ing  index. This is by definition the ratio of the 
reference income Io and the compensated income I i c .
For the real income at t = l  it may be written:
' * = 4  (2)P\
What is the relationship between the price level and the compensation variation? 
Suppose the price rises and income is not compensated. A price rise is not 
compensated when nominal income is constant: Io -  I i . In this case I i R < IoR in other 
words: real income has decreased.
The compensating variation (CV), which would bring the subject back to his/her 
original indifference curve, can be written as:
CK = /,c -7 , (3)
Income Ii is not compensated, and therefore Io = Ii. It might thus be written:
CV = Il)* p ? - I t <»CV = I0* (p ? - i)  (4)
Where p iR can only be calculated on basis of the indifference curves of the subject, 
which are normally unknown. However, from price index theory it is known that the 
Paasche and the Laspeyres index of cost of living are first order approximations of
this true cost of living index (Deaton and Muellbauer 1989).
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The conclusion is that real income changes should be used as a measurement for 
welfare changes, which is conceptually more straightforward than bothering over 
consumers' surpluses.
Now suppose real income is not affected by a price change, but by a rise in nominal 
income, as a result of costs and benefits, while prices stay the same. For a change in 
nominal income it can be written:
If the project is investment in infrastructure, real income is mostly affected by 
changes in efficiency, which is expressed through the price (p). This change in price 
is hard to determine, therefore it makes sense to estimate the change in real income 
by asking for willingness to pay. However, in the case of sports events, changes in 
real income are mainly caused by changes in nominal income and / or expenditures 
(C and B). If it is assumed that prices are not affected, p=l, the last expression is 
equal to:
In other words, if there are negligible price effects, the real change in income is equal 
to the nominal change, a conclusion that is not very surprising.
The general conclusion may be that the objective measure for wealth is (real) income.
AI N = I t - I 0 = B - C (5)
Where C are the (nominal) costs involved, and B the (nominal) benefits (including a 
rise in nominal income). A change in real income is:
(6)
(By definition real income at t=0 is equal to nominal income at t=0). Or
A I * =( I0+ B - C ) * p ? - I 0 (7)
In other words:
M R = CV + { B - C ) * p * (8)
AI R = B - C (9)
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Annex C Exchange rates
Yearly average 1 € = n Swiss Franc
Year n
1996 1.57
1.64
1998 1.62
1999 1.60
1.56
2001 1.51
2002 1.47
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Voorburg/Heerlen 2004-08-11
Yearly average 1 €  =  n £
Year n
1996 0.81
1997 0.69
1998 0.68
1999
2000 0.61
0.62
2002 0.63
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Voorburg/Heerlen 2004-08-11
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Annex D Questionnaires
Visitors’ survey: questionnaire for domestic visitors
Kruis uw antwoord aan
1. Waar woont u?
□ in Amsterdam
□ in een andere plaats in Nederland
2. Wat is uw leeftijd?  jaar
3. Bent u? □ man
□ vrouw
4. Met welk vervoermiddel bent u naar het stadion gekomen?
Meer antwoorden mogelijk, kruis aan welk(e) vervoermiddel(en) u gebruikt heeft.
□ Trein
□ Bus
□ Taxi
□ Auto
□ Metro
□ Tram
□ Anders, nam elijk.........................................
5. Wie heeft uw reis (en eventueel verblijf) naar het stadion geregeld (exclusief
to egangsb e wi j s) ?
□ ik heb mijn reis zelf geregeld zonder tussenkomst van organisaties
□ een reis-/evenementenbureau
□ de supportersclub
□ de sponsor/supplier,..............................................................
□ de Official Accommodation Agency van EURO 2000
□ de voetbalbond
□ anders, te w eten ....................................................................
6. Voor hoeveel personen betaalt u vandaag de kosten in verband met het
bezoek aan de wedstrijd (exclusief toegangsbewijs)?
□ alleen voor mezelf ga naar vraag 8
□ voor mijzelf en n o g  personen, bijvoorbeeld partner, kind(eren)
7. Hoeveel van die andere personen hebben een toegangsbewijs voor de wedstrijd 
van vandaag?
Aantal personen...............
8. Hoeveel besteedt u vandaag, in verband met het bezoek aan de wedstrijd, aan het 
volgende (inclusief de personen voor wie u de kosten betaalt)?
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Geef per uitgave aan of deze plaatsvindt in Amsterdam of daarbuiten.
Bedrag besteed in Bedrag besteed buiten
Amsterdam Amsterdam
Eten en drinken in horeca en snackbars 
Reizen/vervoer in Nederland (+ parkeren, 
benzine e.d.)
Winkelen: merchandise, souvenirs, kleding, 
schoeisel e.d.
Winkelen: eten en drinken (supermarkten, 
bakker)
Excursies, museumbezoek, pretparken e.d. 
Overig namelijk:
9. Heeft u in het kader van uw bezoek aan deze wedstrijd een overnachting 
geboekt?
□ nee hartelijk dank voor uw medewerking
□ ja ga naar de laatste vraag op de volgende pagina
10. Kunt u voor uw overnachting(en) aangeven in welke plaats(en) u verblijft, 
hoeveel nachten u in die plaats(en) verblijft en wat de kosten per overnachting 
zijn?
______Vul per plaats van overnachting in: het aantal nachten, de accommodatie en de kosten.______
Ik overnacht in: Aantal
nachten
Accommodatie Kosten per 
overnachting
□  Amsterdam □  bij vrienden/kennissen □  pension□  hotel □  bungalowpark □  camping
□  anders...........................................
bedrag:..........................
□  Arnhem □ bij vrienden/kennissen □  pension□  hotel □  bungalowpark □  camping
□  anders..........................................
bedrag:..........................
□  Eindhoven □  bij vrienden/kennissen □  pension□  hotel □  bungalowpark □  camping
□  anders..........................................
bedrag:..........................
□  Rotterdam □  bij vrienden/kennissen □  pension□  hotel □  bungalowpark □  camping
□  anders..........................................
bedrag:..........................
□  Andere plaats 
namelijk: □  bij vrienden/kennissen □  pension
□  hotel □  bungalowpark □  camping
□  anders..........................................
bedrag:..........................
□  Andere plaats 
namelijk: □  bij vrienden/kennissen □  pension
□  hotel □  bungalowpark □  camping
□  anders..........................................
bedrag:..........................
□  Andere plaats 
namelijk: □  bij vrienden/kennissen □  pension
□  hotel □  bungalowpark □  camping
□  anders...........................................
bedrag:..........................
Hartelijk bedankt voor het invullen van de vragenlijst en veel succes met de wedstrijd
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Visitors’ survey: questionnaire for foreign visitors
Hello, we were wondering if you wouldn't mind filling in this questionnaire for us. 
When answering our questions, please note the following:
• please put a cross next to the most relevant answer
• please write everything in English
• please be consistant when refering to currency (either use Dutch guilders (NLG) or your 
own currency (Pound Sterling, GBP) all the way through the questionnaire)
1. In which country do you live? ..................................
2. What nationality are you? ..................................
3. How old are you? ..............
4. Are you: □ male
□ female
5. For how many football matches in Holland do you have tickets?
in to ta l.................match (es) in Holland
6. Which method of transport did you use to travel to Holland?
Please tick more than one answer if need be.
□ Aeroplane
□ Train
□ Coach or bus
□ Ferry
□ Taxi
□ Car
□ Other............
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7. How did you arrange your journey and/or accommodation for Holland?
(not including your match tickets).
Please tick the relevant box below.
□ I organised the whole trip independently
(proceed to question 10)
□ through a travel agent in my country
□ through a travel agent in Holland
□ through the supporters club
□ through a sponsor/supplier...............................................
□ through the Euro 2000 Official Accommodation Agency
□ through a FA in my country
□ other, please state..................................................................
8. What precisely did the organisation/agency organise for you (not including 
match tickets)?
Please put a cross next to the relevant aspects below:
□ journey to and back from Holland
□ accommodation
□ transport in Holland
□ food and drink
□ merchandise (eg. caps, scarves, t-shirts etc.)
□ excursions, museum visits, etc.
□ other, please state............................................................
9. Please state approximately the total amount of money you have spent on this 
trip to Holland, including that spent on partner/child(ren) (not including match
tickets):
□ less than £140,00
□ between £ 140,00 and £ 280,00
□ between £ 280,00 and £ 420,00
□ more than £ 420,00
□ not sure
10. How many people are you covering the costs for during Euro 2000?
□ for myself proceed to question 12
□ for myself plus an ex tra.......... people, eg. my partner, children
11a. How many of those other people have a ticket for today's footbal match? 
Number of people:......................
lib . Do they also have tickets for other matches being played in Holland?
□ no
□ yes ■> They have tickets to other matches in Holland.
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12. How much money do you think you are likely to spend in relation to Euro 
2000 during your stay in Holland (not including match tickets)?
(please state own currency GBP or NLG)
Total likely to be spent £ ......................GBP o r .....................NLG
13. How many nights will you be spending in Holland during Euro 2000?
□ None proceed to question 15
□ total number of n ights:...........................
14. Please state in which town(s) you will be staying in Holland.
For each place please fill in: number of nights, type of accommodation and the costs.
Place you are 
staying:
No of 
nights
Accommodation Cost per night
□  Amsterdam □  with friends □  B & B
□  hotel □  camping
□  other...........................................
□  amount...............
NLG
□  amount.............. BGP
□  don't know
□  Arnhem □  with friends □  B & B
□  hotel □  camping
□  other........................................
□  amount...............
NLG
□  amount.............. BGP
□  don't know
□  Eindhoven □ with friends □  B & B
□ hotel □  camping
□  other...........................................
□  amount...............
NLG
□  amount.............. BGP
□  don't know
□  Rotterdam □  with friends □  B & B
□  hotel □  camping
□  other...........................................
□  amount...............
NLG
□  amount.............. BGP
□  don't know
□  Other location, 
please state:
□ with friends □  B & B
□  hotel □  camping
□  other...........................................
□  amount...............
NLG
□  amount.............. BGP
□  don't know
□  Other location, 
please state:
□  with friends □  B & B
□  hotel □  camping
□  other...........................................
□  amount...............
NLG
□  amount.............. BGP
□  don't know
□  Other location, 
please state:
□  with friends □  B & B
□  hotel □  camping
□  other..........................................
□  amount...............
NLG
□  amount.............. BGP
□  don't know
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15. How much money do you think you will be spending in Holland today on the 
following activities/ things?
(Please indicate whether the amount spent was done so in this town or 
elsewhere).
You can either use Dutch Guilders or your own currency to answer this 
question.
Amount spent in this Amount spent outside this 
town. town.
NLG BGP NLG BGP
Food & drink in restaurants & snack 
bars
Travel & transport in Holland (+ 
parking, petrol etc.)
Shopping: merchandise, souvenirs, 
clothes, shoes
Shopping: food & drink 
(supermarket)
Excursions, museum visits, theme 
parks, etc
Other, please state:
16. To what extent do you agree that the following characteristics apply to
Holland and the Dutch people?
agree neutral disagree Don't know
Welcoming □ □ □ □
Dangerous □ □ □ □
As a holiday □ □ □ □
destination
Well organised □ □ □ □
Boring □ □ □ □
Beautiful □ □ □ □
17. Will you be combining your visit to Euro 2000 with visits to other places of 
interest within Holland?
□ Yes
□ No
18. If Holland had not been host country for Euro 2000 this year, do you think you 
would still have visited our country?
□ Yes
□ No
Many thanks for filling in our questionnaire and we wish your team all the best!
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Residents’ survey
Goede<dagsegment>, mijn naam is .... van het NIPO.
Wij doen een onderzoek, in opdracht van de Nederlandse regering en de steden 
Arnhem, Eindhoven, Amsterdam en Rotterdam, naar de beleving en waardering van 
het afgelopen Europees Kampioenschap Voetbal.
Wij willen ook graag uw mening horen en zouden u daarom enkele vragen 
willen stellen.
Het interview duurt ongeveer 5 minuten.
DOELGROEP:
1: inwoners van Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Arnhem en Eindhoven 
2: overig Nederland
Blok 1: Deelname en gedrag
VRAAG10
Heeft u aandacht besteed aan EURO 2000, het Europees kampioenschap voetbal? 
(meer antwoorden mogelijk)
1: Ja, via kranten en tijdschriften
2: Ja, wedstrijden op tv gevolgd
3: Ja, wedstrijden bezocht
4: Ja, evenement op andere wijze gevolgd
5: Nee, geen aandacht besteed ga naar VRAAG 999
VRAAG 20
In welke van de volgende steden komt u regelmatig (vaker dan 2x per jaar)?
(meer antwoorden mogelijk)
(indien meerdere antwoorden, meest bezochte stad noteren)
1: Amsterdam 
2: Rotterdam 
3: Eindhoven 
4: Arnhem
5: Geen van deze (ga naar VRAAG 23)
VRAAG 21
Aan welke stad brengt u het vaakst een bezoek?
1: Amsterdam 
2: Rotterdam 
3: Eindhoven 
4: Arnhem
9: Weet niet \  wil niet zeggen
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VRAAG 22
Heeft u in verband met het toernooi *? STAD vaker of minder vaak bezocht dan 
normaal?
1: Ja, vaker bezocht ga naar VRAAG 30 
2: Ja, minder vaak bezocht ga naar VRAAG 30
9: Weet niet ga naar VRAAG 30
VRAAG 23
Heeft u een van deze steden tijdens EURO 2000 bezocht?
1: Ja
2: Nee
**<Voor inwoners van Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Arnhem en Eindhoven >
VRAAG 30
Heeft u in verband met het toernooi het centrum van uw stad vaker of minder 
vaak bezocht dan normaal?
1: Ja, vaker bezocht
2: Ja, minder vaak bezocht
3: Nee\niet van toepassing
9: weet niet
VRAAG 31
Ondervindt u persoonlijk regelmatig hinder van andere sportevenementen 
(bijvoorbeeld voetbalwedstrijden)?
1: Ja
2: Nee ga naar VRAAG 40 
VRAAG 32
Heeft u in vergelijking met andere sportevenementen meer, minder of evenveel 
hinder ondervonden van EURO 2000?
1: Meer 
2: Minder 
3: Evenveel
VRAAG 40
233
Heeft u in verband met het toernooi uw vakantie plannen aangepast, bijvoorbeeld 
vakantie uitgesteld, langer of korter weggeweest, een andere bestemming gekozen 
etc.?
1: Ja
2: Nee ga naar VRAAG 50 
9: Weet niet 
VRAAG 41
Doet u dat meestal bij EK's en WK's, dat wil zeggen heeft u ook bij eerdere 
voetbaltoernooien, rekening gehouden met het toernooi bij het plannen van uw 
vakantie bijvoorbeeld tijdens het WK in 1998?
1: Ja 
2: Nee
9: Weet niet \  zegt niet 
VRAAG 42
Welk van de volgende beweringen is op u van toepassing?
1: Ik ga normaal op vakantie in Nederland maar ben thuisgebleven vanwege EURO 
2000.
2: Ik ga normaal op vakantie in buitenland maar ben thuisgebleven vanwege EURO 
2000
3: Ik ga normaal op vakantie in deze periode maar heb vakantie uitgesteld of eerder 
opgenomen 
8: Anders
9: Weet niet
Blok 2 Overall beoordeling toernooi
VRAAG 50
Hoe beoordeelt u achteraf het aanbod van Nederland om EURO 2000 te organiseren?
1: erg positief 
2: positief 
3: neutraal 
4: negatief 
5: erg negatief
9: weet niet
**<Alleen voor inwoners Amsterdam, Eindhoven, Arnhem of Rotterdam>
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VRAAG 60
Hoe waardeert u achteraf de beslissing tot deelname van uw stad aan EURO 2000?
1: erg positief 
2: positief 
3: neutraal 
4: negatief 
5: erg negatief
9: weet niet
Blok 3 Beoordeling op onderdelen
VRAAG 69
We geven u nu enkele gevolgen die een dergelijke evenement kan hebben voor u 
persoonlijk en voor Nederland in het algemeen. Kunt u aangeven wat volgens u in 
een duidelijk pluspunt en wat een duidelijk minpunt van EURO 2000 was.
We vragen u eerst deze plussen en minnen te geven vanuit uw persoonlijke 
ervaringen. Daarna vragen we hoe deze plussen en minnen volgens u voor 
Nederland
in het algemeen gelden.
Blok 3a Persoonlijke lusten en lasten
1: uw eigen extra inkomsten door het toernooi
2: uw eigen extra uitgaven door het toernooi
3: de uitslagen van de wedstrijden, het toernooi verloop
4: aandacht op tv, radio en in kranten voor voetbal
5: prestatie van Nederlandse elftal
6: prestatie van een buitenlands elftal
7: de bereikbaarheid van uw huis of buurt
8: de bereikbaarheid van uw werk
9: andere zaken met betrekking tot bereikbaarheid en vervoer 
10: de evenementen die rond het toernooi georganiseerd werden 
11: veiligheid in de speelsteden 
12: veiligheid in de rest van Nederland
13: feit dat u in het land woont dat het toernooi georganiseerd heeft 
14: feit dat u in de stad woont waar wedstrijden worden gehouden 
15: gezelligheid met vrienden\familie\kennissen 
16: Oranjegevoel
VRAAG 80
Als u uw persoonlijke ervaringen het zwaarst laat wegen, bent u dan van 
mening dat Nederland dit soort grote sportevenementen niet meer, af en toe 
of vaker zou moeten organiseren?
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1: Niet meer 
2: Af en toe 
3: Vaker
9: Weet niet \  geen mening
Blok 3b algemene lusten en lasten 
1: prestatie van het Nederlands elftal
2: de opbrengsten voor het bedrijfsleven in de steden waar wedstrijden gespeeld 
werden
3: het gedrag van de buitenlandse supporters
4: het gedrag van de Nederlandse supporters
5: de gastvrijheid van de Nederlandse bevolking
6: de opbrengsten voor het bedrijfsleven in de rest van Nederland
7: de bekendheid van de steden waar gespeeld werd in het buitenland
8: de bekendheid van Nederland in het buitenland
9: verandering in het imago van Nederland in het buitenland
10: sfeer in de steden waar gespeeld werd
11: de veiligheid rond het toernooi
12: de bereikbaarheid van de steden waar gespeeld werd
13: de bereikbaarheid in de rest van Nederland
14: de veiligheid in de rest van Nederland
VRAAG 100
Als u redeneert vanuit het belang van Nederland of uw woonplaats vindt u dan dat 
Nederland dit soort grote sportevenementen niet meer, af en toe of vaker zou moeten 
organiseren?
1: Niet meer 
2: Af en toe 
3: Vaker
9: Weet niet \  geen mening
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VRAAG 110
Voor dergelijke toernooien moet overheid extra uitgaven doen, denk aan de inzet 
van politie, maar de overheid verdient ook geld door belastingen.
Als je de uitgaven aftrekt van wat de overheid verdient, dan krijgen je een positief of 
negatief bedrag voor de overheid. Wat vindt u het meest redelijk:
1: Dat de overheid meer uitgeeft dan ze verdient aan dit soort sportevenementen 
2: Dat de overheid ongeveer quitte speelt bij dit soort sportevenementen, dus dat ze 
evenveel uitgeeft als ze verdient 
3: Dat de overheid meer verdient dan uitgeeft bij dit soort evenementen 
8: Anders
9: Weet niet \  geen mening 
VRAAG 999
Bedankt voor uw medewerking!
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International Survey
We are presently conducting a survey about people's opinions about the Netherlands 
and Dutch people.
Could I ask yourself, or someone in the household a few questions about that?
I would like to speak to the person aged 15 or above who is the next member of the 
household to have their birthday.
1) Firstly I would like to ask you if you plan to visit the Netherlands in the next two 
years?
Definitely 1
Probably 2
Probably not 3, proceed to question 5
Definitely not 4, proceed to question 5
Don't know 5, proceed to question 5
2) Why are you going to visit the Netherlands?
Is that for a holiday, on business, to visit family or for another reason?
Day trip (for non-business purposes) 1
Holiday 2
Euro 2000, European Championship 3, proceed to question 4
Business 4, proceed to question 4
Visiting family/friends 5, proceed to question 4
Other reason 6, proceed to question 4
3) Which place(s) or region do you plan to visit?
4) And how many nights do you expect to spend in the Netherlands?
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
more than 5 6
don't know yet 7
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5) Have you ever stayed overnight in the Netherlands?
Yes 1
No 2 proceed to question 7
6) How long ago was that?
1 year ago or less 1
1 -2  years ago 2
2 -5  years ago 3
longer than 5 years ago 4
7) Could you name any cities or regions in the Netherlands?
Amsterdam 01,
Rotterdam 02,
Utrecht 03,
Groningen 04,
Eindhoven 05,
Arnhem 06,
Other, specifically 07,
Other, specifically 08,
Other, specifically 09,
Other, specifically 10,
Don't Know 11,
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8) I'm now going to read out a number of image statements.
Could you indicate for each image statement whether you feel that it goes well 
with the Netherlands and with Dutch people, that it doesn't go well or that it 
makes no impression on you? Here is the first image statement:
1. (Too) far away
2. Cold, bad weather
3. Tidy
4. Boring
5. Hospitable
6. Similar people to us
7. Flowers
8. Language conflict
9. Windmills
10. Foreign language
11. Holiday destination
12. Drugs
13. Dangerous
14. Insignificant /  small
15. Varied
16. Tolerant
17. Beautiful
18. Reliable
19. Fond of sports
Goes well with The Nederlands and with Dutch pleople 
Doesn't go well with The Netherlands and with Dutch pleople 
Makes no impression on you
9) Which of the following cities have you heard of, even if you've just heard of the
name?
Amsterdam 1,
Rotterdam 2,
Utrecht 3,
Groningen 4,
Eindhoven 5,
Arnhem 6,
none of them 7,
10) I will now read out 4 image statements to you.
For each image statement, could you indicate whether you feel that it goes well 
with (Amsterdam /Rotterdam /Utrecht /  Groningen /Eindhoven /Arnhem) or
1
2
3
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that it doesn't go well or that it makes no impression on you? Here is the first 
image statement:
l.B eautifu l»
2.Safe»
3.Boring»
4.Worth v is itin g »
Goes well 1
Doesn't go well 2
Makes no impression on you 3
Repeat the question for each city the respondent named in question 6 or 9 else 
proceed to question 11
11) Next I'd like to talk about championship football competitions.
Would you happen to know in which country the last European Championship 
Football competition was held?
Yes, England 1
Yes, another country 2
No 3
12) Would you happen to know in which country or countries the forthcoming 
European Championship Football competition in the year 2000 is being organised?
Yes, the Netherlands and Belgium 1
Yes, the Netherlands 2
Yes, Belgium 3
Yes, another country 4
No 5
13) Are the members of your household going to follow the forthcoming European 
Championship Football competition via the newspaper, radio or television?
If yes, how much of the Championship:
Yes, all of it 1
Yes, most of it 2
Yes, but only the matches of the English team 3
Yes, but only now and then 4
No, we're not going to follow it 5
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Finally, I would like to ask you a few background questions: 
What is your age?
15-20 01
21-25 02
26-30 03
31-35 04
36-40 05
41-45 06
46-50 07
51-55 08
56-60 09
61-65 10
65 years or above 11
refuses to answer 12
15) Note down gender without asking
Male 1
Female 2
16) How many people are there living in your household?
INT: ALL PEOPLE LIVING IN THE HOUSEHOLD FOR AT LEAST 4 DAYS A 
WEEK
1 person 1 proceed to question 18
2 persons 2
3 persons 3
4 persons 4
5 persons 5
6 persons 6
7 persons or more 7
17) And how many of those people are aged 15 or below?
1 person 1
2 persons 2
3 persons 3
4 persons 4
5 persons 5
6 persons 6
7 persons or more 7
nobody aged 15 or below 8
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18) The average household income before taxes are deducted is 17,000 sterlling per 
year, which works out to around 1,400 sterlling per month.
Could you indicate whether your household's income is below this average 
about on this average, or above this average income?
Above the average 1
on the average 2
below the average 3
refuses to answer 4
don't know 5
19) These were my questions. Thank you for your time, and have a good evening.
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Annex E Media voices on cost and benefits
Table E.l News quoting research on economic impact and costs
News source Article
NRC Handelsblad EK levert 'maar' 200 mln op 
Netherlands fills with soccer 
Bloomberg fans and their money
Intermediair Wat schuift het?
Trouw Euro 2000: meer winst
Euro 2000 levert veel meer 
Telegraaf winst op
Trouw Nu al strijd om opbrengsten
YahoolSport A boost for both countries
Euro 2000 not so profitable for 
EC-2000.com Dutch
Het Financieele Opbrengst loopt in de 
Dagblad honderden miljoenen
Trends UEFA tackelt belastingbetaler
NRC Handelsblad Boekhouders aan de bal
Algemeen
Dagblad
Algemeen
Dagblad
Twentsche
Courant
Trouw
Trouw
Eindhovens
Dagblad
De Volkskrant
Eindhovens
Dagblad
Wat verdienen we eigenlijk 
aan dat EK?
Peper wil geld voor Euro2000 
EK voetbal brengt meer geld 
op
Euro 2000: meer winst 
Kabinet: meer
sportevenementen 
Nederland: na succes meer 
evenementen
Schatkist dreigt na EK iets 
leger te worden
Ook het geld zal rollen in 
Eindhoven
Date
13 01 2000
10 06 2000 
04 05 2000 
16 04 2000
16 03 2000 
28 01 2000 
11 06 2000
Jan 00
07 06 2000 
01 06 2000 
20 05 2000
24 05 2000 
May 2000
25 072000 
16 04 2000
24 07 2000
04 072000
04 072000
06 06 2000
Translation
EC yields just 200 million (guilders)
How will have to be forked out?
Euro 2000: higher profits
Euro 2000 gives much higher profits
Already a battle for the earnings
Earnings will be hundreds of 
millions
Uefa tackles taxpayer 
Bookkeepers playing ball 
How much do we earn from Euro 
2000?
Peper (minister) wants money for 
Euro 2000
EC yields more money
Euro 2000: higher profit 
Government: more sports events
The Netherlands: after success more 
events
Treasury more empty after event
Money will be spent freely in 
Eindhoven
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Table E.2 Other news related to Euro 2000
Source
Volkskrant
Volkskrant 
NRC Handelsblad
Volkskrant
Volkskrant
Rotterdams
Dagblad
Rotterdams
Dagblad
Rotterdams
Dagblad
NRC Handelsblad
Deventer Dagblad
Volkskrant
Volkskrant
Rotterdams 
Dagblad 
De Twentsche 
Courant
NRC Handelsblad
Reformatorisch
dagblad
NRC Handelsblad
NRC Handelsblad
Rotterdams
Dagblad
NRC Handelsblad
Telegraaf
Reformatorisch
dagblad
De Telegraaf
Title/head date Translation or subject
Organisator EK-voetbal klaagt over 06101994 LOC complains about lack of
kabinet interest from the authorities
Het streven blijft: een ministerie 01111997 Sports federations want money 
voor sport en jeugdzaken for organizing events
De politie is niet te koop, maar wel 21 091998 Police is not for sale but it is for
1 te huur' rent (on sharing the cost for
events)
Kaarten worden eerlijk verdeeld 28101998 Tickets will be fairly distributed
voor volksfeest
De Kuip verslaat de Arena dankzij 28101998 Stadium in Rotterdam wins final 
lepere Rotterdamse lobby
Sporthallen als jeugdherbergen bij 03 051999 Additional accommodation for
Euro 2000 supporters
Meer podia bij Euro 2000 19 051999 Side events in Rotterdam
Euro 2000: geen gevaren, maar 02 071999 Euro 2000: opportunities instead
kansen of risks
Veel kopzorgen over toernooi Euro 03101999 A lot of worries about Euro 2000 
2000 (security)
Veiligheidsplan Euro 2000 rammelt 04101999 Safety plan is not up to
standards
VVD Kamerlid wil analyse vooraf 06101999 MOP wants security analysis
over Euro 2000 before start Euro 2000
Een gevoel van trots, dat hebben 06101999 The Dutch don't feel proud very
Nederlanders niet snel' quickly
Hotels twijfelen over voetbalfans 22101999 Hotels doubt whether to receive
football fans
Hotels niet veel duurder tijdens EK 10111999 Hotels not much dearer during
Euro 2000
Speciaal logo Euro 2000 voor stad 01121999 Special logo for Rotterdam 
Rotterdam
Peper wil gratis vervoer voor 08121999 Mayor of Rotterdam wants free
voetbalsupporters transport for visitors
Tien procent agenten wordt ingezet 09121999 Ten percent of all police officers
tijdens Euro 2000 engaged during Euro 2000
Bulk kaartjes naar het grote publiek, 13121999 Tickets will go to the public, not 
niet naar sponsors to sponsors
Tropicana voetbaldorp met EURO 19121999 Side events in Rotterdam
2000
Dure dans om aandacht voetbalfan 04 02 2000 Expensive dance for the
attention of the football fan 
RAI media centrum bij EK voetbal 10 02 2000 RAI media centre during Euro
2000
Horeca weiger politie nanten van 11 02 2000 Accommodations don't want to
voetbalfans co-operate with police in
transferring names of guests 
EURO 2000: Geen toeristische 25 03 2000 Euro 2000: not a tourism boost
klapper
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De Twentsche Campingbazen houden izch verre 28 03 2000 Camp sites don't want to receive
Courant van Euro 2000-toemooi supporters
Eindhovens Een grote oranje polonaise 01 04 2000 One big orange polonaise
Dagblad
De Gelderlander Stad wil geld verdienen met EK- 05 04 2000 City wants to earn money with
scherm large TV screen
Rotterdams Camping bij Xerxes; dure hotels 14 04 2000 Expensive hotels during EURO
Dagblad tijdens EURO 2000 volgeboekt 2000 fully booked
Trouw Speelsteden te negatief 16 04 2000 Host cities too negative
Rotterdams Wereldcircus ligt plat tijdens 19 04 2000 World circus cancelled for Euro
Dagblad EURO 2000 2000
Eindhovens Winst Philips ruimschoots 20 04 2000 Profit Philips more than doubles
Dagblad verdubbeld
De Gelderlander Stormloop op Nijmeegse hotels met 21 04 2000 Run on hotels is not happening
EK blijft uit
Rotterdams Finalefeest voor Rotterdampromotie 23 04 2000 Party after final for Rotterdam
Dagblad promotion
Rotterdams Liever geen voetbalsupporters op 25 04 2000 Rather no supporters on
Dagblad stadscamping Rotterdam camping
De Gelderlander EK hotels 26 04 2000 EK hotels
NRC Handelsblad EK 2000 levert 35 miljoen aan 04 05 2000 The Netherlands earn 35 million
Nederland op by Euro 2000
De Gelderlander Goedkoop op vakantie bij EK 06 05 2000 Cheap holiday during Euro 2000
Algemeen EK-camping grote hit 13 05 2000 Special campsite for supporters
Dagblad major success
Rotterdams Verkeersluw tijdens EK 17 05 2000 Traffic hindrances during Euro
Dagblad 2000
Telegraaf Veiligheidskosten hotel 17 05 2000 Safety measures for German
'Mannschaft': 1,7 mln gulden team cost 1.7 million. Guilders
Rotterdams EK: strenge controles buiten het 19 05 2000 Strict controls outside the city
Dagblad centrum centres (alcohol)
Eindhovens Geen steun voorMierlo's plan 24 05 2000 No support for plan to allow free
Dagblad wildkamperen in regio camping
Algemeen Amsterdam rekent op D lf 140,- per 24 05 2000 Amsterdam thinks each tourists
Dagblad toerist spends 140
Algemeen Arnhem wil ook op de wereldkaart 24 05 2000 Arnhem wants to be on the
Dagblad world map too
Rotterdams Rotterdam oranje 'tot in de 24 05 2000 Rotterdam will be orange in
Dagblad haarvaten' every corner
Algemeen Eindhoven kleurt geel en blauw 24 05 2000 Eindhoven is blue and yellow
Dagblad (Swedish visitors)
Algemeen 100 miljoen 25 05 2000 Private gambling: 100 million
Dagblad
Algemeen Topdrukte 27 05 2000 Very crowded
Dagblad
Algemeen Het miljoenenspel achter de 30 05 2000 The millions game behind the
Dagblad schermen scenes (money and sponsors)
Algemeen Wildkamperen 30 05 2000 Free camping
Dagblad
Algemeen Niet elke sponsor scoort met Oranje 30 05 2000 Not every sponsor can score
Dagblad with orange
Eindhovens Bestuurlijke angst 02 06 2000 Governmental fear
Dagblad
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Rotterdams Vakanties veel goedkoper door euro 02 06 2000 Holidays much cheaper because
Dagblad 2000 of Euro 2000
Algemeen Gouden tijden 03 06 2000 Golden years (bookmakers in the
Dagblad UK)
Rotterdams Voor een prikkie op reis tijdens Euro 03 06 2000 Cheap holiday during Euro 2000
Dagblad 2000
Algemeen Tijdens EK goedkoop op vakantie 03 06 2000 Cheap holiday during Euro 2000
Dagblad
Volkskrant Voetbal kampioenschap kost RET 03 06 2000 Additional costs for public
ruim 4 miljoen extra transport
Algemeen Steden kunnen invasie niet aan 06 06 2000 Cities cannot cope with invasion
Dagblad of visitors
Eindhovens Bedrijven bang voor omzetverlies 06 06 2000 Companies afraid of loss of
Dagblad turnover
Eindhovens EK mooie uitdaging voor jonge 06 06 2000 Management of stadium
Dagblad managers
Het Financieele Stadion reclame 'ingetogen, klassiek 07 06 2000 Advertising in the stadium
Dagblad en elegant'
Rotterdams Wachten op Noren, Denen en 08 06 2000 Waiting for Norwegians, Danes
Dagblad fietsende Duitser and Germans on bike
De Gelderlander Oranje-emotie in harde guldens 10 06 2000 Orange emotion in hard cash
Algemeen Klaar voor de hordes 10 06 2000 Ready for the crowds
Dagblad
Algemeen Voor wie niet ballen wil. .. 10 06 2000 Alternative programmes for
Dagblad football.haters
Algemeen Van dames van lichte zeden mag 16 06 2000 Prostitutes want Euro 2000 to be
Dagblad Euro2000 voorbij zijn over
Algemeen EK verjaagt toeristen; hotelbezoek 17 06 2000 Euro 2000 chases tourists;
Dagblad valt tegen disappointed hotel owners
Eindhovens Euro 2000 levert stad weinig op 17 06 2000 Not much benefit for cities
Dagblad
Rotterdams Slot van Mundial trekt ruim 19 06 2000 Other events suffer
Dagblad 170.000 bezoekers
Zwolse Courant Toeristen mijden Amsterdam 20 06 2000 Tourists avoid Amsterdam
tijdens toernooi during Euro 2000
Trouw Alleen in Rotterdam zitten de hotels 22 06 2000 Only the hotels in Rotterdam are
vol booked
De Twentsche Folkoreade moet concurreren met 22 06 2000 Other events have to compete
Courant EK voetbal
De Twentsche Omwonenden Kerkplein kunnen 22 06 2000 Nuisance for citizens in the
Courant eindelijk weer slapen centre
De Twentsche Arnhem beleeft ongekend EK-feest 22 06 2000 Arnhem had a superb party
Courant
De Twentsche Euro 2000 toch niet zo lucratief als 22 06 2000 Euro 2000 not as lucrative as
Courant gedacht thought beforehand
Zwolse Courant In Eindhoven niet iedereen tevreden 22 06 2000 Not everyone is satisfied in 
Eindhoven
De Twentsche Holland Festival trekt 118.000 23 06 2000 No effect on other events
Courant bezoekers
De Gelderlander Even zweven op EK-afterparty 23 06 2000 Arnhem parties
Hoogeveensche Verdeelde meningen over opbrengst 23 06 2000 Opinions differ on benefits of
Courant Euro 2000 Euro 2000
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Twentsche ABN Amro: EK-zege Italie beste 24 06 2000 Victory of Italy good for the
Courant voor Europese economie European economy
Haagsche Courant Spelershotels doen goede zaken 24 06 2000 Hotels of visiting team have
good business
Trouw Eurofeiten/Koning Voetbal en de 26 06 2000 Victory of Italy good for the
economie European economy
De Twentsche Peiling: Arnhem bejubelt EK-feest 26 06 2000 Party in Arnhem
Courant in stad
Zwolse Courant Vlaams toerisme profiteert maar 
weinig van EK
26 06 2000 Flanders does not benefit
Eindhovens Euro 2000 levert minder toeristen 28 06 2000 Euro 2000 less tourists than
Dagblad op dan verwacht expected
De Telegraaf Bloemenveiling op rozen door EK 28 06 2000 Flower sales rise during Euro 
2000
Algemeen Oorverdovende stilte op de 28 06 2000 No guests on the camp sites
Dagblad campings
De Gelderlander Veel minder toeristen dan verwacht, 28 06 2000 Less tourists than expected,
supermarkten juichen wel retail is satisfied
BN de Stem EK trekt weinig toeristen 28 06 2000 Not much tourists during Euro 
2000
Eindhovens Gemeente subsidieert uitzenden van 29 06 2000 Community subsidizes TV
Dagblad EK wedstrijden screen
NRC Handelsblad Oranje prikkel voor omzet 29 06 2000 Orange emotion in hard cash
Rotterdams EURO 2000 grote teleurstelling 30 06 2000 Euro 2000 a big disappointment
Dagblad voor Rotterdamse hotels for hotels in Rotterdam
De Twentsche Omzet hotels tijdens EK valt tegen 30 06 2000 Turnover during Euro 2000
Courant disappointing
Algemeen Slotfeest Amsterdam een sof 03 07 2000 Final party in Amsterdam fails
Dagblad
Algemeen Magie op de Maas 03 07 2000 Magic party in Rotterdam
Dagblad
Volkskrant Belgie hoeft niet nog eens zo'n 03 07 2000 Belgium does not want another
toernooi tournament
Trouw Terugblik/Belgies image geschonden 03 07 2000 Image of Belgium damaged
door het EK
Algemeen De onheilsprofeten kregen ongelijk 04 07 2000 Prophets of despair were wrong
Dagblad
Algemeen Protest Italie 04 07 2000 Protest Italy
Dagblad
Algemeen Opbrengst Euro 2000 valt tegen 04 07 2000 Benefits Euro 2000 disappointing
Dagblad
Rotterdams Bioscoopbezoek ruim 30 procent 05 07 2000 Cinema's attract more visitors
Dagblad omhoog
Rotterdams Velen vluchten weg van regen 10 07 2000 Many leave the country after
Dagblad Euro 2000
Eindhovens Drukte in winkels door herfstweer 13 07 2000 Crowds in shops after Euro 2000
Dagblad
Het Parool Gratis ov voor EK-supporter 28 07 2000 Free public transport for 
supporters
Algemeen Big picture 28 07 2000 Sales of tv sets
Dagblad
De Standaard Euro 2000 supporters gaven weinig 30 09 2000 Euro 2000 visitors did not spend
geld uit much
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